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North Korea’s test of a high-thrust solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) engine signals efforts to develop multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV). The MIRV program aims to complicate US and allied defense systems and secure a credible second-strike capability as part of North Korea’s deterrent strategy. North Korean state media reported on March 29 that Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un observed a high-thrust solid-fuel engine ejection test using carbon fiber composite materials. North Korea claimed that the engine produces a maximum thrust of 2,500 kilonewtons (kN), an increase of over 20 percent from the 1,971 kN engine tested in September 2025, which was itself described as a 40 percent improvement over its predecessor. The US Minuteman III, by comparison, produces approximately 891 kN, Russia’s Topol-M generates approximately 913 kN, and the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) DF-41 produces an estimated 1,100-1,400 kN. A 2,500 kN engine would thus exceed the thrust of any currently operational ICBM.
High engine thrust gives missiles long ranges even when equipped with multiple warheads, which increase the missile’s overall weight. The use of carbon fiber composite materials could also reduce missile weight and improve payload capacity. The Stimson Center’s 38 North publication assessed that North Korea’s solid-fuel ICBMs likely have a range of over 15,000 kilometers, which would allow them to strike targets in the United States. North Korea likely aims to pursue MIRV capabilities, which would allow simultaneous nuclear strikes against separate targets, complicating missile defense.
North Korea is continuing to expand the breadth and depth of its international engagement, strengthening its resilience against sanctions and its leverage in future negotiations. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko visited Pyongyang for the first time on March 25 and 26 and met with Kim Jong Un. Kim invited Lukashenko to visit Pyongyang when they met in Beijing in September 2025, on the sidelines of the PRC’s Victory over Japan Day parade. Kim and Lukashenko on March 26 signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation that laid out a legal framework for North Korea-Belarus bilateral cooperation. Neither side has disclosed the content of the treaty at the time of this writing, but it does not appear to be a mutual-defense treaty such as the one North Korea signed with Russia in 2024. The two sides also signed agreements on cooperation in education, culture, healthcare, agriculture, information and press, and other fields. Such agreements may alleviate some of North Korea’s economic hardships and support its external propaganda. Lukashenko also invited Kim to visit Minsk and ordered the opening of a Belarusian embassy in Pyongyang on March 27. Lukashenko reportedly offered to mediate on Kim’s behalf during Lukashenko’s upcoming meeting with Trump, to dissuade the United States from escalating tensions.
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