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Russian President Vladimir Putin is leaning on nuclear saber-rattling to project military strength after Russia’s apparent failure to ensure full security for the May 9 Victory Day parade without asking Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for a ceasefire. Putin claimed on May 12 that Russian forces successfully tested the RS-28 Sarmat super-heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), also referred to as the SS-X-29 or SS-X-30 in NATO classification. Putin lauded the claimed range and payload of the Sarmat and highlighted Russia’s efforts to develop additional nuclear-capable weapons, including the Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Poseidon unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile — all of which Russia has either tested or fielded since the start of the full-scale invasion. Putin claimed that Russia plans to deploy the first Sarmat missiles to combat duty with the 62nd Missile Division (33rd Missile Army, Strategic Missile Forces) in Krasnoyarsk Krai by the end of 2026. Putin and other Russian military officials stated in December 2021, June 2022, and then June 2023 that Russian forces would deploy Sarmats in the near future, all ahead of a likely failed Sarmat test launch in November 2024. Putin’s rhetoric about the March 2026 Sarmat ICBM test launch mirrors his rhetoric about the initial tests of the Oreshnik IRBM, though Putin’s posturing with the Sarmat is intended to disguise his weakness made visible by the need to ask Ukraine to commit not to strike the May 9 Russian Victory Day parade. Ukrainian deep rear strikes revealed Russia’s weakness and inability to reliably defend its deep-rear areas, including its capital, from these strikes, and Russia held a deeply scaled-down parade as a result. Putin likely intends for his Sarmat test launch and rhetoric to disguise the fact that it was Ukraine, not Russia, whose actions guaranteed the safety of the Victory Day parade in Moscow.
Putin’s posturing with the Sarmat ICBMs also likely aims to distract from Russia’s worsening performance on the battlefield, particularly during the Russian spring-summer 2026 offensive. Putin and senior Russian military officials have intensified their exaggerations of Russian battlefield successes throughout 2026, but the Russian rate of advance has declined monthly since October 2025 as Ukrainian forces escalated their mid-range strike campaign and imposed additional costs on Russian efforts to advance. These costs have grown so great that Russian forces actually suffered a net loss of territory in the theater in April 2026 for the first time since Ukraine’s 2024 incursion into Kursk Oblast, and the Russian recruitment rate dipped below its replacement rate for the first time in the war in January 2026. Russian forces began their spring-summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in mid-March 2026, but this effort has failed to yield operationally-significant advances. Ukrainian counterattacks recaptured much of Kupyansk starting in November 2025, liberated over 400 square kilometers in southern Ukraine in winter and spring 2026, and most recently liberated several settlements in western Zaporizhia Oblast in late April 2026. Ukrainian forces have forced Russia to choose between defending against Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and resources to priority sectors of the frontline — a choice that is embarrassing for Putin, whose theory of victory is dependent upon the facade that Russian forces are advancing simultaneously across the theater and are close to collapsing Ukrainian lines. Not only are Ukrainian defensive lines holding, but Ukrainian forces have managed to contest the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline even as Russia continues to lose disproportionate amounts of manpower to achieve minimal gains.
Open-source reporting confirmed the first death of a Russian university student recruited into the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in combat, potentially in an assault unit. The BBC Russian Service reported on May 12 that it confirmed the death of Russian university student Valery Averin, who signed a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in early January 2026 to serve in the Russian USF. The BBC Russian Service reported that Averin completed drone operator training on March 24 and contacted his mother for the last time on April 2, and was killed in action by April 8, only two weeks after completing his training. Averin’s mother told the BBC Russian Service that Russian forces “threw him [Averin] into an assault, right into the meat grinder” and that a Ukrainian “mortar strike” killed Averin. The local Kyakhta Raion Administration in the Republic of Buryatia claimed on April 24 that Averin died “near Luhansk,” likely referring to the frontline near or in occupied Luhansk Oblast. Averin’s mother told the BBC Russian Service that she heard of at least one other university recruit who died, but the BBC Russian Service could not independently verify any combat deaths of other university students recruited in the MoD’s USF recruitment drive. The BBC Russian Service suggested that Averin may have served in the Russian 147th Engineer-Sapper Regiment (likely of the 36th Combined Arms Army [CAA], Eastern Military District [EMD]), which is based near Averin’s university in the Republic of Buryatia. The Russian MoD launched its USF recruitment campaign of Russian university students by January 2026 as part of its forced covert mobilization effort amid declining recruitment rates and rising casualty rates. Russian milbloggers previously criticized the ineffectiveness of the recruitment campaign for the USF due to extensive reporting and worry that the Russian military command would transfer these students from their USF units to assault units.
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