[ISW] 러시아 공격 작전 평가, 2026년 4월 17일

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핵심 내용:

  • 크렘린이 역사적으로 우크라이나 전쟁의 영향으로부터 보호하려 했던 러시아 지역의 관리들이 러시아 후방에서 우크라이나의 장거리 드론 공격의 영향을 인정하기 시작했습니다.
  • 러시아의 여론 조사에서는 증가하는 전쟁 희생과 인기가 없는 검열 캠페인을 배경으로 블라디미르 푸틴 러시아 대통령에 대한 사회적 불만이 커지고 있음을 인정하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아의 해상 원유 수출은 우크라이나의 러시아 석유 인프라 및 항구에 대한 장거리 공격 캠페인 확대 이후 감소한 것으로 알려졌습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 러시아의 장거리 드론 캠페인에 맞서기 위한 지속적인 기술 혁신 속에서 2,000킬로미터 범위에서 Sting 요격 드론을 성공적으로 운용했다고 보고되었습니다.
  • 우크라이나는 공동 생산 노력을 확대하여 우크라이나의 방공 능력을 지원하기 위해 독일 방산업체와 공동 생산 계약을 계속 체결하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 슬로비안스크 인근과 도브로필리아 전술 지역에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 우크라이나를 향해 172대의 장거리 드론과 미사일 1발을 발사했습니다. 우크라이나군은 러시아 국경 지역의 군사 자산에 대한 공격 캠페인을 계속했습니다.

최신 자료 및 관련 링크:

아래 링크들은 위에 언급된 내용과 관련된 최신 정보를 제공하며, 정보의 정확성을 위해 내용 확인을 거쳤습니다.

위 링크들은 2024년 6월 5일 이후의 최신 정보를 반영하며, 전쟁 상황의 유동성을 고려하여 지속적으로 업데이트될 수 있습니다. 자세한 내용은 해당 링크들을 참조하시기 바랍니다.

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[원문]

Russian state polls are acknowledging growing societal discontent with Russian President Vladimir Putin against the backdrop of mounting war sacrifices and an unpopular censorship campaign.

April 17, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

Kateryna Shymkiv, Jessica Sobieski, Nikolai Sundstrom, Jennie Olmsted, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and Kateryna Stepanenko

TOPLINES

Officials in Russian regions that the Kremlin has historically sought to shield from the effects of the war in Ukraine are beginning to acknowledge the impacts of Ukrainian long-range drone strikes in the Russian rear. Leningrad Oblast Governor Alexander Drozdenko told the Leningrad Oblast regional assembly on April 15 that Leningrad Oblast has become a “frontline oblast,” explicitly noting recent Ukrainian strikes against “economic and port” facilities in the oblast. Drozdenko later published a post on his Telegram channel on April 17 stating that Russian authorities will bolster air defenses in Leningrad Oblast, including by providing additional material and tactical assistance to the Russian 6th Air Force and Air Defense Army (Russian Aerospace Forces [VKS] and the Leningrad Military District [LMD]). Drozhenko stated that authorities will also begin recruiting reservists to form mobile fire groups to be stationed near industrial facilities and critical infrastructure.  Drozdenko stated that reservists will sign military service contracts for up to three years through the Leningrad Oblast Military Registration and Enlistment Office and specifically called for veterans of the war in Ukraine or others with combat experience to volunteer. Ukraine’s recent successful long-range strike campaign against Russian port and oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast is likely forcing Russian regional authorities in areas deep in the rear to acknowledge the impact of Ukrainian strikes against critical infrastructure targets in Russia and Russia’s intensifying need to defend them.

 

Drozdenko’s statements suggest that Leningrad Oblast authorities may be preparing to conduct unpopular, limited compulsory reserve callup to defend critical infrastructure in the region. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced plans in October 2025 to deploy active reservists to protect infrastructure in deep Russian rear from Ukrainian drone strikes, though Russia’s existing efforts so far have not been sufficient to protect Russia’s dispersed industrial targets from Ukrainian strikes. Leningrad Oblast officials may also be intensifying the ongoing Russian internet censorship campaign, at least in part to set conditions for compulsory reserve callup and prevent Ukrainian forces from using the internet connection to conduct drone strikes. Drozdenko warned on April 17 about possible reductions in mobile internet speed and St. Petersburg residents noted internet outages on the morning of April 17 and criticized Russians who complain about the internet outages by asking what these Russians are doing to help win the war. Ukrainian forces have increasingly conducted long-range strikes against Russian oil and port infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast since March 2026, exploiting overstretched Russian air defenses and significantly damaging Russian oil export capabilities. Ukrainian strikes are likely forcing Russia to deploy more resources to defend critical infrastructure in the Russian rear, which could restrain Russia from deploying those assets, including reservists, to the frontlines in Ukraine in the future.

 

Russian state polls are acknowledging growing societal discontent with Russian President Vladimir Putin against the backdrop of mounting war sacrifices and an unpopular censorship campaign. Russian state-owned polling institution All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on April 17 the results from a poll for the week of April 6 to 12, indicating that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s approval rating declined for the sixth week in a row from 72.9 percent during the week of March 2 to 8 to 66.7 percent during the week of April 6 to 12. VTsIOM indicated that Putin’s approval ratings have declined from 72.9 percent from the week of March 2 to 8. VTsIOM polling also indicates that trust in Putin fell 1.8 percent to 72 percent during the week of April 6 to 12, down from 77.3 percent during the week of March 2 to 8. VTsIOM polling indicated that the level of support for the Kremlin’s ruling United Russia party fell to 27.3 percent during the week of April 6 to 12 from 32.1 percent during the week of March 2 to 8. The numbers from a Russian state polling organization are not reliable by themselves, but it is notable that a state-controlled institution is acknowledging a weekslong trend of growing domestic discontent with the federal government after four years of war. Other polling agencies also indicate that Russians are growing increasingly discontent with the Kremlin. Independent Russian polling organization Levada Center reported on April 16 that 61 percent of Russians have a negative opinion of the current political situation in Russia, including 52 percent who consider the political situation “tense” and nine percent who consider the situation “critical and explosive” — an increase of nine percent since May 2025. The Levada Center polling also indicates that the percentage of Russians who have a positive view of the political situation in Russia fell to 36 percent since May 2025. The Kremlin has recently faced a downturn in support amidst intensified efforts to throttle access to Telegram and continues shutting down mobile internet in certain areas, increasingly censoring and imposing tangible hardships in the everyday lives of Russians as a result of the war. The Russian domestic populace may also be growing increasingly tired as Russia continues its fourth year of war, especially as the total Russian casualty rate in Ukraine approaches one percent of the overall population.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Officials in Russian regions that the Kremlin has historically sought to shield from the effects of the war in Ukraine are beginning to acknowledge the impacts of Ukrainian long-range drone strikes in the Russian rear.

  • Russian state polls are acknowledging growing societal discontent with Russian President Vladimir Putin against the backdrop of mounting war sacrifices and an unpopular censorship campaign.

  • Russian seaborne oil exports have reportedly fallen following an escalation in Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure and ports.

  • Ukrainian forces reportedly successfully operated a Sting interceptor drone at a range of 2,000 kilometers amid continued technical innovations to combat Russia’s long-range drone campaign.

  • Ukraine continues to conclude joint production agreements with German defense industrial companies to support Ukraine’s air defense capabilities by expanding joint production efforts.

  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Slovyansk and in the Dobropillya tactical area.

  • Russian forces launched 172 long-range drones and one missile against Ukraine. Ukrainian forces continued their strike campaign against military assets in Russian border oblasts.

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