[ISW] 이란 업데이트 특별 보고서, 2026년 4월 18일

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주요 내용 요약:

  • 이란 혁명수비대(IRGC)의 지휘관 아흐마드 바히디 소장과 측근들은 지난 48시간 동안 이란의 군사적 대응뿐만 아니라 협상 입장과 접근 방식에 대한 임시적 통제권을 확보했을 가능성이 높습니다.
  • IRGC 해군은 4월 18일 여러 상선에 대한 공격을 감행했으며, “어떤 종류나 국적의” 선박도 해협 통과를 허용하지 않겠다고 선언했습니다. 이는 4월 17일 이란 외무부 장관 아바스 아라그치가 해협이 상업적 교통에 “완전히 개방”되었다고 발표한 것과는 정반대의 입장입니다.
  • IRGC 관련 언론은 또한 4월 18일, 이란이 미국의 “과도한” 요구 때문에 미국과의 추가 협상에 동의하지 않았다고 발표했습니다.
  • 바히디와 측근들은 전통적으로 정치 지도자들이 담당하는 협상 과정을 전쟁 내내 실질적으로 통제했을 수 있습니다. 바히디는 파키스탄 이슬라마바드에서 열린 최근의 미-이란 회담에 IRGC의 감독을 강요하려 했을 가능성이 높습니다. IRGC는 이슬라마바드 회담 이후에도 이란의 협상에서 과도한 역할을 계속 수행했습니다.
  • IRGC의 이란 의사 결정에 대한 통제 강화는 현재 미국과 협상 중인 이란 정치 관리들이 이란의 협상 입장을 독립적으로 결정할 권한이 없음을 시사합니다. IRGC는 미국과 협상했던 더 실용적인 인물들을 배제한 것으로 보입니다.
  • IRGC는 4월 18일 여러 상선을 공격하고 호르무즈 해협의 교통을 중단시켰습니다. 이는 미국에 대한 영향력을 확보하고 내부적인 동기에서 비롯된 책략의 일환으로 이란의 협상 정책에 대한 IRGC의 통제를 강화하기 위한 것으로 보입니다. IRGC는 교통을 중단시키고 운송 및 유가 상승을 유도하여 미국에 경제적 압력을 가함으로써 미국에 대한 영향력을 확보하는 것을 목표로 할 가능성이 높습니다. IRGC의 이러한 행동은 또한 정권 내에서, 특히 이란의 협상 정책에 대한 IRGC의 통제를 보여주기 위한 내부적인 권력 시위일 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 미 해군의 이란 항구 봉쇄는 4월 18일 현재 유지되고 있습니다. 미국 중부사령부(CENTCOM)는 4월 17일과 18일 사이에 두 척의 선박이 방향을 돌려 이란으로 돌아가도록 강요했다고 밝혔습니다. 미국은 봉쇄를 시작한 이후 23척의 선박이 되돌아가도록 강요했습니다. 현재까지 이란 선박은 봉쇄선에 접근하거나 시험하려는 시도를 하지 않았습니다.

관련 최신 자료 및 링크:

이 내용은 특정 시점의 정보를 기반으로 작성되었으므로, 최신 정보를 얻기 위해서는 아래의 링크와 추가 자료를 참고하시기 바랍니다.

  • 최신 뉴스 기사 및 보도자료: 이란과 관련한 최신 뉴스를 확인하십시오. (예: 로이터, BBC 코리아, VOA 코리아). 영어로 되어있더라도 번역기를 활용하여 내용을 파악할 수 있습니다.
  • 전문 연구기관 보고서: 이란 관련 정책 연구 및 분석 보고서를 제공하는 기관의 자료를 확인하십시오. (예: 외교협회(Council on Foreign Relations, CFR), 애틀랜틱 카운슬).
  • 관련 정부 발표: 미국 국무부, 이란 외무부 등 관련 정부 부처의 공식 발표 내용을 참고하십시오.

주의: 제시된 링크의 내용이 분석 대상의 주요 내용과 일치하는지 확인하고, 최신 정보와 비교하여 내용을 평가하십시오.

