[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 9월 19일

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주요 내용 요약:

  • 이란에 대한 스냅백 제재: 이란은 미국과 E3 (영국, 프랑스, 독일)로부터 사전 양보를 얻어내는 임시 협정을 제안하여 스냅백 제재를 막으려 하고 있습니다. 그러나 이는 핵 프로그램 및 국제원자력기구 (IAEA) 협력에 대한 의미 있는 약속을 회피하는 것입니다. 이러한 이란의 행보는 이란과의 핵 합의에 대한 미국의 공식 입장과 일치하지 않습니다.
  • 사우디-파키스탄 방위 협력: 사우디 아라비아와 파키스탄은 9월 17일에 상호 방위 조약을 체결했습니다. 이는 이란을 포함한 여러 안보 우려에 대한 대응으로 보입니다. 이란 언론은 이 협정을 이스라엘의 9월 9일 카타르 도하 공격에 대한 대응으로 묘사했습니다. 이란은 과거 사우디 아라비아와 파키스탄을 포함한 주변 국가들을 여러 차례 공격했으며, 걸프 국가들을 겨냥한 수많은 민병대 공격을 지원했습니다.
  • 이라크 에너지 수입: 이라크 연방 정부는 미국의 압력으로 인해 투르크멘 가스 수입 계약을 중단한 것으로 알려졌습니다. 이 계약은 이란이 가스 흐름을 관리하고 일일 가스의 23%를 받는 것을 가능하게 했을 것입니다. 이러한 조치는 계약의 특정 조건에 따라 테헤란에 추가적인 수입과 바그다드에 대한 영향력을 제공했을 것입니다.

관련 최신 자료 및 링크:

다음은 위에 언급된 내용과 관련된 최신 자료 및 링크입니다. 최신 정보를 파악하기 위해 각 링크의 내용을 확인하고, 특히 링크의 정보가 최신 내용인지 확인하는 것이 중요합니다.

  • 미 국무부, 이란 제재 및 이란 핵 협정에 관한 정보 (주의: 이 링크는 미 국무부의 공식 웹사이트로, 이란 제재 및 핵 협상 관련 공식 정보를 제공합니다. 최신 정보인지 확인 필요)
  • 외교협회(CFR) 중동 및 북아프리카 관련 분석 (주의: CFR은 외교 정책 연구 기관으로, 중동 및 북아프리카 관련 최신 분석을 제공합니다. 최신 분석 내용인지 확인 필요)
  • 로이터 통신 중동 관련 뉴스 (주의: 로이터 통신은 국제적인 뉴스 제공 기관으로, 중동 관련 최신 뉴스 및 분석을 제공합니다. 최신 정보인지 확인 필요)
  • 알자지라 (Al Jazeera) (주의: 알자지라는 중동 지역의 주요 뉴스 채널로, 중동 관련 뉴스와 분석을 제공합니다. 특히 이란 및 주변 국가들의 시각을 이해하는데 도움이 될 수 있습니다. 최신 정보인지 확인 필요)
  • 월스트리트 저널 (주의: 월스트리트 저널은 국제적인 뉴스 제공 기관으로, 중동 관련 최신 뉴스 및 분석을 제공합니다. 최신 정보인지 확인 필요)

참고: 위 링크들은 정보를 제공하는 데 목적이 있으며, 각 링크의 내용이 항상 최신 정보를 반영한다고 보장할 수는 없습니다. 따라서 각 링크의 내용을 확인하고, 필요한 경우 추가적인 자료 조사를 수행하는 것이 좋습니다. 뉴스 기사나 분석 자료의 발행 날짜를 확인하여 최신 정보를 파악하고, 여러 출처를 비교하여 정보를 검증하는 것이 중요합니다.

