[ISW] 러시아 공격 작전 평가, 2026년 5월 27일

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핵심 요약:

  • 크렘린의 국내 징집 캠페인은 높은 전장 손실의 압력으로 인해 어려움을 겪는 조짐을 계속 보이고 있습니다.
  • 러시아의 잠재적인 강제 예비군 소집이 전장에 미치는 영향은 불분명합니다. 러시아의 인력 요구가 증가하고 있고, 우크라이나의 드론 공격이 러시아군의 전선 이동을 방해하고 있기 때문입니다.
  • 우크라이나의 성공적인 중거리 및 최전선 드론 공격 캠페인은 러시아가 인력을 전선으로 수송하고 최전선 위치를 보급 및 유지하는 능력을 제한하고 있습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 중거리에서 최전선까지 드론 활동의 깊은 구역을 만들었으며, 러시아군이 먼저 우크라이나 드론 작전에 대응하지 않는 한, 추가 예비군 동원이 러시아군의 전장 성과를 실질적으로 향상시킬 수 있을지는 불분명합니다.
  • 러시아 정부는 우크라이나의 러시아 정유 공장 공격 몇 달 후, 러시아 디젤 및 항공유 수출에 대한 일시적인 제한을 고려하고 있다고 보도되었습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 수미주, 하르키우 및 보로바 방향으로 진격했습니다. 러시아군은 포크롭스크 방향으로 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 하룻밤 사이에 우크라이나를 향해 163대의 드론을 발사했습니다.

최신 자료 및 관련 링크:

다음 자료들은 위 요약과 관련된 최신 정보를 제공합니다. (주의: 링크의 내용이 변경될 수 있으며, 최신 정보를 확인하시기 바랍니다.)


참고: 위 링크들은 예시이며, 실제 정보를 확인하고 링크의 유효성을 확인해야 합니다. 전쟁 상황은 매우 유동적이므로 최신 정보를 지속적으로 확인하는 것이 중요합니다.

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[원문]

The Kremlin’s domestic contract recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses.

May 27, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Jakub Kostka, Samuel Shafiro, Grace Mappes, Christina Harward, Diana Nasreddine,

 and Frederick W. Kagan

TOPLINES

The Kremlin’s domestic contract recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses. There are likely internal debates within the Kremlin about whether Russia should conduct another round of involuntary reserve call-ups. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on May 27 that Ukraine is receiving internal Russian information regarding preparations for an additional mobilization in Russia to offset its high losses in Ukraine and to increase the size of the Russian contingent in Ukraine by “tens of thousands” of personnel. Zelensky noted that Ukraine also received intelligence on a further increase in Russian “mobilization efforts,” though it is unclear if Zelensky is referring to ongoing Russian voluntary recruitment and crypto-mobilization efforts or efforts to register and process Russian reservists. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears to remain committed to the ongoing contract recruitment campaign for now, however. Putin signed a decree on May 25 granting debt relief of up to 10 million rubles to new recruits and the spouses of new recruits who signed a contract for at least one year with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) after May 1. These apparent discussions in the Kremlin about a potential involuntary reserve call-up are likely coming from a place of weakness as Russia is increasingly struggling with poor battlefield performance, compounding effects of the war on Russian economy, declining recruitment rates, and societal discontent. The Kremlin appears to remain committed to defining its main advantage over Ukraine as overwhelming numbers, but Ukraine’s tactical drone superiority throughout the theater and mid-range strike campaign have neutralized this advantage for now, inflicting disproportionately high personnel and equipment losses on Russian forces. The lack of significant battlefield successes, mounting war sacrifices, and casualty rates are contributing to the domestic Russian perception that the war in Ukraine is not going well for Russia, a perception that is already hindering Russian contract recruitment. Any involuntary mobilization campaign would likely be significantly more unpopular among the Russian population now, while Russia’s war effort is generating so much strain and discontent than it might have been in mid- to late 2025 when Russian forces were making tactically-significant advances in multiple sectors using a campaign design that Ukraine has since been able to counter.

The effect of a potential Russian involuntary reserve call-up on the battlefield remains unclear given Russia’s growing requirements for manpower and the fact that Ukrainian drone strikes are inhibiting Russian troop movement towards the frontline. Russia has to not only replace its battlefield casualties but also recruit servicemembers for the Russian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) and to defend its operational and deep rear areas from Ukrainian drone strikes. Russia’s voluntary recruitment efforts have waned in 2026, forcing Moscow to expand its voluntary recruitment drives to new demographics, including women and students for USF and rear area air defense operations. Russian contract recruitment continues to decline despite these efforts and recent increases to one-time signing bonuses. Russian forces are already suffering from administrative and training bottlenecks for their ground forces and drone operators at their current recruitment rate, and these challenges would likely have a compounding negative effect on the quality of Russian personnel in a possible involuntary call-up. These training bottlenecks likely contributed to the degradation in the effectiveness of Russia’s elite Rubikon Center for Advanced Unmanned Systems drone operators, whose elite operations initially allowed Russian forces to make substantial gains from August 2025 to late 2025.

Ukraine’s successful mid-range and frontline drone strike campaigns are limiting Russia’s ability to transport personnel to the frontline and to supply and sustain frontline positions. Ukrainian forces began significantly intensifying their intermediate-range strike campaign in Spring 2026 and have already achieved notable operational effects, including degrading Russia’s ability to use the key Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) connecting Russia to occupied Crimea, including the M-14 Rostov-Crimea highway, and GLOCs connecting occupied southern Ukraine to Donetsk City. Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated May 27 that Ukraine is launching a “logistics lockdown” of Russian forces, aiming to scale its intermediate-range strike campaign against Russian logistics and supply lines by increasing procurement funding for Ukraine’s most effective drone units and launching large-scale competitive tenders for further funding.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Kremlin’s domestic contract recruitment campaign continues to show signs of strain under the pressure of high battlefield losses.

  • The effect of a potential Russian involuntary reserve call-up on the battlefield remains unclear given Russia’s growing requirements for manpower and the fact that Ukrainian drone strikes are inhibiting Russian troop movement towards the frontline.

  • Ukraine’s successful mid-range and frontline drone strike campaigns are limiting Russia’s ability to transport personnel to the frontline and to supply and sustain frontline positions.

  • Ukrainian forces have created a deep zone of drone activity from the intermediate range to the frontline, and it is unclear that additional reserve mobilization would materially improve Russian forces’ battlefield performance unless Russian forces can first counter Ukrainian drone operations.

  • The Russian government is reportedly considering imposing a temporary restriction on Russian diesel and jet fuel exports after several months of Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries.

  • Ukrainian forces advanced in Sumy Oblast and in the Kharkiv and Borova directions. Russian forces advanced in the Pokrovsk direction.

  • Russian forces launched 163 drones toward Ukraine overnight.

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