[ISW] 러시아 공세 작전 평가, 2026년 3월 29일

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핵심 내용:

  • 러시아군의 북부 진격 난항: 러시아의 2026년 봄-여름 공세가 시작된 후, 우크라이나의 요새 벨트 북부 지역에서 러시아군이 진격을 하는 데 어려움을 겪고 있습니다.
  • 전술적 이득의 제한적 영향: 최근 러시아군의 전술적 이득은 북쪽의 리만(Lyman) 또는 남쪽의 코스티안티니우카(Kostyantynivka)를 향한 공격 작전을 지원할 수 있지만, 슬로비얀스크(Slovyansk) 자체를 직접 공격하기에는 아직 충분하지 않습니다.
  • 대규모 공격으로 인한 민간인 피해: 러시아군은 3월 28일~29일 밤 우크라이나를 상대로 또 다른 대규모 공격을 감행하여 공공 휴양 시설을 공격하고 민간인 사상자를 발생시켰습니다.
  • 크라마토르스크 공격으로 인한 대규모 민간인 피해: 러시아군은 또한 3월 29일 도네츠크주의 크라마토르스크(Kramatorsk)를 대상으로 대규모 활공 폭탄 공격을 가해 심각한 민간인 사상자를 발생시켰습니다.
  • 우크라이나군의 장거리 공격 지속: 우크라이나군은 3월 28일~29일 밤에도 러시아 석유 및 방위 산업 기반 시설에 대한 장거리 공격을 지속했습니다. 이 중에는 레닌그라드주(Leningrad Oblast)의 러시아 석유 시설에 대한 지난 일주일간의 다섯 번째 공격이 포함됩니다.
  • 러시아 무인 시스템 부대(USF) 모집 비판: 러시아 군사 블로거들은 러시아군의 무인 시스템 부대(USF) 모집 캠페인의 비효율성을 비판하고 있으며, 크렘린이 우크라이나에서 병력 보충률을 유지하기 위해 강제 예비군 소집에 의존할 수 있다는 징후가 지속적으로 나타나고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군의 진격 및 러시아군의 진격: 우크라이나군은 최근 코스티안티니우카(Kostyantynivka)와 훌리아이폴레(Hulyaipole) 방향으로 진격했습니다. 러시아군은 최근 올렉산드리우카(Oleksandrivka) 방향으로 진격했습니다.

관련 최신 자료 및 링크:

다음은 해당 내용과 관련된 최신 정보와 자료를 제공하는 몇 가지 링크입니다. (링크의 내용이 최신 정보와 일치하는지 확인하십시오.)

  • Institute for the Study of War (ISW) – Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, March 29, 2024 (영문): 이 보고서는 전반적인 전황에 대한 ISW의 평가를 제공하며, 러시아의 공세와 우크라이나의 대응에 대한 심층적인 분석을 담고 있습니다. (ISW 보고서는 매일 업데이트되며, 최신 전황 분석에 대한 중요한 정보를 제공합니다.)
  • Kyiv Post – Latest on the War in Ukraine (영문): 우크라이나 관련 최신 뉴스와 분석을 제공하는 키예프 포스트 기사. (키예프 포스트는 우크라이나 현지에서 발생하는 사건과 관련된 정보를 제공하며, 종종 상황에 대한 구체적인 세부 정보를 제공합니다.)
  • BBC News – Ukraine war (영문): BBC 뉴스에서 제공하는 우크라이나 전쟁 관련 기사. (BBC는 신뢰할 수 있는 보도와 광범위한 취재로 알려져 있으며, 전쟁에 대한 다양한 시각과 정보를 제공합니다.)
  • CNN – Europe (영문): CNN에서 제공하는 유럽 관련 뉴스. (CNN은 국제 뉴스를 다루며, 우크라이나 전쟁과 관련된 최신 상황을 보도합니다.)

주의: 전쟁 상황은 유동적이므로, 위에 제시된 링크의 정보가 최신 정보와 다를 수 있습니다. 최신 정보를 얻기 위해서는 여러 출처를 참고하고, 정보의 진위를 꼼꼼하게 확인하는 것이 중요합니다.

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[원문]

Russian forces are struggling to advance on the northern part of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt following the onset of the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.

