March 27, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Kelly Campa, Ben Rezaei, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, Nidal Morrison, Grace Mappes, and Annika Ganzeveld

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Iran may be attempting to maximize the effects of its limited capacity to launch large missile salvos at Israel by launching small missile salvos throughout the day to impose psychological effects on Israeli civilians by consistently forcing them to take shelter and keeping the country under constant alert. Iran has launched between five and 11 missile barrages at Israel per day over the past week. The IDF reported on March 27 that Iran has launched about 10 missiles at Israel per day, which suggests that each Iranian barrage has consisted of either a single missile or a small number of missiles. Iran is spreading out its launches throughout the day, often pausing for several hours between launches. Ballistic missiles take about 10 minutes to reach Israel once launched from Iran. Spreading out ballistic missile launches over a long period of time presumably increases the number of times per day that Israeli civilians must seek shelter.

Such a strategy is suboptimal and likely reflects the US-Israeli combined force’s degradation of Iran’s ability to launch large-scale missile attacks. Iran has long sought to overwhelm Israeli air defenses through large missile and drone strike packages. Iran launched hundreds of ballistic and cruise missiles and one-way attack drones targeting Israel in April and October 2024, for example. The combined force’s degradation of Iran’s missile capabilities has prevented Iran from consistently launching large-scale missile attacks against Israel during the current conflict, however. The combined force has struck missile launchers, missile storage facilities, and dropped heavy munitions on hardened Iranian missile bases during the war. Iran could be launching smaller salvos due to its depleted missile stockpile. The United States assesses ”with certainty” that the combined force has destroyed about a third of Iran’s missile stockpile and assesses that the combined force has likely ”damaged, destroyed, or buried” another third of Iran’s missile stockpile, according to five people familiar with US intelligence speaking to Reuters on March 27. The decline could also reflect a deliberate Iranian strategy to protect missile launchers from combined force airstrikes by only fielding a small number of launchers at a time. The IDF has destroyed or rendered inoperable around 330 out of Iran’s 470 missile launchers. An Israeli OSINT account posted footage of an Iranian missile launch from the Yazd Missile Base on March 27. The combined force struck the base several hours later, which highlights how the combined force is patrolling Iranian airspace and striking targets as they appear.

• Iran may be attempting to maximize the effects of its limited capacity to launch large missile salvos at Israel by launching small missile salvos throughout the day to impose psychological effects on Israeli civilians by consistently forcing them to take shelter and keeping the country under constant alert. Iran is spreading out its launches throughout the day, often pausing for several hours between launches. Spreading out ballistic missile launches over a long period of time presumably increases the number of times per day that Israeli civilians must seek shelter.

• Such a strategy is suboptimal and likely reflects the US-Israeli combined force’s degradation of Iran’s ability to launch large-scale missile attacks. The combined force’s degradation of Iran’s missile capabilities has prevented Iran from consistently launching large-scale missile attacks against Israel during the current conflict, however.

• Iran has increasingly used cluster munitions in its attacks on Israel during the war, which likely reflects Iran’s inability to meaningfully threaten discrete military targets in Israel and efforts to inflict psychological effects on Israeli civilians.

• Ukraine and Saudi Arabia concluded a defense cooperation agreement on March 27. The Ukrainian Presidential Office reported that Ukraine will help Saudi Arabia with air defenses under the agreement, which also outlines the foundations for further contacts and includes technological cooperation and investments.

• The combined force has continued to disrupt Iran’s ability to launch missile attacks, including by disrupting Iranian efforts to regain access to missile launchers in underground bases. US Central Command (CENTCOM) published footage on March 27 showing that it struck bulldozers and loaders that Iran was likely using to try to clear debris and reopen tunnel entrances to underground facilities.



• The IDF struck Iranian nuclear infrastructure on March 27, including sites involved in plutonium production and the uranium fuel cycle. The IDF struck the Arak Heavy Water Production Facility in Arak, Markazi Province, following repeated Iranian attempts to restore the site following IDF strikes on the site during the June 2025 Israel-Iran War. The IDF also struck the Ardakan Yellowcake Production Plant in Yazd Province.

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