April 13, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, Avery Borens, Kelly Campa, Will Doran, and Annika Ganzeveld

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Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states. The Bahrain Defense Force reported that it intercepted seven “Iranian” drones on April 13. Bahrain did not specify from where the drones were launched. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias use some of the same types of drones as Iranian forces do because the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) supplies drones to its Iraqi militia partners. It is therefore possible that the Bahrain Defense Force’s use of the term “Iranian” drones refers to Iranian drones used by Iraqi militias. Bahrain’s Foreign Ministry also summoned the Iraqi charge d’affaires on April 13 in response to “continued” Iraqi militia drone attacks targeting Bahrain and other Gulf Cooperation Council states. Saudi Arabia similarly summoned the Iraqi ambassador to Saudi Arabia on April 12 for the same reason. Iranian-backed Iraqi militia front groups have claimed multiple drone attacks targeting US bases in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait since the start of the war.

It is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states. Many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias answer to the IRGC, which provides guidance and support for their attacks. The IRGC has previously demonstrated its ability to force Iraqi militias to halt their attacks, such as when IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani directed Iranian-backed Iraqi militias to halt their attacks against US forces in January 2024. The fact that Iraqi militias continue to attack the Gulf states, therefore, suggests that Iran has not directed the militias to halt these attacks.

Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have continued to attack regional states despite the Shia Coordination Framework’s efforts to push the militias to agree to a “truce.” An informed source told Iraqi media on April 5 that the framework authorized Iranian-backed Badr Organization head Hadi al Ameri to negotiate a “temporary truce” with the militias. The source stated that Ameri’s negotiations focused on Iranian-backed Iraqi militias Kataib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, both of which are more loyal to Iran and are less responsive to domestic pressure than other Iraqi militias. Framework member Amer al Fayez told Iraqi media on April 12 that Ameri’s committee successfully negotiated a “conditional truce” with the militias. Fayez stated that the truce stipulated that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would halt attacks on US interests and diplomatic facilities in exchange for a commitment from the United States and Israel to stop striking Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and militia bases in Iraq. It is unclear whether the truce required the militias to halt attacks against US interests across the region, or only in Iraq. Iranian-backed Iraqi militias control multiple brigades within the PMF. It is unclear which militias agreed to this truce.

• Iranian-backed Iraqi militias are likely responsible for at least some of the recent drone attacks against Gulf states. It is very unlikely that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias would conduct drone attacks against regional states if the Iranian regime opposed such attacks, which suggests that Iran has not ordered its militia partners to cease attacking regional states.

• The US negotiating delegation demanded a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment, the removal of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile from Iran, and unfettered freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz during the negotiations in Pakistan. Iran countered the 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment with a “single-digit” number of years and offered to downblend its HEU instead of handing over its HEU stockpile. It is unclear whether the three US demands and the Iranian counterproposal represent the full scope of each side’s demands.

• US Central Command (CENTCOM) is simultaneously imposing a blockade on Iranian ports and vessels while taking steps to open the official transit route through the Strait of Hormuz for vessels transiting to or from non-Iranian ports. CENTCOM implemented its blockade on Iranian ports and vessels at 10:00 AM ET on April 13.



• Iranian and Iranian-approved vessels continued to use the Iranian-approved transit route to cross the Strait of Hormuz before the blockade went into effect on April 13, but more vessels transited outside this route near the Omani coast than on April 12. At least two oil tankers destined for China via the Iranian-approved transit route turned around after CENTCOM began blockading Iranian and Iranian-approved shipping.

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