March 29, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

Grace Mappes, Samuel Shafiro, Jennie Olmsted, Diana Nasreddine, and Kateryna Stepanenko

TOPLINES

Russian forces are struggling to advance on the northern part of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt following the onset of the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on March 29 that elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, Southern Military District [SMD]) fighting near Kryva Luka and Zakitne (east of Slovyansk, the northern tip of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt) have stalled after making tactically-significant advances in the last month (since about February 27). Mashovets noted that Russian forces have failed to advance within the last week (since about March 22) after achieving a tactical penetration of Ukrainian defenses between Kryva Luka and Riznykivka (southeast of Kryva Luka). Mashovets noted that elements of the Russian 20th and 25th CAAs (Moscow Military District [MMD] and Central Military District [CMD], respectively) in the Lyman direction and 8th CAA (SMD) and 3rd Army Corps (SMD) in the Kostyantynivka direction are advancing much more slowly than the 3rd CAA Mashovets assessed that Russian forces will only have the 3rd CAA available drive directly on Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. A decision to conduct such an operation without mutually-supportive operations on the flanks would likely further stymie the Russian rate of advance east of Slovyansk and inflict critically high casualties for disproportionately minimal gains. Mashovets warned, however, that elements of the 3rd CAA could instead support the Russian offensive operations in the Lyman or Kostyantynivka directions instead of a direct drive on the Fortress Belt. This operation would also require Russian forces to temporarily abandon their offensive directly against the northern part of the Fortress Belt, which challenges the Kremlin’s cognitive warfare effort that aims to portray Russian forces as making simultaneous advances across the theater and to misrepresent Ukrainian defensive lines as collapsing.

 

The recent Russian tactical gains could support offensive operations to the north against Lyman or to the south against Kostyantynivka, but so far are insufficient for a drive directly on Slovyansk itself. ISW assessed on March 19 that Russian forces likely began their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive between March 17 and 21 after significantly intensifying mechanized and motorized assaults in various sectors of the front, including a battalion-sized mechanized assault in the Borova-Lyman direction, a period of intensified drone, artillery, and air strikes, and the movement of heavy equipment and troops on the frontline. The pace of Russian offensive operations in the Lyman direction has slowed in recent days, however, suggesting that Russian forces are unable to maintain the same intensity of their recent mechanized assaults at the cost of significant losses taken in the near term. Current weather conditions may also be slowing the Russian rate of advance. Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force Spokesperson Colonel Viktor Trehubov assessed on March 28 that Russian forces are likely waiting for more spring foliage to emerge to provide concealment for Russian assaults and infiltration missions toward Lyman. Russian forces remain unlikely to seize Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in 2026, especially if many of the forces involved in such an operation are bogged down in Ukrainian defenses.

Russian forces conducted another massive strike against Ukraine on the night of March 28 to 29, striking a public recreation area and inflicting civilian casualties. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched one Kinzhal aeroballistic missile and 442 Shahed, Gerbera, Italmas, and other drones — of which roughly 300 were Shaheds. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian forces downed 380 drones, that 16 drones struck seven locations, and that downed debris fell on 14 locations. Ukrainian officials reported that Russian strikes hit a civilian enterprise and residential areas in Chernihiv Oblast; residential areas in Kharkiv City; agricultural infrastructure and residential areas in Kyiv Oblast; a public recreation area in Mykolaiv Oblast; civilian and energy infrastructure in Odesa Oblast; and a civilian infrastructure facility in Sumy Oblast. Ukrainian officials reported that the Russian strike against the public recreation area killed one child and injured at least 10 other civilians, including eight children. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 29 that Russian forces launched 3,000 drones, 1,450 guided aerial bombs, and 40 missiles against Ukraine in the last week (between March 22 and 29. Russian forces have launched four strike packages with over 400 projectiles against Ukraine thus far in March 2026, including the largest strike package of the war containing nearly 1,000 drones launched throughout the night and day on March 23 and 24. Russia’s increasingly large and diverse strike packages continue to highlight the critical importance of Western assistance in bolstering Ukraine’s air defense capabilities, both with high-end US-made Patriot air defense systems that can effectively counter Russian ballistic missiles and other lower-end forms of air defense, for a holistic, well-equipped air defense umbrella.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Russian forces are struggling to advance on the northern part of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt following the onset of the Russian Spring-Summer 2026 offensive.

  • The recent Russian tactical gains could support offensive operations to the north against Lyman or to the south against Kostyantynivka, but so far are insufficient for a drive directly on Slovyansk itself.

  • Russian forces conducted another massive strike against Ukraine on the night of March 28 to 29, striking a public recreation area and inflicting civilian casualties.

  • Russian forces also conducted a large glide bomb strike against Kramatorsk, Donetsk Oblast on March 29, inflicting heavy civilian casualties.

  • Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil and defense industrial infrastructure on the night of March 28 to 29, including launching the fifth strike in the last week against Russian oil infrastructure in Leningrad Oblast.

  • Russian milbloggers are criticizing the ineffectiveness of Russian forces’ Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) recruitment campaign amid ongoing indications that the Kremlin may resort to involuntary reserve callups to maintain its replacement rate in Ukraine.

  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka and Hulyaipole directions. Russian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction.

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