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[원문]

Iran is attempting to prevent snapback sanctions by offering an interim deal that secures concessions upfront from the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), but avoids an

September 19, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Schmida, Adham Fattah, Kelly Campa, Avery Borens, Parker Hempel, and

Brian Carter

TOPLINES

Iran is attempting to prevent snapback sanctions by offering an interim deal that secures concessions upfront from the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), but avoids any meaningful commitments regarding its nuclear program and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iranian and US officials have reportedly been in direct contact in recent days to discuss a new nuclear proposal. Iran‘s new proposal stipulates that Iran would resume talks with the United States over an interim deal while the E3 simultaneously halts the snapback process and extends UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2231 for several months to allow time for negotiations. UNSC Resolution 2231, which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, prohibited Iran from engaging in “any activity related to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons…until the date eight years after the JCPOA Adoption Day.” Iran’s proposal said that the United States must also provide a guarantee that there will be no more strikes on Iran once an interim deal is reached. Iran would then begin retrieving its 60 percent highly enriched uranium stockpile.

The UNSC rejected a draft resolution on September 19 to permanently lift sanctions on Iran. South Korea, which is the UNSC’s current president, finalized a UNSC resolution on September 8 to extend sanctions relief for Iran. South Korea was required to hold the resolution for 10 days after the E3 triggered the snapback mechanism if no other UNSC member held the resolution. The E3 triggered the 30-day Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process on August 28. The UN Security Council will reimpose snapback sanctions on Iran when the 30-day process concludes on September 27 unless Iran meets the criteria laid out under the JCPOA. Snapback sanctions target Iran’s arms transfers and nuclear program more broadly, including its domestic enrichment activities.

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, likely in response to multiple security concerns, including Iran. The agreement is a mutual defense guarantee under which an attack on one party would trigger a response by both countries. Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif stated on September 18 that Pakistan’s nuclear program “will be made available” to Saudi Arabia if necessary. Asif added that Pakistan or Saudi Arabia has not specified a “country whose attack would automatically trigger a retaliatory response,” which demonstrates that the agreement aims to address multiple security concerns rather than a single security threat. Iranian media have portrayed the agreement as a response to Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha, Qatar, that drew condemnation from Gulf states. Iranian outlets have also framed the agreement as a challenge to US influence in the region. An Iranian media outlet stated on September 19 that the agreement signals that “the era of unilateral dependence on America is over.” The outlet claimed that the agreement shows that Saudi Arabia is shifting away from the United States toward other “independent options.” Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states have been losing faith in US security guarantees for several years, at least since Iran targeted Saudi oil facilities with multiple missiles and drones in 2019, and a separate Iranian-backed attack struck Abu Dhabi, UAE, in 2022. The timing of this agreement suggests that the recent Israeli strike in Doha factored in the Saudi decision to pursue and sign the agreement. But Iran has repeatedly targeted regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, in the past, with much less precision and to a much greater effect than the Israeli strikes in Doha. The Iranian drone and missile attack in 2019 forced Saudi Arabia to dip into its oil reserves to support exports. Iran has backed hundreds of Houthis and Iraqi militia attacks targeting the Gulf states since 2015 as well. Iran similarly conducted missile and drone strikes in Pakistan in January 2024, claiming to target members of the Baloch, Salafi-jihadi militant group Jaish al Adl. Iran has also repeatedly accused Saudi Arabia of fomenting internal unrest in Iran and backing anti-regime groups in southeastern Iran. Saudi Arabia has historically supported US efforts to curb Iranian influence in the region, including by fighting Iran‘s regional proxies such as the Houthis in Yemen. CTP is considering the hypothesis that Iran may be more concerned about this development than Iranian media coverage would suggest, given Iran’s repeated attacks or support for attacks in both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Snapback Sanctions on Iran: Iran is trying to prevent snapback sanctions by offering an interim deal that secures concessions upfront from the United States and the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) but avoids any meaningful commitments on its nuclear program and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cooperation. These Iranian steps are inconsistent with the stated US position on any nuclear agreement with Iran.

  • Saudi-Pakistan Defense Cooperation: Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact on September 17, likely in response to multiple security concerns, including Iran. Iranian media have portrayed the agreement as a response to Israel’s September 9 strikes in Doha, Qatar. Iran has repeatedly targeted regional states, including Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, in the past, and backed numerous militia attacks targeting the Gulf states.

  • Iraq Energy Imports: The Iraqi federal government has reportedly suspended an agreement to import Turkmen gas due to US pressure. The deal would have enabled Iran to manage the gas flow and receive 23 percent of the gas daily. Such an arrangement would have given Tehran additional revenue and leverage over Baghdad, depending on the specific terms of the deal.

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