April 1, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Ria Reddy, Ben Schmida, Nidal Morrison, Ben Rezaei, Adham Fattah, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

As the Middle East crisis evolves, ISW urgently needs your support.

Help us stay independent and impactful.

Senior officials in Tehran have signaled that they seek to use the Strait of Hormuz and energy flows around it as points of leverage that Iran can use after the war to extract concessions and secure strategic aims. Multiple Iranian officials and institutions, including Iranian parliament speaker and key regime leader Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, several IRGC-linked media platforms, and an analyst close to Iranian security institutions, all highlighted the strait’s value as leverage and Iran’s ability to use its leverage over shipping through the strait to “ensure” the regime’s survival now and in the future. Some of the officials discussing the value of the Hormuz are not decisionmakers, but their statements reflect a broader discussion in Tehran about how to achieve short- and long-term military and strategic aims. The analyst close to the regime stated on April 1 that Iran can remove the ability of the United States and Israel to threaten it if it maintains its "legal-security dominance" over the strait even after the war ends.

These statements indicate that Iran could continue to use its proven ability to disrupt shipping in the strait after the war ends to deter the United States and its partners or compel them to avoid actions that would have negative impacts on Iran. Iran would not need to continue attacks indefinitely to retain the ability to deter and coerce the United States and its partners using the leverage Tehran has over the straits. Iran now has a proven ability to disrupt the global economy by shutting down the Strait, and it could threaten to disrupt shipping in the future for any reason and at any time. Iran may be especially incentivized to leverage its control around the strait if it concludes that such actions are an effective means of coercing the United States and its partners.

Iran has continued attacks on shipping amid discussions in Tehran about Iran’s leverage over the strait. Iran attacked the Panamanian-flagged AQUA 1 oil tanker, leased by Qatari state-owned energy firm, 17 nautical miles northwest of Ras Laffan, Qatar. The tanker’s hull sustained damage. This is the second Iranian attack on a civilian vessel in two consecutive days. Such attacks are one of the ways that Iran can impede shipping around the strait.

• Senior officials in Tehran have signaled that they seek to use the Strait of Hormuz and energy flows around it as points of leverage that Iran can use after the war to extract concessions and secure strategic aims. They have also signaled that they will not accept a ceasefire or halt disruptions to international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz unless the United States and Israel cease all attacks on Iran.

• Iran has continued attacks on shipping amid discussions in Tehran about Iran’s leverage over the strait. Iran attacked the Panamanian-flagged AQUA 1 oil tanker, leased by Qatari state-owned energy firm, 17 nautical miles northwest of Ras Laffan, Qatar.

• These statements indicate that Iran could continue to use its proven ability to disrupt shipping in the strait after the war ends to deter the United States and its partners or compel them to avoid actions that would have negative impacts on Iran. 

• The IDF stated on April 1 that it struck “approximately 15 weapons production sites,” including a Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL) complex for advanced missile production.

• The IDF struck a pharmaceutical research and development company that supplied the Iranian regime with materials, such as fentanyl, that can be used for chemical weapons.

• The IDF killed IRGC Quds Force Lebanon Corps Engineering Head responsible for advancing underground projects in Lebanon and Syria for Hezbollah and the Assad regime and he managed dozens of underground facilities in Lebanon used to store advanced weapons.

• Iran launched five missile salvoes, including a 10-missile salvo, which was among the largest missile salvoes targeting Israel since the beginning of the war. It remains unclear if this was a one-off large salvo or will become part of a trend.

• Iran launched 19 drones and four ballistic missiles targeting Bahrain on April 1. One or more of these targeted a company in Bahrain. This follows the IRGC’s threat on March 31 that it would target US‑linked information, communications, artificial intelligence, and advanced technology firms in retaliation for US and Israeli attacks.

• Hezbollah claimed that it conducted 71 attacks targeting northern Israeli communities and Israeli forces and positions in northern Israel and southern Lebanon between 2:00 PM ET on March 31 and 2:00 PM ET on April 1.

• The Houthis launched an unspecified number of ballistic missiles targeting southern Israel on April 1. This attack marks the fourth time that the Houthis have attacked Israel since entering the conflict on March 28. The Houthis claimed that it coordinated the ballistic missile attack on Israel with Hezbollah and Iran.

ISW offers customizable email subscription options. Click below to learn more and customize your preferences.

Website | Jobs | Internships

Follow ISW on social media:

Facebook | X | YouTube | Instagram | LinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.

ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

ISW is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.