April 15, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Ria Reddy, Ben Rezaei, Benjamin Schmida, Parker Hempel, Nidal Morrison, Adham Fattah, Carolyn Moorman, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

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US naval forces continued to enforce the blockade on Iranian ports. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on April 15 that no vessels had breached the blockade on Iranian ports during the first 48 hours of enforcement. CENTCOM stated that nine vessels complied with the US direction to turn around and return to Iranian ports or coastal areas. CENTCOM added that US forces have halted economic maritime trade to and from Iran and are prepared to act against any vessels attempting to violate the blockade. Additional CENTCOM reporting indicates that the US forces redirected at least one Iranian-flagged cargo vessel after it departed Bandar Abbas, Hormozgan Province.

The United States has reportedly set two preconditions for another round of negotiations: first, Iran must fully “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz, and second, the Iranian negotiating delegation must have “full authority” to finalize a deal. Iran has not conducted any kinetic activity targeting international shipping since April 7. Iran does not need to conduct attacks against vessels to maintain the threat to international shipping, however. The decision for vessels to transit the strait is for the shipping companies, which will likely be hesitant to move vessels through the Strait until Iran provides reassurance that it does not pose a threat to their vessels and cargo.

The second precondition, which demands that Iran‘s delegation have “full authority“ from Iran’s senior leadership (including the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)) to finalize a deal, corroborates ISW-CTP’s assessment that the United States is negotiating with a divided council of hardliners and pragmatists rather than a singular, unified authority. US Vice President JD Vance stated on April 14 that he believed that the Iranian negotiators in Islamabad wanted to make a deal, which implies that he assesses that the hardliners in Tehran were responsible for Iran’s reticence to make a deal. Anti-regime media separately reported on April 14 that Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary General Mohammad Bagher Zolghadr was furious when Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi allegedly appeared open to compromising on halting Iranian funding for the Axis of Resistance at the US-Iran negotiations in Islamabad on April 11. Zolghadr then reportedly briefed Araghchi’s “deviation” to senior leadership, including by sending messages to IRGC officials and Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei’s close affiliate Hossein Taeb, which resulted in the leadership ordering the delegation to leave after 21 hours of negotiations. Zolghadr was one of the founding members of the IRGC Quds Force and helped establish some of the groups that now comprise the Axis of Resistance. Unspecified mediators speaking to the Wall Street Journal on April 15 confirmed that Zolghadr has been “highly influential” in Iranian decision-making in US-Iran negotiations. These reports follow previous anti-regime media reports on April 10 that IRGC Commander and key decisionmaker Major General Ahmad Vahidi pushed to get Zolghadr on the Iranian delegation to Islamabad, but the delegation leaders Araghchi and Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf pushed back due to Zolghadr’s lack of diplomatic experience. The senior leadership’s response to withdraw the delegation after Araghchi’s reported openness to discussing Iran’s support for the Axis of Resistance shows how unwilling the hardliners are to compromise on Iranian positions and how much sway they have over Iranian decision-making.

• US naval forces continued to enforce the blockade on Iranian ports. US Central Command (CENTCOM) reported on April 15 that no vessels had breached the blockade on Iranian ports during the first 48 hours of enforcement.

• The United States has reportedly set two preconditions for another round of negotiations: first, Iran must fully “reopen” the Strait of Hormuz, and second, the Iranian negotiating delegation must have “full authority” to finalize a deal. The second precondition comes amid reports of intra-regime conflict and corroborates ISW-CTP’s assessment that the United States is negotiating with a divided council of hardliners and pragmatists rather than a singular, unified authority.

• Some Iranian officials have signaled different levels of willingness to compromise on Iran’s nuclear program in negotiations with the United States. These statements, at least to some extent, reflect internal disagreement over Iran’s negotiating position.

• Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated on April 14 that the United States and Israel have decided that removing the enriched uranium from Iran is a “threshold condition” for ending the US-Israeli campaign.

• The US Treasury sanctioned 29 targets, including three individuals, 17 companies, and nine vessels on April 15, which are tied to Iranian oil smuggling and associated financing networks as part of the United States’ broader economic pressure campaign on Iran.

• Pakistan is reportedly pushing the United States and Iran to extend the ceasefire by 45 days. US President Donald Trump told ABC News on April 14 that he is not considering extending the ceasefire that ends on April 22.

• Iran is exploiting the current ceasefire to reorganize and regenerate its ballistic missile forces program on the tactical level by attempting to reopen tunnel entrances at missile bases.

• Iran reportedly utilized an advanced reconnaissance satellite purchased from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2024 to target US military assets and bases across the Middle East during the war.



• The Israeli Security Cabinet reportedly held a meeting on April 15 to discuss a possible ceasefire in Lebanon, amid recent direct talks between Israel and Lebanon under US auspices. Israeli officials have not announced the outcome of the security cabinet meeting at the time of this writing, however.

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