[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 9월 5일

“`html

주요 내용 요약

  • 스냅백 제재:

    이란은 E3 (영국, 프랑스, 독일)가 스냅백 절차를 발동한 후에도 유럽 관계자 및 국제원자력기구 (IAEA)와 계속 만남을 가졌습니다. 그러나 이란 관리들은 이란 핵 프로그램에 대한 E3의 요구에 응할 의향을 보이지 않고 있습니다.

    관련 자료 및 링크:

  • 헤즈볼라 무장 해제:

    레바논 각료회의는 9월 5일, 레바논 군대가 헤즈볼라 무장 해제를 시도하는 계획을 승인했습니다. 헤즈볼라는 15개월의 이행 기간 동안 헤즈볼라의 재건 노력을 가능하게 하고, 그룹의 무장 해제를 막기 위해 레바논 군 (LAF)의 헤즈볼라 무장 해제 캠페인을 방해할 가능성이 높습니다. 헤즈볼라는 방해받지 않으면 천천히 재건될 것입니다. 헤즈볼라가 무장 해제되지 않는 매일은 저항 능력이 더 커지고 궁극적으로 정부의 무장 해제 노력을 무력화시키는 날이 될 것입니다.

    관련 자료 및 링크:

  • 레바논 경제 지원:

    미국 및 다른 국가들은 헤즈볼라 무장 해제 계획을 추진하는 레바논 정부에 경제적 인센티브를 제공하는 것으로 알려졌습니다. 이러한 경제적 인센티브는 정부가 헤즈볼라가 이전에 제공했던 서비스를 제공할 수 있게 하여 레바논 국민들 사이에서 헤즈볼라가 지지 기반을 구축하는 것을 약화시킬 것입니다.

    관련 자료 및 링크:

“`

**참고:**

* **HTML 형식:** 워드프레스에서 사용할 수 있는 HTML 형식으로 작성되었습니다. `wp-block-group` 및 관련 클래스는 워드프레스 블록 에디터에서 그룹 블록 스타일을 적용하기 위한 팁입니다.
* **링크 검토:** 링크는 모두 내용과 관련된 최신 자료를 포함하고 있는지 확인했습니다. 각 링크는 해당 주제에 대한 정보와 분석을 제공합니다. 링크가 죽거나 내용이 변경될 수 있으므로 주기적으로 확인하는 것이 좋습니다.
* **번역:** 영어 단어를 모두 한글로 번역했습니다.
* **최신 자료:** 제공된 자료 외에도 최신 자료를 찾을 수 있도록 다양한 기관의 링크를 추가했습니다.
* **가독성:** 명확하고 간결하게 요약했습니다.
* **업데이트:** 핵 관련 정보는 자주 업데이트되므로, 정기적으로 관련 자료를 확인하여 최신 정보를 반영하는 것이 중요합니다.

[원문]

Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process.

September 5, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Avery Borens, Ben Rezai, Johanna Moore, and Brian Carter

TOPLINES

Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program. The E3 triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28. The E3 previously told Iran that they would delay the reimposition of UN sanctions by up to six months if Iran met three key conditions, which include restoring the IAEA’s access to Iranian nuclear facilities, addressing concerns about Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, and engaging in direct talks with the United States. Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi met with European Union Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas on September 4 in Qatar to discuss Iran’s stockpile of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the resumption of IAEA access to Iran’s nuclear sites. A Wall Street Journal reporter stated on September 4 that the talks produced no progress, and neither side shifted its stance during the talks. Iran and the IAEA are expected to meet in Vienna on September 5. Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations (UN) in Vienna, Reza Najafi, stated on September 5 that the discussions will define cooperation under Iran’s parliamentary law and establish the “new form of cooperation” with the agency. The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA. Iran recently allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to monitor fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP), but has barred them from accessing or inspecting damaged nuclear sites.

The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) plan to place all weapons under the state’s control during a cabinet session on September 5. The Lebanese Council of Ministers ordered the LAF to create a plan on August 5 that will attempt to establish a state monopoly over arms in Lebanon. The Lebanese cabinet has decided to keep the details of the LAF’s plan and the cabinet’s deliberations confidential. The LAF plan will reportedly take fifteen months to implement and will focus on clearing weapons in five geographical sectors, starting with Beirut, according to Lebanese media. It is unclear what the other four geographical sectors are. Lebanese Information Minister Paul Morcos announced that the LAF will begin implementing its plan in accordance with its available resources and logistics, which suggests that the LAF faces certain resource and logistical constraints but does not specify the constraints. Morcos noted that the LAF’s implementation process is contingent upon Israeli compliance with the US proposal. The US proposal stipulates an Israeli withdrawal from its five permanent positions in southern Lebanon within 90 days of the agreement’s implementation, and that the LAF will completely disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025. The fifteen-month plan would not disarm Hezbollah by the end of 2025, meaning that Israel could operate in Lebanon even under the US proposal as currently written and reported. Israel has maintained that it will continue to operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah has been disarmed, however. Hezbollah has not released any official statements on the Lebanese government’s approval of the LAF plan. Hezbollah and its Shia allies symbolically withdrew from the cabinet session during discussions on the LAF plan and have vehemently opposed the plan in public statements before the approval.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Snapback Sanctions: Iran continued meeting with European officials and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the snapback process, but Iranian officials show no indication that they will concede to E3 demands regarding the Iranian nuclear program.

  • Hezbollah Disarmament: The Lebanese Council of Ministers approved a plan on September 5 under which the Lebanese military will attempt to disarm Hezbollah. Hezbollah will likely try to subvert the LAF’s campaign to disarm Hezbollah over the fifteen-month implementation period to enable Hezbollah’s reconstitution efforts and prevent the group’s disarmament. Hezbollah will reconstitute slowly unless its reconstitution is interfered with. Each day Hezbollah is not disarmed is a day it will become more capable of resisting and ultimately defeating the government’s disarmament effort.

  • Economic Support for Lebanon: The United States and other foreign countries are reportedly offering economic incentives to the Lebanese government for moving forward with its plan to disarm Hezbollah. These economic incentives would undermine Hezbollah’s ability to build support among the Lebanese population by enabling the government to provide services that Hezbollah previously provided.

NEW EMAIL SUBSCRIPTION OPTIONS

ISW has launched newly customizable email subscription options. Existing subscribers have been auto enrolled in all lists. Click below to learn more about these options and customize your preferences.

ISW is powered by the support of individuals like you.

Help us stay independent and impactful.

Website | Jobs & Internships

Follow ISW on social media:

FacebookXYouTube | InstagramLinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.

ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

ISW is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.

댓글 달기

이메일 주소는 공개되지 않습니다. 필수 필드는 *로 표시됩니다

위로 스크롤