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Iran’s consistent pursuit of international recognition of Iranian sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz reinforces ISW-CTP’s previous assessment that Iran views control of the waterway as its most important tool of deterrence against future US or allied military action, because such recognition would allow it to restrict activity in the strait whenever it wills. Senior Iranian officials have repeatedly signaled that Iran does not intend to relinquish its claims to the Strait of Hormuz, including through statements attributed to Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and public comments by close advisers. Iran is simultaneously attempting to normalize and formalize its control of the strait through rhetoric and operational measures. IRGC Navy Political Deputy Brigadier General Mohammad Akbarzadeh claimed on May 12 that the strait’s “operational area” has expanded from “around islands such as Hormuz and Hengam” and a narrow “20-30 mile corridor into a 200-300 mile crescent stretching from Jask and Sirik to beyond Qeshm Island and the Greater Tunb.” It is unclear what Akbarzadeh means by “operational area” in this context. Akbarzadeh’s omission of other countries’ land and maritime territories in the strait in his statement to Iranian media suggests Iran’s intent to define much of the surrounding maritime space as effectively under Iranian management, however. Supreme Leader adviser Mohammad Mokhber more explicitly stated on May 8 that the strait carries strategic value comparable to a nuclear weapon, enabling Iran to influence the global economy “with one decision,” and asserting that Iran “will not lose the strait under any circumstances.” Iran also instituted a new transit regime on May 7 that requires vessels to receive Iranian regulations by email and submit detailed ownership, nationality, and crew information to Iran’s ”Persian Gulf Strait Authority” to obtain authorization for passage. IRGC-affiliated media continues to frame routine maritime transit as contingent on Iranian permission, such as on May 12, when IRGC-affiliated media reported that Iranian forces “allowed” a second Qatari tanker to pass through the strait.
Iran has made clear that it will not negotiate without guarantees or credible deterrence against future military attacks, including sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. An Al Jazeera journalist, citing a well‑informed source familiar with the negotiations, reported on May 12 that the Iranian negotiating team has been instructed to insist on five preconditions before entering nuclear talks: a complete end to the war on all fronts, the lifting of all sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets, compensation for war‑related damages and losses, and formal recognition of Iran’s sovereign rights over the Strait of Hormuz. Former IRGC commander and Mojtaba Khamenei confidant Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari publicly articulated these same demands on May 11, signaling alignment between Iran’s negotiating strategy and senior IRGC leadership. Sobh‑e No, a newspaper affiliated with Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, who led Iran‘s negotiating team, separately reported Iran’s latest proposal, which provided a similar list of uncompromising positions. The framework reported by Sobh-e No also proposed a monitoring mechanism and a UN Security Council resolution as a guarantee against future US or allied attacks.
Iranian sovereignty and control over the Strait of Hormuz would have severe consequences for global shipping for all countries dependent on maritime trade, but especially the Gulf States. The Economist reported on May 12 that the ongoing conflict has already cut Saudi oil exports by roughly a third and UAE exports by about half, while Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait are exporting almost no energy products. The head of Saudi Aramco warned on May 10 that if trade and shipping remain constrained for more than a few weeks, supply disruptions could persist for years, with markets potentially not normalizing until 2027. Iran, if its control of the strait were to be recognized, could impose similar costs on the Gulf States at any time and for any reason, and point to the recognition of its control to legitimize its actions.
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