March 31, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Katherine Wells, Ben Schmida, Ben Rezaei, Nidal Morrison, Ria Reddy, and Brian Carter

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The combined force campaign targeting Iranian commanders is likely impeding their ability to conduct sizable and coordinated attacks. Officials familiar with US and Western intelligence assessments speaking to the New York Times on March 30 said that the deaths of local Iranian commanders have degraded the ability of local Iranian commanders to communicate to launch large and coordinated attacks. The targeted killing of local commanders has immediate practical effects by removing key commanders who give orders. Decapitation also creates a pervasive fear that can cause targeted commanders to take precautions to survive that impede their ability to execute their assigned mission. US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth stated on March 31 that combined force airstrikes have degraded the Iranian military’s morale and even led to “widespread desertions, key personnel shortages and causing frustrations amongst senior leaders.” The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) are evidently facing recruitment struggles as they lowered the recruitment age to 12 to support patrols, checkpoints, and logistics.

Iran launched only three missile barrages at Israel since ISW-CTP’s last data cutoff at 2:00 PM ET on March 30, marking its lowest barrage rate of the war to date. These salvoes also contain only a small number of missiles, which may be a byproduct of Iranian command-and-control challenges highlighted previously. Iran has been firing only a few missiles per salvo at Israel since March 20. The three waves only consisted of one missile in two of the waves and a “small” number of missiles in the third wave. Smaller salvoes are relatively easier for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)’s air defense systems to intercept, as demonstrated by their performance against small Houthi salvoes between 2023 and 2025. Iran has only been launching one missile per salvo and three to seven salvoes per day at Israel for the past four days. This is considerably less compared to what Iran fired at the start of the war. The IDF also assessed that Iran’s missile fire targeting Israel has slowed to around 10-15 missiles a day over the past two weeks. The low salvo and missile-per-salvo rate targeting Israel does not necessarily imply Iran is suffering the same challenges when it comes to its short-range ballistic missiles that target the Gulf states, though March 31 saw a lower number of missiles targeting the Gulf states than the average. Hegseth separately confirmed on March 31 that Iran launched its lowest number of missiles and drones in general in the past 24 hours.

• The combined force campaign targeting Iranian commanders is likely impeding their ability to conduct sizable and coordinated attacks. Officials familiar with US and Western intelligence assessments speaking to the New York Times on March 30 said that the deaths of local Iranian commanders have degraded the ability of local Iranian commanders to communicate to launch large and coordinated attacks. The targeted killing of local commanders has immediate practical effects by removing key commanders who give orders. Decapitation also creates a pervasive fear that can cause targeted commanders to take precautions to survive that impede their ability to execute their assigned mission.

• Iran launched only three missile barrages at Israel since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff, marking its lowest barrage rate of the war to date. These salvoes also contain only a small number of missiles, which may be a byproduct of Iranian command-and-control challenges highlighted previously. Iran has been firing only a few missiles per salvo at Israel since March 20.

• The Iranian Parliament National Security Commission passed a bill on March 30 titled the “Strait of Hormuz Management Plan,” which outlines a series of policies that assert that Iran has sovereignty over international waterways in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s parliament has little real power but its decision to pass this bill represents a desire in Tehran to continue to impede international shipping around the Strait after the war. Iran could use these threats to coerce concessions from the United States or its partners or deter them.

• Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Kataib Hezbollah almost certainly executed the kidnapping of US freelance journalist Shelly Kittleson in Baghdad City, Iraq, on March 31.

• Hezbollah conducted four first-person view (FPV) drone strikes against IDF armored vehicles in southern Lebanon on March 31. None of the IDF’s armored vehicles that Hezbollah struck with FPV drones appeared to be equipped with improvised top-mounted slat armor to protect the vehicles against FPV drone attacks or anti-tank munitions.

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