May 15, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Ria Reddy, Will Doran, Avery Borens, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

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Senior Iranian officials continue to demand guarantees against future US-Israeli attacks as a precondition for negotiations, and the Iranian regime likely views recognized control over the Strait of Hormuz as one such guarantee. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Baghiyatollah Sociocultural Headquarters Commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari stated on May 14 that the United States must satisfy Iranian “confidence-building” measures before Iran will negotiate. The regime has consistently pursued recognition for its control over the strait and likely views recognized control over the strait as a deterrent against future US or Israeli military action, which means that recognition effectively serves as a “confidence-building” measure.

The People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not appear to have made a clear commitment to support US efforts to secure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. US President Donald Trump asserted that the PRC “would like to be of help” in reopening the strait after meetings with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping from May 13 to 15. US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that he is expecting the PRC to work “behind the scenes” to influence Iran to open the strait because reopening the strait would serve PRC interests. PRC readouts and statements on the summit downplayed discussions on Iran, however, and reiterated standard rhetoric on the issue.

Iran may have decided to deprioritize certain restrictive measures in the Strait of Hormuz, such as toll collection, in order to encourage states such as the PRC to cooperate with Iran and implicitly recognize its control over the strait. Iranian officials previously emphasized their ability to impose tolls on vessels transiting the strait, but Iran only announced its first toll payment on April 23. Iran has exempted so-called “friendly” countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, and Malaysia, from toll requirements, which suggests that Iran now prioritizes securing international recognition of its control over the strait over toll collection. The PRC has explicitly opposed the toll system, and its vessels have continued to transit the strait via the Iranian-approved route through the strait, although it is unclear if these vessels paid any tolls. ISW-CTP previously assessed that Iran is likely prioritizing the implementation of the protocol over the tolls at this time in order to present itself as a reasonable actor that is willing to “open” the strait to “free” travel without tolls. Iran may calculate that reducing overtly problematic measures such as tolls will encourage more states to cooperate with Iranian procedures and, therefore, strengthen Iranian authority over the strait. Legitimizing any aspect of Iranian control over the strait, with or without tolls, is extremely detrimental to global shipping. Iranian officials have not indicated any willingness to relinquish control over the strait. Officials claim that Iran will “open” the strait while preserving Iran’s authority to regulate and permit vessel transit, which would leave Iran with the ability to restrict international shipping at its discretion and target any country, including through attacks on civilian vessels.

• Senior Iranian officials continue to demand guarantees against future US-Israeli attacks as a precondition for negotiations, and the Iranian regime likely views recognized control over the Strait of Hormuz as one such guarantee.

• The People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not appear to have made a clear commitment to support US efforts to secure freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s assertion of control over the strait is inconsistent with the long-stated PRC position, however.

• Iran may have decided to deprioritize certain restrictive measures in the Strait of Hormuz, such as toll collection, in order to encourage states such as the PRC to cooperate with Iran and implicitly recognize its control over the strait.

• The Iranian regime is attempting to ease economic pressures that the US naval blockade on Iranian ports is imposing upon the Iranian economy by taking measures to preserve necessary economic resources, while attempting to keep the Iranian public calm ahead of expected shortages.

• The United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced on May 15 that it will accelerate efforts to double the export capacity in Fujairah to bypass the Strait of Hormuz and reduce the UAE’s strategic vulnerability. This reflects a broader strategy that Gulf states are adopting to safeguard energy exports from future disruption through chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz.

• Unspecified Western diplomats told Western media on May 14 that Saudi Arabia is discussing pursuing a potential non-aggression pact with Iran after the war, but it is unclear how much meaningful progress there has been towards such a pact. Iran could theoretically attack Gulf states under the guise of targeting US assets in each country, even under such a pact.

• The recent war has showcased the UAE’s adoption of a more assertive posture against Iran amid its deepening security ties with Israel.

• The US State Department announced on May 15 that Israel and Lebanon have agreed to extend the temporary ceasefire for an additional 45 days.

• Iranian-backed Iraqi militia leaders and political figures are threatening to withdraw their support for new Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al Zaidi’s government amid US pressure to deny Iranian-backed figures positions of influence in the Iraqi government.



• US authorities charged senior Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah commander Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawoud al Saadi with planning attacks targeting civilians in the United States, Canada, and Europe.

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