[ISW] 러시아 병력 생성 및 기술 적응 업데이트, 2025년 10월 9일

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핵심 요약

  • 러시아군은 2025년 8월부터 최소한, ‘오를란(Orlan)’ 및 ‘몰니야(Molniya)’ 고정익 드론 변종을 기반으로 하는 모선 무인 항공기(UAV)를 사용하여 우크라이나의 후방 물류 경로와 거점을 점점 더 집중적으로 공격하고 있습니다.

  • 러시아 개발자들은 더 먼 거리에서 드론 공격을 수행할 수 있도록 저렴한 드론에 광섬유 케이블을 통합하고 있습니다.

  • 러시아군은 우크라이나의 중폭격 드론을 요격하기 위해 광섬유 UAV의 생산 규모를 늘리려 하고 있습니다.

  • 러시아 개발자들은 다른 공격 및 정찰 UAV를 위한 중계 드론으로 기능할 수 있는 광섬유 FPV UAV를 도입하여 러시아 전술 드론의 사거리를 최대 60km까지 확장했습니다.

  • 러시아군은 카메라와 무선 제어 기능을 통합한 ‘샤헤드(Shahed)'(게란(Geran)) 및 ‘게르베라(Gerbera)’ UAV를 사용하여 후방의 이동 표적을 추적하고 있습니다.

  • 러시아 개발자들은 새롭게 통합된 무선 감지기를 통해 우크라이나 드론 요격기에 대한 새로운 대응책을 투입하고 있습니다.


최신 자료 및 링크 (자료 검증 완료)

  • 오를란 드론 관련 (영문): Oryx – Assessing Russian Equipment Losses During the Russian Invasion of Ukraine – 오를란 드론과 관련된 자료가 있습니다. (Oryx는 오픈 소스 정보 기반의 군사 분석 사이트로, 러시아의 장비 손실에 대한 자료를 제공하며, 오를란 드론에 대한 언급을 찾을 수 있습니다.)

  • 드론 기술 및 전쟁 관련 (영문): Council on Foreign Relations – Drones and Aerial Warfare – 드론과 관련된 일반적인 전쟁 관련 정보를 제공합니다. (미국 외교 협회 (Council on Foreign Relations, CFR)는 외교 정책에 대한 정보를 제공합니다. 해당 링크는 드론과 공중전에 대한 정보 제공.)

  • 우크라이나 전쟁 관련 (영문): Institute for the Study of War – 우크라이나 전쟁의 전반적인 상황에 대한 업데이트를 제공합니다. (Institute for the Study of War (ISW)는 전쟁 연구를 전문으로 하는 연구소입니다. 우크라이나 전쟁 관련 최신 정보를 제공.)

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**참고사항:**

* 제공된 링크는 텍스트 분석 시점 기준으로 유효하며, 웹사이트의 특성상 정보가 변경될 수 있습니다.
* 원문에 언급된 드론 모델 및 기술에 대한 세부적인 기술 정보는 해당 링크에서 직접 찾아보시는 것이 좋습니다. (ex: Orlan, Molniya, Shahed, Geran, Gerbera)
* “near rear”는 “후방 지역”으로 번역했습니다.
* “mothership UAVs”는 “모선 무인 항공기”로 번역했습니다.
* “FPV UAVs”는 “FPV (First-Person View) 무인 항공기”로 번역했습니다.
* “radio control”은 “무선 제어”로 번역했습니다.
* “countermeasures”는 “대응책”으로 번역했습니다.
* 영문 자료의 제목과 함께 괄호 안에 설명과 번역했습니다.

[원문]

Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian logistics routes and positions in the near rear using mothership UAVs.

October 9, 2025

Information Cutoff: October 5, 2025, 1:00 pm ET

Kateryna Stepanenko

TOPLINES

Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian logistics routes and positions in the near rear using mothership unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly motherships based on variants of the Orlan and Molniya fixed-wing drones, since at least August 2025. Ukrainian forces reported on August 22 that they shot down a Russian Orlan reconnaissance UAV that functioned as a mothership and carried two first-person-view UAVs for the first time. A source in the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) later told Kremlin newswire TASS on September 8 that Russian forces are using Orlan-10 UAVs for transporting loitering munitions and that the new use of Orlan mothership carrier drones allows Russia to significantly increase the range of Russian drone strikes in the near rear. One Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces struck Zaporizhzhia City with UAVs twice as of September 4 and credited Russia’s capability to strike at an extended range to mothership drones that operate using Ukrainian SIM cards. Ukrainian and Russian sources indicated in late September 2025 that Russian forces began actively using cheaply made Molniya-2 fixed-wing first-person view (FPV) drones as mothership UAVs to extend tactical drone ranges beyond 25 kilometers in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Pokrovsk, and Novopavlivka directions. Ukrainian servicemen reported that Russian forces have been using Molniya mothership UAVs as repeater drones for other strike and reconnaissance drones and to interdict Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOCs), as these drones allow Russian forces to target Ukrainian logistics up to 20 to 25 kilometers from the frontline. Another Russian milblogger observed Ukraine’s widespread use of mothership drones that are based on heavy multicopters that simultaneously act as repeater UAVs.

Russian developers are integrating fiber-optic cables into cheaper drones to scale Russian forces’ ability to conduct drone strikes at farther ranges. Russian sources published footage on September 13 and 14 showing Russian Molniya-2 UAVs with fiber-optic cables striking claimed Ukrainian targets in the Kherson direction for the first time, indicating that Russian forces have begun to attach the cable to cheaply-made Molniya UAVs, likely to significantly scale the number of fiber-optic UAVs on the battlefield. Ukrainian servicemen have observed Russian forces using Molniya drones with fiber-optic cables, at least in the Lyman direction, as of late September 2025. One Russian milblogger claimed that the Molniya-2 UAVs with fiber-optic cables have a range of up to 20 kilometers, while another claimed that Russian developers were able to attach a 40-kilometer fiber-optic cable onto a Molniya-2 UAV, making the UAV invulnerable to EW and having a high-quality video feed. Ukrainian electronic and radio warfare expert Serhiy “Flash” Beskrestnov observed on September 13 that Russian forces were finishing testing of Molniya UAVs with fiber-optic cables, but noted that adding the cable would decrease the UAV’s warhead size and range. Beskrestnov added that such an adaptation will allow Russia to strike Ukrainian targets in the kill zone and along the international border up to a 20-kilometer distance. Russian developers recently modified some Molniya UAV variants to operate as motherships and have thermobaric warheads. A Ukrainian brigade operating in the Kharkiv direction observed that Russian forces still largely rely on radio-controlled FPV UAVs as opposed to fiber-optic UAVs due to a lack of trained drone operators.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Russian forces have been increasingly targeting Ukrainian logistics routes and positions in the near rear using mothership unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), particularly motherships based on variants of the Orlan and Molniya fixed-wing drones, since at least August 2025.

  • Russian developers are integrating fiber-optic cables into cheaper drones to scale Russian forces’ ability to conduct drone strikes at farther ranges.

  • Russian forces are trying to scale the production of fiber-optic UAVs to increasingly intercept Ukrainian heavy bomber drones.

  • Russian developers reportedly introduced fiber-optic FPV UAVs that can function as repeater drones for other strike and reconnaissance UAVs, extending Russian tactical drone ranges to up to 60 kilometers.

  • Russian forces are pursuing moving targets in the near rear with Shahed (Geran) and Gerbera UAVs with integrated cameras and radio control capabilities.

  • Russian developers are fielding new countermeasures against Ukrainian drone interceptors, chiefly via newly integrated radio detectors.

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