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A recent op-ed from Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media offers insight into how some elements of the Iranian regime may be viewing the relationship between the United States, Israel, and the Gulf in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha. IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim released an op-ed on September 14 in which it claimed that Israel has played an increasingly divisive role in the relationship between the United States and the Gulf states. Tasnim suggested that the Gulf states should make their continued economic cooperation with the United States contingent upon US efforts to “contain” Israel. The report also added that the Gulf countries can diversify their partnerships with other countries with US adversaries, particularly Russia and the People‘s Republic of China (PRC). It is unclear if Iranian officials are directly attempting to convince Gulf states to undertake any of these efforts in the wake of Israel’s September 9 strikes on Hamas leaders in Qatar.
Qatar hosted an emergency Arab-Islamic summit in Doha on September 15 to discuss the recent Israeli strikes in Doha. No Gulf state, including Qatar, has made any tangible moves to punish Israel for the strikes. Numerous Gulf and Arab leaders attended the summit, including Emirati Vice President Mansour bin Zayed al Nahyan, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Kuwaiti Crown Prince Sabah Khaled al Hamad al Sabah, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. The heads of state and other representatives condemned the Israeli strikes, reaffirmed solidarity with Qatar in its right to respond, and stressed the need for the international community to act urgently to ”deter Israel.” The Supreme Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) discussed the repercussions of the Israeli airstrikes and asserted that the strikes constitute a direct threat to the Gulf’s joint security. The GCC stated that Israel’s ongoing ”aggressive policies” undermine the future of ”existing understandings and agreements” with Israel, likely referring to the Abraham Accords and other economic agreements between GCC countries and Israel.
Iran does not appear to have made serious commitments in its new agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Iranian effort to secure an agreement was likely an attempt to delay or prevent potential snapback sanctions. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi signed the Iran-IAEA agreement on September 9. Grossi stated on September 10 that the agreement sets procedures for inspections and reporting on all Iranian facilities, including sites damaged during the 12-day War. Araghchi stated on September 11 that Iran’s cooperation with the IAEA will solely take place under a “new framework” that is defined by parliamentary law and the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). The SNSC Secretariat confirmed in a statement on September 14 that all cooperation with the IAEA requires SNSC approval and that Iran will provide reports to the IAEA only after establishing its own internal security and safety conditions. Iran has continued to refrain from cooperating with the IAEA in the days since the agreement and has not provided the IAEA with any timeline for resumed inspections or any clarification about the whereabouts of its remaining stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium. Iran’s newly defined limitations on its resumed cooperation with the IAEA follow a long pattern of Iran’s partial and conditional cooperation with the IAEA. Iran also restricted IAEA oversight after 2021 by removing monitoring equipment and expelling inspectors. Iran has also historically restricted IAEA oversight by refusing access to certain facilities associated with its pre-2003 weapons program and by withdrawing the certifications of several inspectors in September 2023 and barring other top inspectors in November 2024. The European Union (EU) warned at the 69th IAEA General Conference on September 15 that the IAEA has not been able to access most safeguarded facilities since June 2025.
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