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Western media reported on May 28 that US and Iranian negotiators have reached a 60-day memorandum of understanding (MoU), but the US and Iranian leaders who must approve the agreement—US President Donald Trump and Iranian Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, respectively—have not approved the “agreement” at this time. The details of the reported “agreement” are also unclear based on the wording and sourcing of the leaks of the agreement. Two unspecified US officials told Axios on May 28 that US and Iranian negotiators have reached a 60-day MoU to extend the ceasefire and launch negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The officials claimed that Iranian negotiators received the “necessary approvals” from “senior leadership” to sign the deal. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Tasnim News Agency, citing a source close to the negotiating team, denied that an MoU has been “finalized,” however. An unspecified source also told Israeli media that Mojtaba has not yet approved the “agreement.”
The US officials told Axios that Iran would allow “unrestricted” shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, stop imposing tolls and harassing vessels in the strait, and remove naval mines within 30 days, while the United States would lift its naval blockade on Iranian ports. The officials did not specify how the MoU defines “unrestricted” shipping. Iranian officials have repeatedly described the strait as “open” to shipping while forcing vessels to receive Iranian permission to pass through the strait and to use Iran’s illegal traffic separation scheme. Iranian officials have also claimed that Iran is charging vessels “protection fees” and “environmental fees” instead of “tolls.” The ambiguity around these terms makes it unclear whether Iranian negotiators have actually committed to any concessions in the reported MoU.
Even if Iranian negotiators did offer some concessions, it is far from clear that senior decision-makers in Tehran, including Mojtaba Khamenei and IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, are willing to make such concessions. Mojtaba’s recent public statements indicate that he is not willing to give up Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz. IRGC-affiliated media has also insisted that Iran must receive economic relief—including the release of some of Iran’s frozen assets—before Iran will discuss its nuclear program. ISW-CTP continues to assess that Vahidi and his inner circle are currently dominating Iranian decision-making. The US officials told Axios that the United States would discuss sanctions relief and the release of Iran’s frozen assets during the 60-day negotiations period, in contrast to the Iranian regime’s demand for immediate economic relief upon the signing of an agreement. If Iranian negotiators did agree to postpone the discussion of economic relief to the 60-day negotiations period, this would indicate that Iranian negotiators may not be aligned with Mojtaba and Vahidi. Anti-regime media, citing a source close to the negotiations, reported on May 28 that there are doubts among unspecified individuals about Iranian Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and the negotiating team’s coordination with Mojtaba, which further suggests that the terms in the reported US-Iran MoU may not reflect the positions of key Iranian leaders in Tehran.
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