[ISW] 중국-대만 주간 업데이트, 2025년 10월 10일

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핵심 내용:

  • 중국 인민해방군(PLA) 현대화: 중국은 최근 우크라이나에 대한 대규모 러시아 공격을 지원하기 위해 위성을 통해 표적 정보를 제공했을 수 있습니다. 이러한 지원은 현재 PLA가 부족한 중요한 작전 경험을 제공할 수 있습니다. PLA는 현대전에서 우주 기반 정찰과 장거리 및 정밀 타격을 사용할 필요성을 강조해 왔습니다.

    관련 최신 자료:

  • 중국 인민해방군(PLA) 현대화: PLA는 내몽골에 있는 “모의 타이페이” 훈련장을 확장했습니다. 이 기지 확장은 PLA가 군사 훈련을 더욱 현실적으로 만들고 특히 타이페이 주변 전투에 대비하려는 노력을 반영합니다. 중국은 또한 이 기지 확장을 통해 대만 지도자들과 대중을 더욱 위협할 수 있습니다.

    관련 최신 자료:

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[원문]

The PRC may have provided targeting intelligence to support a recent, large-scale Russian strike on Ukraine.

October 10, 2025

Information Cutoff: October 10, 2025

Matthew Sperzel, Alison O’Neil, Karina Wugang, and Jackson Karas of the Institute for the Study of War;

Alexis Turek, Luke Jacobus, Alex Chou, Yeji Chung, and Katherine Wells of the American Enterprise Institute

TOPLINES

The PRC may have provided targeting intelligence to support a recent, large-scale Russian strike on Ukraine. The Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) stated that two PRC satellites—the Yaogan 33-03 and Yaogan 33-04—orbited over western Ukraine at the same time as a large-scale Russian strike targeting the western city of Lviv on October 5. Western media and US think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) claim that the PRC’s Yaogan satellites provide the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with space-based reconnaissance, though the PRC claims they are for environmental management and agricultural purposes. The SZRU stated that the PRC likely used the Yaogan satellites to provide targeting support for the Russian strike on Lviv. ISW noted at the time of the strike that Russian forces experimented with different flight trajectories to reduce the effectiveness of the Ukranian-operated Patriot air defense systems. The PRC continues to frame itself as a neutral party working for peace in Ukraine.

This support to Russian forces could provide the PLA some critical operational experience that it currently lacks. The PLA has placed tremendous emphasis in recent years on the need to fight “informatized warfare,” which involves fielding a well-networked force and emphases efforts trying to achieve information superiority or even dominance. PLA writings stress the need to closely integrate space-based capabilities and long range, precision fires to conduct informatized warfare. The PLA views those capabilities are critical to target enemy command, control, communications, and computers and thereby disrupt the enemy ability to conduct joint operations.

Ukraine has previously accused the PRC of supplying Russia with military equipment despite claiming that it is neutral in the war. Ukraine also claimed in April 2025 that 155 PRC nationals were fighting in the Russian military. PRC Foreign Affairs Minister Wang Yi told the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Kaja Kallas that the PRC cannot accept a Russian defeat in Ukraine. The PRC has a strategic interest in enabling the Russian war effort in Ukraine to keep United States’ and its allies’ attention divided between Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • PLA modernization: The PRC may have provided targeting intelligence via satellite to support a recent, large-scale Russian strike on Ukraine. This support could provide the PLA some critical operational experience that it currently lacks. The PLA has emphasized the need to use space-based reconnaissance and long-range and precision strikes in modern warfare.

  • PLA modernization: The PLA has expanded one of its “mock Taipei” training grounds in Inner Mongolia. The expansion of that site reflects PLA efforts to make military exercises increasingly realistic and better prepare the force for combat around Taipei in particular. The PRC may also use the expansion of the site to further intimidate Taiwanese leaders and the public.

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