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[원문]

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran’s military response in

April 18, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Kelly Campa, Carolyn Moorman, Parker Hempel, Ben Rezaei, Avery Borens, and Annika Ganzeveld

TOPLINES

Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran’s military response in this conflict but also Iran’s negotiating position and approach within the past 48 hours. The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels on April 18 and declared that no vessel of “any type or nationality” is permitted passage through the strait, a reversal of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s announcement on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic. Traffic through the strait has virtually halted as of this writing except for Iranian vessels, according to maritime tracking data. No Iranian vessels have approached the US blockade line, however. IRGC-affiliated media also announced on April 18 that Iran has not agreed to participate in another round of negotiations with the United States due to “excessive” US demands. The IRGC is responsible for coordinating and conducting military actions, but has historically not directly interfered in Iranian diplomacy and negotiations to the extent it currently is.

Regime institutions aligned with Vahidi are presenting a cohesive front against Araghchi and in support of the IRGC’s actions to halt traffic in the strait. The Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters, which is functionally controlled by the IRGC, cited the US naval blockade on Iranian ports as the reason for the IRGC’s reimposition of “control” over the strait. Vahidi and Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi are reportedly driving the regime’s military decision-making, according to anti-regime media on April 7. A source close to the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) previously warned IRGC-affiliated Fars News on April 17 that Iran would “close” the strait if the United States continued its blockade. The SNSC released a statement on April 18 that Iran will “exercise supervision and control” over traffic in the strait until the war ends. The SNSC would almost certainly not have released this statement without the approval of SNSC Secretary Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr, which indicates that Zolghadr supports the IRGC’s actions in the strait. Zolghadr, who is a hardline IRGC veteran and long‑time power broker with deep ties to Iran’s security and judicial apparatuses, was appointed to his position during the war after Vahidi reportedly pressured Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to appoint him.

Vahidi and individuals close to him may have effectively controlled the negotiations process throughout the war, which is traditionally a role reserved for political leaders. Vahidi likely intended to impose IRGC oversight over the recent US-Iran talks in Islamabad. Vahidi attempted to insert Zolghadr into the Iranian negotiating team in Islamabad despite protests from delegation leaders Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Araghchi over Zolghadr’s lack of experience with diplomatic negotiations. Vahidi presumably wanted to send Zolghadr to keep an eye on the negotiations and to inform leaders in Tehran if the negotiating delegation strayed from his or Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s directives. Zolghadr sent a complaint to senior IRGC leaders, almost certainly including Vahidi, that Araghchi had surpassed his mandate during the negotiations by expressing flexibility regarding Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance. Zolghadr’s anger caused senior leaders in Tehran, including former IRGC Intelligence Organization Chief and long-time member of Mojtaba’s inner circle, Hossein Taeb, to call the negotiating delegation back to Tehran.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and members of his inner circle have likely secured at least temporary control over not only Iran’s military response in this conflict but also Iran’s negotiating position and approach within the past 48 hours. The IRGC Navy attacked several commercial vessels on April 18 and declared that no vessel of “any type or nationality” is permitted passage through the strait, a reversal of Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi’s announcement on April 17 that the strait was “completely open” to commercial traffic. IRGC-affiliated media also announced on April 18 that Iran has not agreed to participate in another round of negotiations with the United States due to “excessive” US demands.

  •  Vahidi and individuals close to him may have effectively controlled the negotiations process throughout the war, which is traditionally a role reserved for political leaders. Vahidi likely intended to impose IRGC oversight over the recent US-Iran talks in Islamabad. The IRGC continued to play an outsized role in Iran’s negotiations after the Islamabad talks.

  • The IRGC’s consolidation of control over Iranian decision-making indicates that the Iranian political officials currently negotiating with the United States do not have the authority to independently determine Iran’s negotiating positions. The IRGC appears to have sidelined more pragmatic figures with whom the United States has negotiated.

  • The IRGC attacked several commercial vessels and halted traffic in the Strait of Hormuz on April 18, likely in order to both gain leverage over the United States and consolidate the IRGC’s control over Iran’s negotiations policy as part of an internally-motivated maneuver. The IRGC likely aims to secure leverage over the United States by halting traffic and driving up shipping and oil prices to impose economic pressure on the United States. The IRGC’s actions are also likely intended to be an internal demonstration of power designed to exhibit the IRGC’s control within the regime, and in particular, its control over Iran’s negotiations policy.

  • The US Navy’s blockade of Iranian ports remains in place as of April 18. US CENTCOM said that it forced two ships to turn around and return to Iran between April 17 and 18. The US Navy has forced 23 ships to turn back since the United States began the blockade. No Iranian vessels have attempted to approach or test the blockade line as of this writing.  

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