|
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) continues to artificially inflate its claims of advance in Ukraine to support the Kremlin’s false narrative that a Russian victory in Ukraine is inevitable. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized at least 4,714 square kilometers across the theater between January 1 and September 25, 2025: 205 square kilometers in Luhansk Oblast; 3,308 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast; 261 square kilometers in Zaporizhia Oblast; 175 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 542 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast; and 223 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces seized 205 settlements in Ukraine during this time period. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces have seized only 3,434 square kilometers since January 1: 151 square kilometers in Luhansk Oblast; 2,481 square kilometers in Donetsk Oblast; 248 square kilometers in Zaporizhia Oblast; 96 square kilometers in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 255 square kilometers in Kharkiv Oblast; and 210 square kilometers in Sumy Oblast. ISW assesses that the Russian MoD is inflating its claimed advances by 36 percent in Luhansk Oblast; 33 percent in Donetsk Oblast; five percent in Zaporizhia Oblast; 83 percent in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; 112 percent in Kharkiv Oblast; and six percent in Sumy Oblast.
The Russian MoD often inflates its territorial claims in order to shape Western thinking about Russia’s military capabilities and prospects for victory. Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on August 30 that Russian forces had seized 3,500 square kilometers of territory and 149 settlements since March 2025, whereas ISW assessed at the time that Russian forces had gained only roughly 2,346 square kilometers since March 1. The Russian MoD’s September 25 claims are a continuation of these wider efforts to use large amounts of false quantitative data to create the impression that Russian forces are advancing at a fast rate on the battlefield, even though Russian forces continue to advance at a slow foot pace. ISW also assesses that the Russian MoD has been leveraging footage showing Russian soldiers holding flags within specific settlements to claim that Russian forces had seized entire settlements. The Russian footage only shows small group infiltration missions into areas where Russian forces are unable to secure enduring positions, however. The Kremlin is attempting to convince the West that Russia will inevitably achieve its original war goals on the battlefield in order to force Ukraine and its partners into conceding to Russian demands.
Russian forces are reportedly rearranging forces to prepare for offensive operations across several sectors of the frontline but lack the forces and means required to sustain these operations simultaneously. Ukrainian military observer Kostyantyn Mashovets reported on September 24 that the Russian military command is rearranging forces in order to conduct several operational-level efforts across the frontline, including offensive operations in the Kupyansk, Lyman, Kostyantynivka, Pokrovsk, and Zaporizhia directions, as part of Russia’s wider strategic-level plan for 2025. Many of these Russian efforts are not mutually supportive in that forces assigned to one sector of the front are not conducting offensive operations in a way that supports the offensive operations of another sector. Mashovets noted that the Russian military command began in August 2025 to redeploy some forces from deprioritized sectors of the front, including Sumy and Kherson oblasts, to higher priority sectors in eastern Ukraine — some of which Mashovets characterized as “odd.” Mashovets stated that the Russian military command redeployed elements of the 76th Airborne (VDV) Division from Sumy Oblast to the area of responsibility (AoR) of the 5th Combined Arms Army (CAA, Eastern Military District [EMD]) in the south Donetsk direction (likely referring to the Novopavlivka and Velykomykhailivka directions) and to the AoR of the 35th CAA (EMD) in the Hulyaipole direction. Russian VDV are among Russia’s relatively more combat capable forces, and Russia tends to redeploy these forces to their most prioritized areas of the front, including the Kostyantynivka and Dobropillya areas. Mashovets reported that unspecified sources expected Russia to redeploy elements of the 76th VDV Division to western Zaporizhia Oblast to participate in offensive operations south of Zaporizhzhia City. Mashovets reported that Russia is establishing operational reserves in the 58th CAA (Southern Military District [SMD]) operating in the deprioritized Kherson direction from the 25th CAA (Central Miliary District [CMD]) that is currently operating in the Lyman direction, rather than from units and formations of the 58th CAA itself. Mashovets reported that the Russian command is similarly establishing operational reserves in the 3rd CAA (formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps, SMD), which is currently operating in the Lyman direction, from elements of the 70th Motorized Rifle Division (18th CAA, SMD) in the Kherson direction.
|
