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Taiwan’s opposition Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun reiterated standard PRC rhetoric during her April 10 meeting with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping. The PRC is setting conditions for continued cooperation with the KMT. The PRC’s readout for the Cheng-Xi meeting emphasized cross-strait integration, criticized “Taiwan independence” activists, and stated that the KMT and CCP would continue working together to promote cross-strait relations. Taiwanese media reported that Cheng avoided directly answering whether she supported Xi’s vision of “reunification.” Cheng did state that “Taiwan’s achievements and the mainland’s achievements are all achievements of the Chinese nation,” echoing PRC rhetoric on the shared “national rejuvenation” of the “Chinese nation.” PRC rhetoric uses this phrasing to reference the PRC’s development and modernization, as well as the “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan and the PRC under ”one country, two systems.” Cheng and Xi reiterated their support for the 1992 Consensus, an unofficial agreement between the KMT and CCP that states that both sides agree that there is “one China,” but disagree on whether that “China” is the PRC or the Republic of China (ROC).
Cheng is the first sitting KMT chairperson to meet with Xi since then-KMT Chairwoman Hung Hsiu-Chu in 2016. Hung similarly referenced the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and emphasized cross-strait exchanges. The PRC cut off communications with Taiwan following the May 2016 election of former Democratic Progressive (DPP) President Tsai Ing-wen. Former and current KMT politicians have facilitated dialogue with the CCP since then, allowing the KMT to present itself as the facilitator of cross-strait exchanges.
The PRC is continuing its multi-domain coercion efforts targeting Taiwan as a means to achieve “peaceful reunification.” The PRC released a ten-point plan to increase cross-strait integration, particularly with Taiwan’s offshore islands Kinmen and Matsu, following the Xi-Cheng meeting. The measures proposed establishing infrastructure ties between Kinmen and Matsu and the PRC’s Fujian province, the closest province to Taiwan, and allowing direct flights between Taiwan and certain cities in the PRC. The PRC has targeted Kinmen in numerous acts of coercion, including aerial and maritime incursions meant to erode the islands’ threat awareness. The PRC may be working to increase economic links between the PRC and Taiwan’s offshore islands to spread the notion that cross-strait cooperation is economically beneficial for Taiwan and thus improve Taiwanese public sentiment towards cross-strait integration. Kinmen and Matsu have closer economic and political ties to the PRC than the main island of Taiwan due to their proximity to PRC territory, which the PRC may assess as making them more amenable to economic integration efforts. Taiwanese scholars expressed concerns that the PRC’s proposed infrastructure initiatives could increase Taiwan’s economic dependence on the PRC or foment internal divisions in Taiwan.
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