[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 10월 3일

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주요 내용 요약:

  • 러시아군은 10월 2일에서 3일 밤, 우크라이나를 상대로 대규모의 미사일과 드론 공격을 감행했습니다. 이는 대규모지만 빈번하지 않은 공격을 위해 미사일을 더욱 활용하는 추세입니다.
  • 러시아군은 2025년 9월 한 달 동안 탄도 미사일과 순항 미사일을 비축하여, 특정일에 몇 차례의 대규모 드론 및 미사일 공격을 수행했을 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 러시아군은 우크라이나 방공 시스템을 뚫는 능력을 향상시키기 위해, 최근 업그레이드된 러시아 탄도 미사일을 활용하고 있을 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 러시아는 유럽 관료들이 자국 영공에서 정체불명의 드론 작동을 보고하는 가운데, 유럽에 대한 불안정화 노력을 계속해서 확대하고 있습니다.
  • 크렘린은 유럽을 분열시키고 혼란에 빠뜨리려는 더 큰 캠페인의 일환으로, 보스니아 헤르체고비나에서 서방이 중재한 평화를 훼손하려는 노력을 지속하고 있습니다.
  • 노르웨이와 우크라이나의 유럽 파트너들은 10월 1일, 폴란드에 우크라이나 군인들을 위한 최대 규모의 훈련 센터를 개설했습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 포크롭스크와 벨리코미하일리우카 인근에서 진격했으며, 러시아군은 최근 하르키우주 북부에서 진격했습니다.

최신 자료 및 관련 링크:

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[원문]

Russian forces conducted a large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3, increasingly leveraging missiles in large but infrequent strike packages.

October 3, 2025

Information Cutoff: 6:45 pm ET

Jennie Olmsted, Daria Novikov, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, and Kateryna Stepanenko

TOPLINES

Russian forces conducted a large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3, increasingly leveraging missiles in large but infrequent strike packages. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Russian forces launched seven Iskander-M/KN-23 ballistic missiles; 21 Iskander-K cruise missiles; seven Kh-59/69 cruise missiles; and 381 Shahed-type, Gerbera-type, and other drones from the directions of Kursk, Bryansk, and Oryol cities; Millerovo, Rostov Oblast; Shatalovo, Smolensk Oblast; and Primorsk-Akhtarsk, Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that Ukrainian air defenses downed 303 drones, 12 Iskander-K cruise missiles, and five Kh-59/69 guided air missiles. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that 18 missiles and 78 drones struck 15 locations throughout Ukraine and that drone debris fell in six locations. The Ukrainian Air Force reported that the Russian drones and missiles primarily targeted critical energy infrastructure in Kharkiv and Poltava oblasts and struck Sumy, Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, and Kyiv oblasts. The Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Ukrainian state-owned gas operator Naftogaz reported that Russian drones and missiles intentionally targeted critical energy infrastructure during the October 2-3 strike, including gas transportation infrastructure that has no military purpose, to deprive Ukrainian civilians of the ability to heat their homes leading into the winter of 2025 to 2026. Naftogaz Board Chairman Serhiy Koertskyi reported that the October 2-3 strike significantly damaged unspecified Ukrainian energy facilities. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned in August 2025 that Russia was increasingly targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure to undermine Ukraine’s preparations for the winter heating season.

Russian forces likely stockpiled ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September 2025 to conduct a few large scale drone and missile strikes on select days. Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Oleksandr Syrskyi reported on October 2 that Russian forces launched 6,900 drones against Ukraine in September 2025, including more than 3,600 Shahed-type drones. Russian forces do not regularly launch missiles in nightly strike packages against Ukraine and often go several days without using missiles in these packages. Russian forces appear to be stockpiling ballistic and cruise missiles most days and then launching large numbers of missiles in conjunction with large numbers of drones, likely to overwhelm Ukrainian air defense systems. Russian forces notably only conducted four overnight strikes containing over 10 missiles in September 2025 and have conducted one overnight strike containing over 40 missiles roughly every two weeks since late August 2025, underscoring Russia’s recent pattern of intermittently conducting a few large, combined strikes between Russia’s most consistent, smaller drone strikes. Russian forces are continuing to use more cruise missiles and fewer ballistic missiles in combined strikes and are likely continuing to rely on ballistic missiles to conduct pinpoint strikes on specific targets while using drones and cruise missiles to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses. Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems remain Ukraine’s only air defense systems capable of downing Russian ballistic missiles, and Russian forces may be specifically targeting cities and energy infrastructure not actively defended by Ukraine’s Patriot systems to increase the chances that Russia successfully strikes its intended target.

Russian forces are likely leveraging recent upgrades to Russian ballistic missiles to improve their ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defense systems. The Financial Times (FT) reported on October 3 that Russia likely recently modified its Iskander-M and Kinzhal ballistic missiles to execute unexpected diversionary maneuvers during the terminal flight phase to “confuse” Ukrainian Patriot interceptor missiles. FT reported that a Western official familiar with Ukraine’s Patriot systems’ interception rates attributed the recent “marked” decrease in Ukraine’s Patriot interception rates to this new “pattern” in Russian missiles’ terminal phase maneuvers. The FT noted that Ukraine’s air defenses may also be degraded due to ongoing Russian strikes targeting Ukraine’s Patriot air defense systems. A US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report published in August 2025 stated that modifications that enable Russian ballistic missiles to change trajectories and perform maneuvers atypical of a traditional ballistic trajectory have impeded Ukraine’s ability to leverage Patriot air defense systems against Russian ballistic missiles.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Russian forces conducted a large, combined missile and drone strike against Ukraine on the night of October 2 to 3, increasingly leveraging missiles in large but infrequent strike packages.

  • Russian forces likely stockpiled ballistic and cruise missiles throughout September 2025 to conduct a few large scale drone and missile strikes on select days.

  • Russian forces are likely leveraging recent upgrades to Russian ballistic missiles to improve their ability to penetrate Ukrainian air defense systems.

  • Russia continues to escalate its destabilization efforts against Europe as European officials continue to report unidentified drones operating in their airspace.

  • The Kremlin continues efforts to undermine Western-brokered peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, likely as part of a larger campaign to divide and distract Europe.

  • Norway and Ukraine’s European partners opened the largest training center for Ukrainian military personnel in Poland on October 1.

  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka, and Russian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast.

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