[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 9월 14일

“`html

핵심 요약:

  • 9월 13일 밤, 러시아 드론이 루마니아 영공에 진입했습니다. 9월 9일에서 10일 밤, 폴란드 영공에 러시아 드론이 침입한 지 며칠 되지 않아서 벌어진 일입니다.
  • 폴란드는 9월 9일에서 10일 사이에 발생한 러시아 드론의 폴란드 영토 침입에 대응하여, Operation Eastern Sentry(동부 경계 작전)을 위해 NATO 증원군 파견을 승인했습니다.
  • 러시아와 벨라루스 군은 Zapad-2025(서부 2025) 합동 군사 훈련을 계속 진행했습니다.
  • 우크라이나는 9월 13일에서 14일 밤, 러시아와 점령된 크림반도의 러시아 석유, 가스, 철도 및 군사 기반 시설에 대한 장거리 드론 공격 및 파괴 작전을 계속했습니다.
  • 크렘린은 막대한 재정 적자에 직면해 있으며, 전쟁 기금 삭감 대신 소비자 세금을 인상하여 적자를 보충할 수 있습니다. 이는 러시아 국민이 우크라이나 전쟁을 지원하기 위해 감수해야 하는 희생으로 간주될 수 있습니다.
  • VAT(부가세) 인상은 러시아 중앙은행이 인플레이션에 대항하여 이룬 모든 진전을 되돌릴 수 있으며, 핵심 금리를 너무 일찍 인하함으로써 발생할 수 있는 문제들을 해결하지 못할 수 있습니다.
  • 러시아군은 포크롭스크 근처와 서부 자포리자주에서 진격했습니다.

관련 최신 자료 및 링크:

참고: 위 링크들은 해당 내용과 관련된 최신 뉴스 기사, 연구 보고서, 정부 성명서 등을 포함합니다. 각 링크의 내용을 꼼꼼히 확인하여 최신 정보를 얻으시기 바랍니다.

“`

[원문]

A Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 13, days after a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace.

September 14, 2025

Information Cutoff: 12:15 pm ET

Jessica Sobieski, Justin Young, Grace Mappes, Jennie Olmsted, Anna Harvey, and Kateryna Stepanenko

TOPLINES

A Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 13, days after a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10. Romanian Defense Minister Ionuț Moșteanu reported on September 13 that Romanian forces scrambled two F-16 fighter jets from the 86th Air Base near Fetesti after a Romanian radar detected a Russian drone in Romanian airspace at 1823 local time. Mosteanu stated that Romania faces “provocations from Russia” nearly every week. Romanian Foreign Minister Oana-Silvia Toiu stated that the F-16s tracked the drone until it left Romanian airspace without causing any damage or casualties 50 minutes after the moment of entry. Toiu noted that two allied German Eurofighter jets were ready to aid Romanian forces, condemned the attack as “unacceptable and reckless,” and stated that Romania will take the necessary measures to protect Romanian sovereignty and security. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noted that Russian drone flight paths are "always calculated” and that the drone did not accidentally enter the Romanian airspace due to a mistake or actions of lower-level commanders. This is Russia’s second incursion into NATO airspace over the course of four days. The Romanian Ministry of Defense (MoD) provided data to ABC News on September 14 indicating that Russian drones have penetrated Romanian airspace 11 times since the start of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, inclusive of the September 13 incursion.” The Romanian MoD noted that Russian drones have conducted about 50 drone strikes near the Ukrainian-Romanian border since February 2022, including 30 strikes in which drone debris fell on Romanian territory. 

