August 27, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Ben Rezaei, Ria Reddy, Nidal Morrison, Avery Borens, Adham Fattah, Ben Schmida, Kelly Campa, Henry Jenks, and Annika Ganzeveld

The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) will reportedly initiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process as soon as August 28, according to three European diplomats and one Western diplomat. The JCPOA snapback mechanism allows JCPOA signatories to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran in the event of “significant non-performance” of JCPOA commitments. The snapback mechanism is currently set to expire on October 18, 2025. The E3 imposed a deadline of August 31 on Iran to make meaningful progress toward a nuclear deal, such as by renewing cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and resuming negotiations with the United States. The E3 offered to postpone the expiration of the snapback mechanism to allow Iran more time to negotiate with the United States. Iran reportedly failed to make “sufficiently tangible commitments” during the most recent Iran-E3 meeting in Geneva on August 26. Another source stated that Iran offered “very little to work with” to secure an extension.

It is unclear if the E3 will initiate the dispute resolution process outlined in the JCPOA or directly refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC. The dispute resolution process can take up to 35 days and involves a series of steps that aim to resolve non-compliance issues. The E3 can choose to engage in the dispute resolution process and then refer the issue to the UNSC if it believes that Iran continues to show "significant non-performance." The E3 can, conversely, bypass the dispute resolution process and directly refer the non-compliance issue to the UNSC. The E3 would be required to include a description of "the good-faith efforts the [E3] made to exhaust the dispute resolution process" when they refer Iran’s non-compliance to the UNSC. The JCPOA gives the UNSC 30 days to pass a resolution to extend sanctions relief for Iran, but UNSC permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia) can veto such a resolution. The E3 is reportedly hopeful that Iran will make unspecified commitments regarding its nuclear program within 30 days that will allow the E3 to avoid reimposing UNSC sanctions on Iran. The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran’s missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.

Hardline Iranian parliamentarians criticized the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran and argued that their return undermines a recent law that parliament passed to restrict cooperation with the agency. These criticisms arose after IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi announced on August 26 that IAEA inspectors would soon resume inspections in Iran. Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Spokesperson Behrouz Kamalvandi stated on August 27 that IAEA inspectors will supervise the fuel replacement at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP) to ensure that electricity is produced in a timely manner. The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 to suspend all cooperation with the IAEA.

• Snapback Sanctions: The E3 (the United Kingdom, Germany, and France) will reportedly initiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback process as soon as August 28, according to three European diplomats and one Western diplomat. The snapback mechanism would reimpose six UNSC resolutions on Iran, including bans on the transfer of conventional arms to and from Iran, international support for Iran’s missile program, enrichment-related activities, and the testing and development of nuclear-capable missiles.

• Nuclear Inspections in Iran: Hardline Iranian parliamentarians criticized the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran and argued that their return undermines a recent law that parliament passed to restrict cooperation with the agency. Iran may have allowed IAEA inspectors to return to Iran to show limited cooperation and ease international pressure from the E3.

• Iranian Influence in Iraq: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani withdrew the Popular Mobilization Authority bill from parliament on August 27, reportedly due to US threats to sanction Iraq if he did not withdraw the bill. The Popular Mobilization Authority bill would likely increase Iran’s influence in the Iraqi political and security spheres by formalizing key structures of the Iranian-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).

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