[ISW] 이란 업데이트 특별 보고서 2026년 5월 4일

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핵심 내용:

  • 이란은 호르무즈 해협에서 미국의 상업 항해 자유 보장 시도에 대응하여 해협에 대한 “통제”를 과시하려 하고 있습니다. 이란은 상업 선박 공격, 아랍에미리트(UAE)의 석유 시설 공격, 오만의 민간 건물 공격 등을 통해 미국의 노력을 방해하고 통제력을 과시하려 합니다.
  • 이란이 호르무즈 해협 및 국제 해상 상업의 상당 부분을 통제하도록 허용하는 것은 미국의 이익에 반합니다. 이란이 해협을 통제하도록 허용하면 미국과 국제 경제에 경제적 비용을 부과할 수 있으며, 동시에 이란 핵 프로그램과 같은 다른 중요한 문제에 대한 협상에서 지렛대로 작용할 수 있습니다.
  • 그러나 5월 4일 트럼프 미국 대통령은 최근 이란의 공격이 휴전 위반에 해당하지 않는다고 밝혔습니다. 트럼프 대통령은 이란의 행동이 휴전을 위반했는지 질문에 대해 “격렬한 발포”가 없었다고 말했습니다.

최신 자료 및 관련 링크:

다음은 본 내용과 관련된 최신 정보 및 추가적인 배경 정보를 제공하는 몇 가지 자료입니다.

참고: 위에 제시된 링크는 현재 시점의 정보를 기준으로 하며, 상황 변화에 따라 정보의 정확성이 달라질 수 있습니다. 각 링크의 내용을 직접 확인하여 최신 정보를 얻는 것이 좋습니다.

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[원문]

Iran is attempting to demonstrate its “control” over the Strait of Hormuz in response to US attempts to secure freedom of commercial navigation in the strait.

May 4, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Adham Fattah, Parker Hempel, Ria Reddy, Avery Borens, and Brian Carter

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TOPLINES

Iran is attempting to demonstrate its “control” over the Strait of Hormuz in response to US attempts to secure freedom of commercial navigation in the strait. Iran is attempting to disrupt these US efforts and demonstrate its control by attacking commercial vessels, oil infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and a civilian building in Oman. Iranian decisionmakers seek to retain “control” over the strait because this “control” is a key piece of leverage over the United States. “Control” of the strait allows Iran to place upward pressure on the global price of oil, which imposes economic and political costs on the United States, the longer the conflict goes on. US President Donald Trump said on May 3 that the US Navy would escort commercial vessels through the strait beginning on May 4. Successful transits under escort would undermine Iran’s ability to credibly threaten commercial shipping. Iran’s ability to ”control” the strait is dependent on its ability to credibly threaten commercial shipping to compel shipping to pay Iran and use Iranian-dictated travel separation schemes.

Hardline Iranian officials immediately recognized the risk that successful escorts would undermine their ability to threaten shipping and compel shipping to cooperate, and responded rhetorically and militarily. The Iranian Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Commission Chairman, Ebrahim Azizi, stated on May 3 that Iran would consider any US interference with Iran’s blockade of the Strait of Hormuz to be a ceasefire violation. Iranian forces then attacked an Emirati-affiliated tanker on May 3 with two drones as it tried to pass through the strait. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Brigadier General Ali Abdollahi Aliabadi threatened on May 4 to attack US warships and commercial vessels that try to transit through the Strait of Hormuz without Iranian permission. The IRGC Navy also published a map of the Strait of Hormuz that claimed that Iran controlled all of the strait. IRGC-affiliated media reported afterwards on May 4 that the IRGC Navy fired ”a warning shot“ at a US warship. US Central Command (CENTCOM) announced on May 4 that two US destroyers guided two US-flagged commercial vessels through the strait without damage. Iran reportedly fired cruise missiles and drones at the vessels and destroyers. Iran also reportedly sent six fast attack craft after the commercial vessels, all of which US forces sank.

Iran then escalated its attacks by targeting naval and land targets in the UAE and Oman on May 4, possibly to try to deter US allies from using the Strait of Hormuz after these initial steps failed to compel the United States to stop its efforts to escort shipping. The Emirati Defense Ministry announced on May 4 that its forces intercepted three of four Iranian cruise missiles fired at the UAE, with one falling in the sea. Iran reportedly launched a drone at an unspecified target at the Fujairah Petroleum Industrial Zone in Fujairah, UAE, which injured three people. The IRGC then reportedly struck a South Korean cargo vessel named HMM Namu, about 36 nautical miles north of Dubai, UAE. The IRGC also reportedly struck an unknown vessel about 14 nautical miles west of Mina Saqr, UAE. The Emirati Defense Ministry announced afterwards that its air defenses engaged Iranian projectiles at least three more times. An Iranian projectile also struck a residential building in the Tabat area of Bukha Province, Musandam Governorate, Oman, but it is unclear if Iran sought to target this building.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Iran is attempting to demonstrate its “control” over the Strait of Hormuz in response to US attempts to secure freedom of commercial navigation in the strait. Iran is attempting to disrupt these US efforts and demonstrate its control by attacking commercial vessels, oil infrastructure in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and a civilian building in Oman.

  • It is against the United States’ interests to allow Iran to exert control over the Strait of Hormuz and thus a large part of international maritime commerce. Allowing Iran to exert control over the strait enables Iran to impose economic costs on the United States and the international economy while simultaneously giving it leverage in negotiations over other important issues, such as Iran’s nuclear program. 

  • US President Trump indicated on May 4 that the most recent Iranian attacks did not constitute a ceasefire violation, however. Trump stated that there was no “heavy firing” when asked whether Iran’s actions violated the ceasefire.

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