Poland authorized NATO reinforcements to deploy to Poland for Operation Eastern Sentry in response to the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion into Polish territory. Polish President Karol Nawrocki signed a decree on September 14 authorizing NATO to deploy another foreign contingent to Poland as reinforcements, specifically in support of the Operation Eastern Sentry. NATO announced the start of Operation Eastern Sentry on September 12, and NATO officials noted that the intent of the operation is to reinforce NATO’s eastern flank, including Poland, following the Russian drone incursion and violation of NATO airspace. Polish and NATO allied aircraft scrambled, and Poland’s ground-based air defense systems were activated to the highest possible readiness again in response to Russian drone strikes against Ukrainian border regions overnight on September 13 to 14. NATO and member state officials have continued denouncing the Russian drone incursion into Poland and reiterated that the drone incursion was likely intentional, as ISW continues to assess. Russian officials and pro-Kremlin sources have continued deflecting blame for the drone incursion and downplaying NATO states’ reactions to the drone incursion. ISW continues to assess that Russia is likely attempting to gauge NATO’s capabilities and reactions to the drone incursion in hopes of applying lessons learned to possible future conflicts against the NATO alliance. 

Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed on September 14 that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted several naval exercises as part of Zapad-2025, including training to use Bal coastal missile systems and Uran cruise missiles to strike simulated enemies and ships in the Barents Sea, and launch a Ka-27 naval helicopter from the Udaloy-class anti-submarine destroyer Severomorsk. The Russian MoD claimed that the Russian Baltic Fleet practiced emergency rescue assistance to surface ships. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces conducted several joint aviation exercises, including training to conduct long-range Il-76 military transport aircraft flights behind enemy lines, use Ka-52M and Mi-28NM combat helicopters to provide fire support for air assault landings, and fly MiG-31 interceptor aircraft with Kinzhal ballistic missiles to strike enemy targets. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Su-34 fighter-bomber crews practiced conducting air strikes. The Belarusian MoD claimed that Russian and Belarusian forces practiced conducting reconnaissance; counter-sabotage operations; relocating a command post; recapturing a defense infrastructure facility from a hostile formation; defending against forces crossing a river; operating drones, including quadcopter and first-person view (FPV) drones; operating the Kvadrat and Sprint satellite communications systems; and coordinating with military command. Footage published on September 14 purportedly shows a Russian Iskander-M ballistic missile system deployed in Kaliningrad Oblast as part of the Zapad-2025 exercises. Ukrainian open-source intelligence group CyberBoroshno geolocated the footage to the E28 Kaliningrad-Elblag highway about 35 kilometers from the Polish border. Russia permanently deployed Iskander-M systems to Kaliningrad Oblast in 2018.  

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • A Russian drone entered Romanian airspace on the night of September 13, days after a Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace on the night of September 9 to 10.

  • Poland authorized NATO reinforcements to deploy to Poland for Operation Eastern Sentry in response to the September 9 to 10 Russian drone incursion into Polish territory.

  • Russian and Belarusian forces continued the Zapad-2025 joint military exercises.

  • Ukraine continued its long-range drone strike and sabotage campaign against Russian oil, gas, railway, and military infrastructure in Russia and occupied Crimea on the night of September 13 to 14.

  • The Kremlin is facing a massive budget deficit and may increase consumer taxes to compensate for the deficit rather than decreasing funding for its war machine, passing the economic costs off as a sacrifice that the Russian population must accept to support Russia’s war in Ukraine.

  • Increasing the VAT could reverse any progress the Russian Central Bank may have made against inflation while also failing to address any of the issues that will likely arise from prematurely lowering the key interest rate.

  • Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.

NEW EMAIL SUBSCRIPTION OPTIONS

ISW has launched newly customizable email subscription options. Existing subscribers have been auto enrolled in all lists. Click below to learn more about these options and customize your preferences.

ISW is powered by the support of individuals like you.

Help us stay independent and impactful.

Website | Jobs & Internships

Follow ISW on social media:

FacebookXYouTube | InstagramLinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

© 2025, Institute for the Study of War

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.

 

ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

ISW is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.

댓글 달기

이메일 주소는 공개되지 않습니다. 필수 필드는 *로 표시됩니다

위로 스크롤