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Iran is unlikely to make meaningful concessions in its next proposal to the United States, which is expected in the next several days. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Major General Ahmad Vahidi, whose hardline position on negotiations the regime has adopted, appears unwilling to concede on Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program. Iran’s delegation told Pakistani mediators on April 27 that it needed to consult Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei before responding with an updated proposal following US President Donald Trump’s dissatisfaction with Iran’s lack of nuclear concessions in its April 26 three-stage plan. Vahidi maintains near-exclusive access to Mojtaba and serves as a gatekeeper who conveys Mojtaba’s approval of decisions made by formal state institutions, according to several senior Iranian sources speaking to Western and anti-regime media in recent days. The regime has adopted Vahidi’s hardline positions on negotiations, which indicates that Vahidi has significantly more power within the regime and influence over the outcome of policy decisions compared to other leaders who are more supportive of negotiations. The extent to which Vahidi or any other regime leader controls the decision making process is unclear, even though Vahidi seems to have significant influence over the outcome.
Mainstream Iranian politicians are consolidating around the decision to avoid discussing the nuclear issue before the United States lifts the naval blockade on Iranian ports, which was Vahidi’s preferred policy outcome. This illustrates that there is some level of political support for Vahidi’s policies within the broader regime, which suggests Iran’s negotiating stance will not soften in the near term. Mojtaba approved these policies in his role as supreme leader, but he lacks the stature of his father and has struggled to behave as a neutral arbiter in internal debates, according to Reuters. Assembly of Experts members and members of parliament have voiced their support for Mojtaba’s directive against discussing the nuclear issue before the US lifts the naval blockade on Iranian ports. These statements reflect the same logic that led Iranian decision makers to withdraw the Iranian negotiators from the April 11 Islamabad negotiations.
Other Iranian regime factions do not appear to materially constrain Vahidi’s uncompromising position. Saeed Jalili — also on the SNSC — and his Stability (Paydari) Front continue to advocate an even more uncompromising stance against negotiations. These ultra-hardliners reinforce Vahidi’s position against concessions in negotiations. Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf appears sidelined. Ghalibaf’s recent unity statement, urging loyalty to the supreme leader, followed by an unusual April 29 audio message reiterating support for the supreme leader, suggests he has acquiesced to the dominant hardline position on negotiations. Reformist voices, such as Pezeshkian and former President Hassan Rouhani, who previously called for negotiations to prioritize Iran’s economy, appear absent from the current decision making and information space, further narrowing the range of policy options. The regime-imposed internet shutdown, presumably enforced by the IRGC, is almost certainly contributing to the absence of dissenting views.
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