[ISW] 러시아 공세 작전 평가, 2026년 4월 1일

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핵심 요약:

  • 러시아 국방부(MoD)는 러시아군이 전면적인 침공 과정에서 세 번째로 루한스크주 전체를 점령했다고 주장했습니다. 하지만 러시아군은 2022년 10월부터 루한스크주 대부분을 통제해 왔습니다.
  • 크렘린의 루한스크주 점령에 대한 과장된 주장은, 우크라이나가 점령되지 않은 도네츠크주를 포기하도록 강요하기 위한, 위기감을 조성하려는 광범위한 정보 캠페인의 일환입니다.
  • 러시아군은 3월 31일 밤부터 4월 1일 낮까지 두 차례에 걸쳐 총 700대의 드론을 발사하는 등 우크라이나를 상대로 또 다른 장기간의 공격을 감행했습니다.
  • 러시아의 새로운 장기간의 야간 및 주간 공격 전술은 현재 이란이 이스라엘과 걸프 지역에 드론 및 미사일 공격을 감행하는 방식의 측면을 반영합니다.
  • ISW는 3월 23일 이후 7대의 우크라이나 드론이 발트해 및 핀란드 영토에 추락했다는 보고를 관찰했습니다. 이는 러시아의 전자전(EW) 노력의 결과일 수 있습니다.
  • 러시아의 비에너지 자원 수출은 중동에서 진행 중인 전쟁으로 인해 이익을 얻고 있습니다.
  • 크렘린은 강제적인 은밀한 동원 노력의 일환으로 대학생들에게 눈을 돌리고 있다는 보도가 있습니다.
  • 유럽 연합(EU)은 동결된 러시아 자산에서 발생한 14억 유로를 우크라이나 지원에 사용할 것입니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 포크로우스크 및 훌랴이폴레 방향으로 진격했습니다.

관련 최신 자료 및 링크:

  1. 루한스크주 상황 및 러시아의 정보 작전 관련:

  2. 러시아의 드론 공격 및 전술 변화 관련:

  3. 전자전(EW) 및 드론 문제:

  4. EU의 지원 및 우크라이나 상황:

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**참고:**

* 위 링크들은 제공된 정보와 관련하여 현재까지 공개된 최신 자료들을 바탕으로 합니다.
* 각 링크의 내용이 시간이 지남에 따라 변경될 수 있으므로, 최신 정보를 확인하는 것이 중요합니다.
* 일부 링크는 영어로 제공될 수 있습니다. 필요에 따라 번역기를 활용하여 내용을 파악하십시오.
* ISW는 Institute for the Study of War (전쟁연구소)의 약자입니다.
* MoD는 Ministry of Defense (국방부)의 약자입니다.
* EU는 European Union (유럽 연합)의 약자입니다.

[원문]

Russian forces conducted another prolonged strike series against Ukraine with a total of 700 drones launched in two waves

April 1, 2026

Assessment as of: 8:00 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 12:30 PM ET

Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Samuel Shafiro, Diana Nasreddine, Christina Harward, and Karolina Hird

TOPLINES

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the third time over the course of Russia’s full-scale invasion, even though Russian forces have controlled most of Luhansk Oblast since October 2022. The Russian MoD claimed on April 1 that Russian forces seized all of Luhansk Oblast. ISW has observed evidence to assess that Russian forces control 99.84 percent of Luhansk Oblast as of April 1 but have not seized Nadiya and Novoyehorivka (both east of Borova). Russian officials have repeatedly claimed that Russian forces control all of Luhansk Oblast throughout the war. Then-Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu claimed in July 2022 that Russian forces seized the oblast, and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Head Leonid Pasechnik made the same claim again in June 2025. Russian President Vladimir Putin later claimed in October 2025 that Ukrainian forces only maintained positions in 0.13 percent of Luhansk Oblast. Russian forces have controlled most of Luhansk Oblast since Fall 2022, when the frontline in this area settled following the Ukrainian Kharkiv counteroffensive. Kremlin claims in 2025 and 2026 about seizing the oblast are aggrandizing miniscule changes on the front in Luhansk Oblast in order to create the false impression that Russian forces are rapidly advancing on various sectors of the battlefield.

