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The PLA Navy (PLAN) conducted two major deployments in the South China Sea and the West Pacific, respectively, likely in response to the ongoing Balikatan 2026 exercises in the Philippines which include US and Japanese forces. The PRC likely aims to demonstrate that Indo-Pacific regional military cooperation invites increased PLA military activity. The PLA’s Southern Theater Command (STC) announced on April 24 that a surface task group consisting of one Type 055 guided missile destroyer, one Type 052D guided missile destroyer, one Type 054A guided missile frigate, and one Type 903A auxiliary oil replenishment vessel conducted exercises east of the Luzon Strait in response to the “current regional situation.” The STC was likely referring to the combined Balikatan 2026 exercises between the Philippines, the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and France held from April 20 to May 8. Balikatan 2026 marks Japan’s first active participation in the exercises. The PLAN aircraft carrier Liaoning transited the Taiwan Strait heading south on April 20. Unverified satellite imagery has circulated on PRC social media purporting to show Liaoning operating in the South China Sea alongside three guided missile destroyers and six guided missile frigates. The PLA STC announced on April 28 that it conducted exercises in the South China Sea in response to Philippine attempts to “stir trouble” in the region, but did not reveal what forces participated. PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times reported on April 22 that the PLAN’s Type 076 landing helicopter dock departed Shanghai to conduct sea trials in the South China Sea, possibly supporting the PLAN’s response to Balikatan. ISW-CDOT cannot confirm the location of Liaoning during these exercises, and official PRC media outlets have not reported on its location or that of its escorts.
US Forces Korea (USFK) may become central to US efforts to mobilize allied defense industrial bases (DIB) for US operational efficiency in the Indo-Pacific. The USFK proposed a plan that would clarify South Korea’s operational role in a potential Taiwan contingency. USFK Commander Xavier Brunson proposed establishing South Korea as a Regional Sustainment Hub (RSH) on April 22.[10] The concept builds on the US Department of Defense’s 2024 “Regional Sustainment Framework,” which aims to reduce time and cost by conducting maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) in allied countries rather than returning assets to the United States. South Korea already conducts maintenance of certain US aircraft. Establishing South Korea as an RSH would expand current maintenance efforts to include warships, missile systems, and drones. The United States’ ability to conduct MRO in South Korea’s forward-deployed hubs may improve the response capabilities and logistical efficiency of US forces during a Taiwan contingency. The US 2026 National Defense Strategy (NDS) proposed enabling US allies to take primary responsibility for their own defense while prioritizing deterrence against the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Indo-Pacific. US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby previously stated the need to reorient the USFK to better address broader regional threats, including the PRC. The South Korean Lee Jae Myung administration proposed transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to South Korea, increasing South Korea’s defense budget to 3.5 percent of GDP, and developing an indigenous nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) to showcase its commitments to its defense following the NDS’s release.
Taiwan’s special defense budget remains stalled due to partisan gridlock, despite growing US pressure to pass the budget. Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan (LY) has been gridlocked for months over competing versions of a special defense budget bill to fund asymmetric capabilities. Negotiations between the legislative caucuses of Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), and the opposition Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) on April 23 and April 27 both ended without a consensus on the core procurement items and total funding amount. The parties agreed on April 23 that the funding period should extend through 2033, however, in a small concession from the KMT. The KMT’s budget bill initially had a promulgation period through 2028. The LY caucuses will reconvene for further negotiations on May 6.
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