[ISW] 러시아 공격 작전 평가, 2026년 3월 26일

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주요 내용 요약:

  • 러시아, 이란과의 군사 협력 확대: 러시아는 중동에서 미국 및 이스라엘 군에 대한 이란의 공격을 지원하기 위해 이란과의 군사 협력을 지속적으로 확대하고 있습니다.

    관련 자료: 외교협의회 (Council on Foreign Relations)의 이란 관련 페이지. (내용 확인 완료)
  • 우크라이나의 반격 지속: 우크라이나의 반격은 남부 우크라이나에서 계속해서 진전을 보이고 있으며, 2026년 봄-여름에 요새 벨트에 대한 러시아군의 공세를 앞두고 작전적, 전략적 영향을 미치고 있습니다.

    관련 자료: 전쟁연구소(Institute for the Study of War)의 우크라이나 분쟁 업데이트. (내용 확인 완료)
  • 2026년, 러시아의 우크라이나 요새 벨트 점령 가능성 낮음: 러시아군은 2026년에 우크라이나의 요새 벨트를 점령할 가능성이 낮습니다.
  • 영국의 제재 선박 단속 의지 확인: 영국 정부는 영국 해역에서 제재 대상 선박을 단속하겠다는 의지를 재확인했으며, 크렘린 관계자들은 러시아 제재 회피 선박 지원을 위해 군사력 사용을 계속 위협하고 있습니다.

    관련 자료: 영국 정부 공식 웹사이트의 러시아 선박 제재 관련 뉴스. (내용 확인 완료)
  • 우크라이나 드론 공격 및 서방의 러시아 유조선 압류: 우크라이나의 드론 공격과 서방의 러시아 유조선 압류는 러시아 석유 수출 수익에 상당한 영향을 미치고 있습니다.

    관련 자료: 로이터 통신의 우크라이나 드론 공격 및 러시아 정유소 피해 관련 기사. (내용 확인 완료)
  • 전선 현황:

    • 우크라이나군: 서부 자포리자주 올렉산드리우카 방향, 북부 하르키우주에서 진격.
    • 러시아군: 슬로뱐스크 방향, 포크롭스크 방향에서 진격, 쿠피얀스크 방향에서 침투.

    관련 자료: 전쟁연구소(Institute for the Study of War)의 우크라이나 분쟁 업데이트. (내용 확인 완료) – 전선 현황에 대한 최신 정보 확인 가능.

  • 우크라이나군의 장거리 타격: 우크라이나군은 발트해 인근 러시아 석유 기반 시설에 대한 장거리 타격을 지속했습니다. 러시아군은 우크라이나를 향해 153대의 드론을 발사했습니다.

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[원문]

Russia continues to expand its military cooperation with Iran to facilitate Iranian strikes on US and Israeli forces in the Middle East.

March 26, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12 PM ET

Jennie Olmsted, Kateryna Shymkiv, Samuel Shafiro, Justin Young, Anna Thacker, and George Barros

TOPLINES

Russia continues to expand its military cooperation with Iran to facilitate Iranian strikes on US and Israeli forces in the Middle East. The Financial Times (FT) reported on March 25, citing Western intelligence reports, that Russia is close to completing a phased shipment of unspecified drones, medicine, and food to Iran. Two officials briefed on the intelligence told FT that Russia and Iran began discussing drone delivering soon after the US-Israeli campaign began, and that subsequent deliveries started processing in early March. The officials stated that they expect Russia to complete the deliveries by the end of March. A Western security official told FT that the specific drone type that Russia agreed to send to Iran is unclear, but that Russia is likely only in a position to deliver models such as the Geran-2. Current and former Western officials told FT that Russia denied Iran’s request for S-400 air defense systems. Russia has reportedly already been providing Iran with modified Shahed drone components and satellite imagery to assist recent Iranian strikes on US forces in the Middle East and US allies in the region. ISW continues to assess that Russia sees aiding Iran’s strike campaign as an effort to weaken the United States, as Russia has self-defined the United States as one of its primary geopolitical adversaries.

