March 25, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:00 PM ET

Justin Young, Jennie Olmsted, Anna Thacker, Christina Harward, Grace Mappes, and Kateryna Stepanenko

A prominent Russian milblogger issued a lengthy critique of the Russian military’s inability to achieve victory in Ukraine and called for serious force generation and defense industrial reforms. A Russian milblogger highlighted on March 25 that Russian forces suffer from numerous problems that prevent them from making frontline gains. The milblogger claimed that Russian forces are struggling to advance with small group infiltration tactics and in the face of Ukrainian battlefield drone dominance. The milblogger emphasized that Russian forces will be unable to achieve a decisive battlefield victory in the near term without fundamental changes in Russia’s force structure and a move away from small group infiltrations. The milblogger assessed that the Russian high military command needs to eliminate the pressure on Russian lower-echelon commanders to provide exaggerated reports to superiors and needs to improve and prolong combat training. The milblogger called for the Russian defense industrial base (DIB) to be more responsive to battlefield technological developments and criticized the lack of adequate protection for Russian armored vehicles despite Ukrainian forces’ clear ability to destroy the vehicles with first-person view (FPV) drones. The milblogger stated that Russian forces would take around 100 years to seize the rest of Ukraine, similar to ISW’s assessment that Russian forces would take 83 years to seize the remainder of the country should they be able to continue their pace of advance from February 2025. The milblogger’s statements may be a final attempt to criticize the Kremlin and Russian military command before the Kremlin implements the anticipated ban on Telegram in the future and pushes milbloggers to state-controlled platforms.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued insistence that Russian forces maintain pressure along the entire frontline with continuous, albeit slow and grinding, advances is incompatible with the reforms the Russian military and DIB would need to implement to achieve a decisive battlefield victory in Ukraine. The Russian DIB would need to take factories offline to retool their machines to produce modified equipment and weapons. The Russian military command would have to pull back active forces from the frontline for more training, and implementing longer initial training periods for new recruits would delay their deployment to the frontline. Any potential mobilization efforts the Kremlin could undertake in the near future would not provide combat-ready forces in time for the summer offensive.

Successful Ukrainian counterattacks in northeastern and southern Ukraine in recent months are, in part, triggering such criticism in the Russian information space. The milblogger explicitly criticized the Russian military command’s repeated lies about the Russian seizure of Kupyansk. Putin and Chief of the Russian General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov have both claimed the seizure of Kupyansk multiple times despite widespread Russian milblogger backlash and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky‘s visit to the town in mid-December 2025. ISW has assessed that Ukraine launched successful counterattacks in the Kupyansk direction in November 2025 and in the Oleksandrivka direction in late January 2026, which triggered backlash within the ultranationalist information space.

• A prominent Russian milblogger issued a lengthy critique of the Russian military’s inability to achieve victory in Ukraine and called for serious force generation and defense industrial reforms

• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s continued insistence that Russian forces maintain pressure along the entire frontline with continuous, albeit slow and grinding, advances is incompatible with the reforms the Russian military and DIB would need to implement to achieve a decisive battlefield victory in Ukraine.

• Successful Ukrainian counterattacks in northeastern and southern Ukraine in recent months are, in part, triggering such criticism in the Russian information space.

• The Kremlin recently cracked down against another prominent pro-Kremlin blogger for challenging Putin and his conduct of the war.

• Ukrainian forces struck the Novatek Ust-Luga oil terminal in Leningrad Oblast overnight on March 24 and 25, marking the second strike in three days against Russian oil terminals in Leningrad Oblast.

• Ukrainian forces also targeted a Russian shipbuilding plant in Leningrad Oblast on the night of March 24 and 25, striking a ship.

• The Kremlin’s efforts to close the Russian open internet are degrading the effectiveness of Russian air raid warning systems in border regions.

• Russian authorities are likely trying to mitigate backlash against the recent throttling of Telegram and YouTube by promising to allow advertising on these platforms through the end of 2026.

• Russia is trying to increase its number of trained drone operators and specialists in 2026.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction, in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Hulyaipole direction.



• Ukrainian forces conducted mid-range strikes against Russian military assets in occupied Ukraine. Russian forces launched 147 drones against Ukraine.

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