The Kremlin’s aggrandized claims about the seizure of Luhansk Oblast are part of a wider coordinated information campaign that aims to create a false sense of urgency to force Ukraine to cede unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast. The Russian MoD’s claim about Luhansk Oblast is part of the Kremlin’s ongoing cognitive warfare effort aimed at portraying Ukrainian defenses as on the verge of collapse to drive the United States and Ukraine’s other partners into forcing Ukraine to unnecessarily cede territory that Russian forces are very unlikely to seize militarily in the medium term, if at all. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated on March 31 that Russia is demanding that Ukrainian forces withdraw from the remainder of Donetsk Oblast within two months (by late May 2026) and implied that the Kremlin is trying to create a perception that Russia will imminently take Donbas and will make new, harsher demands if Ukraine does not withdraw from Donetsk Oblast on the Kremlin-dictated timeline. Kremlin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov answered a question on April 1 about the alleged two-month deadline, claiming that Zelensky must make this decision “today” but ideally should have made it “yesterday.” Russian State Duma Defense Committee Member Andrei Kolesnik claimed that Zelensky should have withdrawn from Donetsk Oblast “the day before yesterday.” State Duma International Affairs Committee First Deputy Head Alexei Chepa claimed that Russia’s new terms in the future could include demands that Ukraine also withdraw from Zaporizhia and Kherson oblasts and cede Odesa, Mykolaiv, Dnipro, and Kharkiv cities. Kremlin threats that Russian forces are going to “inevitably” seize Donetsk Oblast militarily or even seize territory outside of the five regions that Russia has illegally annexed are not new. Russian officials have routinely called Odesa and Kharkiv cities “Russian” cities, for example. The Kremlin has been making these demands for years but is likely amplifying them now as US-Ukrainian-Russian negotiations have stalled due to the ongoing war in the Middle East.

Russian claims that Russian forces will be able to seize the rest of Donetsk Oblast easily — let alone make large-scale advances to seize major cities in other oblasts far from the frontline — are absurd and do not correspond with the current battlefield realities. The current battlefield realities and recent Ukrainian advances show that significant Russian battlefield gains are not inevitable, particularly against the large and well-fortified cities of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt in Donetsk Oblast. The Russian military command has previously set ambitious deadlines for the seizure of Ukraine’s Fortress Belt, and Russian forces have repeatedly failed to meet these goals. Ukrainian successes in 2026 have likely further disrupted Russia’s preparations for its spring-summer offensive against the Fortress Belt, with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky noting on April 1 that Russian forces were unable to achieve their goals in Donetsk Oblast and had to again postpone their deadlines. Russian forces have also been unable to take advantage of their yearslong control over a majority of Luhansk Oblast to launch a successful offensive against Slovyansk or Izyum from the east of northeast. Russian advances have actually slowed since the start of 2026, with Ukrainian forces having shown their ability to contest the initiative for a protracted period and successfully counterattacking in various parts of the frontline.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces seized the entirety of Luhansk Oblast for the third time over the course of Russia’s full-scale invasion, even though Russian forces have controlled most of Luhansk Oblast since October 2022.

  • The Kremlin’s aggrandized claims about the seizure of Luhansk Oblast are part of a wider coordinated information campaign that aims to create a false sense of urgency to force Ukraine to cede unoccupied parts of Donetsk Oblast.

  • Russian forces conducted another prolonged strike series against Ukraine with a total of 700 drones launched in two waves on the night of March 31 to April 1 and during the day on April 1.

  • Russia’s new tactic of prolonged nighttime and daytime strikes reflects aspects of the way Iran is currently launching drone and missile salvos at Israel and the Gulf.

  • ISW has observed reports of seven Ukrainian drones crashing in Baltic and Finnish territory since March 23, possibly as a result of Russian electronic warfare (EW) efforts.

  • Russian exports of non-energy resources are benefiting from the ongoing war in the Middle East.

  • The Kremlin is reportedly turning to university students as part of its forced covert mobilization efforts.

  • The European Union (EU) will transfer €1.4 billion in proceeds from frozen Russian assets to aid Ukraine.

  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Pokrovsk and Hulyaipole directions.

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