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The Washington Post reported that US President Donald Trump did not approve a 400 million US dollar military aid package to Taiwan at some point in Summer 2025, which could suggest to the PRC that its coercive demands for the United States to limit some support to Taiwan are effective in some limited circumstances, such as the current trade talks. The Washington Post cited anonymous sources stating that the aid package included munitions, autonomous drones, and other “more lethal” systems. The White House stated that the decision to approve or reject the package has not been finalized, and the Washington Post added that the decision “may still be reversed.” The Trump administration’s decision to cancel this military aid package, if confirmed, would align with the administration’s preference for military sales over military aid. Taiwan has responded to Trump’s policy preferences by voicing its intention to increase its purchases of US military equipment through foreign military sales, however.
The administration’s strong support for Taiwanese purchases of US military equipment through foreign military sales means that the PRC’s coercive demands are having only a limited effect. Unspecified US officials told Reuters in May 2025 that US arms sales to Taiwan in Trump’s second term “could ‘easily exceed’” the 18.3 billion USD in foreign military sales to Taiwan under the first Trump administration. The second Trump administration prefers to rely on foreign military sales instead of military aid and has relied upon military sales to Ukraine to support the Ukrainian military against Russia.
The US House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) advanced the Taiwan Allies Fund Act and the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act to votes on September 18, indicating continued US support for Taiwan. The PRC, given its recognition that any aid to Taiwan is detrimental to its objectives vis-a-vis Taiwan, will likely view this congressional support and the foreign military sales as evidence of continued strong US support to Taiwan. These two bills were part of the State Department Reauthorization package, which the full House and Senate must then vote on before President Trump signs it into law. The Taiwan Allies Fund Act would appropriate 120 million USD from FY 2026-2028 to subsidize Taiwan’s diplomatic and economic allies to enable them to resist PRC coercion. The PRC has used economic coercion to convince states to switch diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC, further isolating Taiwan from the international community and supporting PRC claims over Taiwan. The Six Assurances Act would codify the Six Assurances, which are semi-official US commitments that have guided US-Taiwan policy since 1982, and ensure that subsequent administrations cannot alter the assurances without congressional approval. The Six Assurances stipulate that:
- The United States did not set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan,
- The United States did not agree to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan,
- The United States will not act as a mediator between the PRC and Taiwan,
- The United States did not agree to revise the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA),
- The United States did not take any positions on Taiwanese sovereignty,
- The United States and will not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with the PRC.
These two acts garnered bipartisan support within HFAC and reflect strong and continued congressional support for providing material and economic aid to Taiwan. The US House of Representatives passed the 2026 National Defense Authorization Act on September 10, which included several provisions to enhance Taiwanese security and foster greater US-Taiwan military cooperation. These two acts would further support US efforts to enhance Taiwan’s defense by countering PRC coercion and clearly expressing that official United States policy towards Taiwan remains unchanged.
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