October 2, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Ben Rezai, Adham Fattah, Kelly Campa, Zahra Wakilzada, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Hossein Alaei emphasized the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Alaei claimed that Iran demonstrated the strength of its ballistic missiles and national unity during the war in an interview with Nour News on October 1. Alaei claimed that Iran‘s demonstration of these strengths caused the United States and Israel to call for a ceasefire. Alaei also claimed that Iranian missiles became more precise throughout the war and that no segment of the Iranian population chose to side with Israel in support of internal division. Alaei’s reflections almost certainly reflect only some segments of the regime’s national security community, and CTP-ISW cannot determine whether Alaei’s statements are reflective of a broader trend in Iranian strategic thought or if it is isolated to only a small number of thinkers.

Alaei’s statements regarding Iran‘s ballistic missiles and national unity suggest that some elements of the regime’s national security community believe that the regime has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes. These reflections indicate that some Iranian officials believe that at least some elements of its previous efforts to deter and defend against Israeli strikes could be successful in the future, presumably with some modifications. Israel accomplished its campaign objectives—the degradation of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs—in the Israel-Iran War, but it needed to end the war rapidly and at a moment of its own choosing. Israel forced Iran to rapidly end the war by creating the perception of a credible existential threat to the Iranian regime. Israel struck Iranian institutions and other assets used by the Iranian regime to ensure regime stability. A series of strikes against these institutions and assets that the Israelis design to demonstrate a credible threat to the regime’s stability could be expanded or contracted depending on how the regime responds and Israel’s desire for a ceasefire. Israel calculated that the Iranian regime’s overwhelming interest in ensuring regime survival would compel it to agree to a ceasefire. Alaei appears to be implying that the war illustrated that, in the future, Iranian missiles could be more successful if Israeli interceptor stockpiles are depleted. Alaei also suggests that national unity would have sustained a longer war, but it is unclear if expanded Israeli strikes would change Iranian calculations about regime stability.

Alaei’s assumptions that the ballistic missile attack campaign and national unity were part of Iran’s “success” seem to disregard the reality that Israeli operations did not intend to collapse the regime or even seriously threaten it. Israel only aimed to demonstrate its military capability to destroy Iran’s ability to control its population. Israel retains that capability, and as noted above, could decide to expand or contract its military campaign against regime targets and threaten regime stability as it deems necessary to accomplish its objectives.

• Iranian Strategic Re-Think: Former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Navy Commander Hossein Alaei emphasized in an interview with Nour News the role that Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and national unity played in its “success” during the Israel-Iran War in June 2025. Alaei’s statements suggest the regime believes that it has enough domestic support to engage in a prolonged conflict with Israel and could inflict more damage through continued missile strikes in the future.

• Iranian Air Defense: Iran is attempting to improve and fix vulnerabilities in its air defense systems that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War. An Iranian Armed Forces General Staff (AFGS)-controlled outlet reported on October 1 that the Iranian army has replaced and strengthened its air defense systems and short-range air defenses to counter drones.

• Syrian-Russian Defense Cooperation: Senior Syrian and Russian defense officials have continued to discuss possible defense cooperation, signaling a possible shift towards deeper Syrian-Russian defense relations. Syrian officials’ visit to Moscow on October 2 suggests that Syria may seek to increase military cooperation with Russia in the coming months, possibly through the exchange of military expertise.

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