[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 10월 6일

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핵심 내용 요약:

  • 가자 지구 휴전 계획: 10월 3일, 하마스는 이스라엘과의 휴전에 동의했지만, 가자 지구 평화를 위한 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령의 계획에 대한 다른 측면을 협상할 것을 요구했습니다. 트럼프 계획의 일부 요소는 하마스가 오랫동안 고수해온 휴전 요구 사항에 양보할 것을 요구하며, 이는 장기 휴전 협정의 실현 가능성에 대한 의문을 제기합니다.

  • 시리아 의회 선거: 10월 5일 시리아 의회 선거는 시리아의 대표 정부 발전을 위한 긍정적인 단계이지만, 아흐메드 알 샤라 시리아 대통령에 대한 의미 있는 반대 세력을 형성하기 위해서는 정당 설립이 필요할 것으로 보입니다. 북동부의 시리아 쿠르드족과 남부 시리아의 드루즈족은 선거에 참여하지 않았습니다.

  • 이란-중국 무역: 10월 5일 발표된 두 개의 미국 언론 보도에 따르면, 이란과 중화인민공화국(PRC)은 2018년 이후부터 국제 시장에서 통화 거래를 피하는 물물교환 시스템을 사용하여 이란에 대한 미국의 제재를 회피하는 것으로 알려졌습니다.

  • 이란 방공망 강화: 이란은 이스라엘-이란 전쟁 동안 이스라엘이 이용했던 취약점을 해결하기 위해 외국 전투기를 구매하여 공군력 강화를 우선시하는 것으로 보입니다.

  • 이라크 의회 선거: 이라크 시아파 민족주의 성직자 무크타다 알 사드르는 2025년 11월 이라크 의회 선거와 관련하여 “혼란이나 확산”을 일으키지 않을 구체적이지 않은 “움직임”을 계획하고 있다고 전 사드르 의원이 밝혔습니다. 전 의원의 진술은 사드르가 선거와 관련하여 시위를 선동할 계획이 없음을 시사합니다.

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[원문]

Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of President Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza

October 6, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Kelly Campa, Andie Parry, Carolyn Moorman, Adham Fattah, Katherine Wells, Ben Rezaei, Nidal Morrison, Avery Borens, and Annika Ganzeveld

TOPLINES

Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Trump proposed a 20-point plan to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on September 29 that laid out a broad vision for the end of the Israel-Hamas War and the reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. Trump warned that Hamas would face “all hell” if it did not agree to his peace plan by October 5. Hamas leaders agreed on October 3 to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages as part of the ceasefire and expressed openness to engaging in negotiations on other elements of Trump’s plan. Hamas endorsed one point of Trump’s plan that calls for a Palestinian body of independent technocrats to govern the Gaza Strip, but did not explicitly agree that an international transitional body chaired by Trump should have oversight and supervision over the Palestinian technocratic body. Hamas’ statement also did not acknowledge that Trump’s plan requires Hamas and other Palestinian factions to disarm. US, Israeli, and Hamas negotiators held indirect negotiations on the ceasefire plan in Egypt on October 6. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) has continued offensive operations and airstrikes in the Gaza Strip, but halted its major offensive into Gaza City due to the ceasefire agreement. Hamas and other Palestinian factions have continued to target Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip since Hamas agreed to the proposal on October 3.

Elements of Trump’s plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement. Hamas and Israel last observed a ceasefire between January and March 2025. The ceasefire ended after Israel accused Hamas of delaying the release of hostages and failing to negotiate on next steps to end the war. Hamas has consistently demanded a full Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and a “permanent ceasefire,” but Trump’s plan only requires the IDF to fully withdraw after a set of undefined ”standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization” are met in the opinion of the IDF, the United States, and additional guarantors. Hamas previously demanded a “permanent” ceasefire in exchange for releasing Israeli hostages due to skepticism that the IDF would resume hostilities once Israel received the hostages. Hamas has seemingly conceded on this demand by agreeing to release all living and deceased Israeli hostages before receiving a guarantee of a full IDF withdrawal from the Gaza Strip. Hamas has also not yet addressed US and Israeli demands that it disarm and disband under Trump’s plan. Netanyahu remains adamant that Hamas will be disarmed either through diplomatic means with Trump’s plan or through IDF military action if the plan fails. Hamas would receive some elements of its long-held demands, namely aid, reconstruction, and the release of prisoners held in Israel, under the proposal.

It is unclear if an end to the war in the Gaza Strip would impact how Hamas’ partners in the Axis of Resistance engage with Israel. Both Iran and Hezbollah supported Hamas’ agreement to the ceasefire and implicit rejection of the full US plan. Iran and Hezbollah’s endorsement of Hamas’ objection to the later stages of Trump’s plan surrounding the political administration of the Gaza Strip suggests that both support Hamas continuing the war. The Houthis have justified their missile and drone campaign against Israel and international shipping as a response to Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. It is unclear if the Houthis would halt these campaigns in response to a lasting Israel-Hamas ceasefire. The Houthis have continued to attack Israel since Hamas agreed to the ceasefire with Israel on October 3. Houthi Political Bureau member Mohammad al Bukhaiti said on October 6 that international mediators should not focus on disarming Hamas “because our weapon is Hamas’ weapon, and our theater of operations is Hamas’ theater of operations,” suggesting that the Houthis will continue to support Hamas even if the group is disarmed.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Gaza Ceasefire Plan: Hamas agreed to a ceasefire with Israel on October 3 but called for negotiating other aspects of US President Donald Trump’s plan for peace in the Gaza Strip. Elements of Trump’s plan require Hamas to concede on many of its long-held ceasefire demands, which raises questions about the viability of a long-term ceasefire agreement.

  • Syrian Parliamentary Elections: Syria’s October 5 parliamentary elections are a positive step toward the development of a representative government in Syria, but the establishment of political parties will likely be necessary to form any meaningful opposition to Syrian President Ahmed al Shara. Neither Syrian Kurds in the northeast nor Druze in southern Syria participated in the elections.

  • Iran-PRC Trade: Iran and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have reportedly used barter systems that avoid monetary transactions on the international market to circumvent US sanctions on Iran since at least 2018, according to two US media reports published on October 5.

  • Iranian Air Defense: Iran appears to be prioritizing strengthening its air power by purchasing foreign fighter jets to address weaknesses that Israel exploited during the Israel-Iran War.

  • Iraqi Parliamentary Elections: Iraqi Shia nationalist cleric Muqtada al Sadr is reportedly planning to make an unspecified “move” regarding the upcoming November 2025 Iraqi parliamentary elections that will not cause “chaos or escalation,” according to a former Sadrist parliamentarian. The former parliamentarian’s statement suggests that Sadr does not plan to incite protests surrounding the elections.

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