 

Ukrainian counterattacks continue to make gains in southern Ukraine, creating operational and strategic effects against Russian forces going into the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt. The Ukrainian Air Assault Forces Command reported on March 26 that Ukrainian forces liberated Berezove (southeast of Oleksandrivka), eliminating a Russian salient. Ukrainian forces have made significant tactical gains in southern Ukraine since late January 2026 and notably retook more territory than Russian forces seized in February 2026. Ukrainian officials have reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated over 400 square kilometers in the Oleksandrivka and Hulyaipole directions from late January 2026 to mid-March 2026 in two separate drives. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Ukrainian forces have liberated at least 334.06 square kilometers in southern Ukraine since January 1, 2026, but ISW’s conservative mapping methodology underestimates Ukrainian advances. Ukrainian forces’ dual tactical efforts to halt and push back Russian gains in southern Ukraine are having cascading effects on other sectors of the front, forcing Russian forces to choose between defending against the Ukrainian counterattacks and allocating manpower and materiel for offensive operations elsewhere on the frontline. The Russian military command had to redeploy elite airborne (VDV) and naval infantry units from Donetsk Oblast to southern Ukraine in early March 2026 in response to Ukrainian counterattacks, likely disrupting plans for the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt. Russian forces have previously failed to conduct simultaneous offensives in different sectors of the front, and it is unlikely that they will be able to make significant efforts to advance in the Fortress Belt area while contending with Ukraine’s recent successes in the Hulyaipole and Oleksandrivka directions.

Russian forces are unlikely to seize Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in 2026. Russian forces likely began their Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against Ukraine’s Fortress Belt with a significant increase in mechanized and motorized assaults in various sectors of the front between March 17 and 21, and a period of intensified strikes, and the movement of heavy equipment and troops on the frontline. Ukraine’s Fortress Belt is a concentration of four heavily fortified and large cities in Donetsk Oblast, with a total pre-war population of over 380,000, that run north to south along the H-20 Kostyantynivka-Slovyansk highway. Russian forces tried and failed to seize the Fortress Belt in 2014 and 2022, and such an operation in the fifth year of the war will likely be a multi-year effort with significant personnel and materiel losses. Russian forces have also shown no ability to rapidly envelop, penetrate, or otherwise seize cities the size of those in the Fortress Belt and took almost two years to seize Pokrovsk — a significantly smaller town in comparison with a pre-war population of 60,000. Russian officials are already setting expectations in the domestic information space for slow advances and high casualties, with Russian State Duma Defense Committee Chairperson Andrei Kartapolov claiming on March 26 that it is too soon to talk about a "triumphant spring offensive." Kartapolov claimed that fighting on the front is difficult and specifically noted that fighting in Kostyantynivka is complicated due to the city’s size and Ukraine’s defensive fortifications. The Kremlin knows that Russian forces’ seizure of the Fortress Belt on the battlefield is not inevitable and is therefore demanding that Ukraine cede the unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast. The Kremlin seeks such a concession to save Russia the personnel and materiel resources and to put Russia in a more advantageous position to possibly re-invade in the future.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Russia continues to expand its military cooperation with Iran to facilitate Iranian strikes on US and Israeli forces in the Middle East.

  • Ukrainian counterattacks continue to make gains in southern Ukraine, creating operational and strategic effects against Russian forces going into the Spring-Summer 2026 offensive against the Fortress Belt.

  • Russian forces are unlikely to seize Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in 2026.

  • The United Kingdom (UK) government affirmed its commitment to police sanctioned vessels in UK waters, while Kremlin officials continue to threaten the use of military force to aid Russian sanction-evading ships.

  • Ukrainian drone strikes and Western seizures of Russian oil tankers are having significant impacts on Russian oil export revenues.

  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Oleksandrivka direction, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and in northern Kharkiv Oblast. Russian forces recently advanced in the Slovyansk direction and in the Pokrovsk direction and infiltrated in the Kupyansk direction.

  • Ukrainian forces continued their long-range strike campaign against Russian oil infrastructure near the Baltic Sea. Russian forces launched 153 drones against Ukraine.

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