[ISW] 러시아 공세 작전 평가, 2026년 4월 24일

“`html

핵심 내용 요약:

  • 러시아 중앙은행, 2026년에 세 번째, 지난 12개월 동안 여덟 번째로 기준 금리 인하: 러시아 경제가 안정적인 것처럼 보이려는 시도를 지속하면서.
  • 러시아 경제, 막대한 전쟁 지출로 계속 어려움 겪는 중:
  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴에 대한 사회적 불만 증가: 러시아 정부 소유 및 독립 기관의 여론조사에서 확인됨. 이는 러시아 국민의 희생 증가와 크렘린의 검열 강화 때문일 가능성 높음.
  • 우크라이나와 러시아, 4월 24일 포로 교환 실시:
  • 우크라이나군, 코스티안티니우카-드루주키우카 전술 지역 및 포크로우스크 방향에서 최근 진격:
  • 러시아, 밤사이 우크라이나에 이스칸데르-M 탄도 미사일 2발 및 드론 107대 발사: 우크라이나군은 최근 러시아 내 군사 및 방공 자산 공격.

최신 관련 자료 및 링크 (최신 정보를 위해 링크 내용을 직접 확인하세요):

  • 러시아 경제 상황 (영문):
    IMF – Russia (국제통화기금, IMF): 러시아 경제 전망, 금리 변동, 전쟁의 영향 등 관련 최신 자료.

    번역: 국제통화기금(IMF) 웹사이트에서 러시아 경제에 대한 기사들을 확인할 수 있습니다.
  • 러시아-우크라이나 전쟁 상황:
    Institute for the Study of War (ISW) (전쟁연구소, ISW): 전쟁 상황 분석, 전선 변화, 러시아의 공격 및 우크라이나의 반격에 대한 보고서.

    번역: 전쟁연구소(ISW)는 매일 전쟁 상황을 분석하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아 내 여론 동향:
    Levada Center (레바다 센터): 러시아 내 여론조사 결과, 푸틴 지지율, 전쟁에 대한 인식 변화 등. (영문/러시아어 제공)

    번역: 레바다 센터는 러시아 내 여론조사 기관으로, 러시아 국민들의 의견을 분석합니다.
  • 우크라이나 전쟁 포로 교환:
    U.S. Department of State – Prisoners of War in Ukraine (미국 국무부): 포로 교환 관련 보도자료 및 성명.

    번역: 미국 국무부 웹사이트에서 포로 교환과 관련된 내용을 확인할 수 있습니다.
  • 러시아의 군사 공격 및 우크라이나의 반격:
    BBC News – Ukraine war (BBC 뉴스): 전쟁 관련 뉴스, 군사 작전, 미사일 공격 등.

    번역: BBC 뉴스에서 우크라이나 전쟁 관련 소식을 확인할 수 있습니다.

주의: 위에 제시된 링크는 최신 정보를 얻기 위한 참고 자료이며, 각 링크의 내용이 항상 최신 상황을 반영한다고 보장할 수 없습니다. 따라서, 링크 내용을 직접 확인하여 최신 정보를 얻는 것이 중요합니다. 또한, 전쟁 상황은 유동적이므로 정보의 정확성을 위해 다양한 출처를 참고하는 것이 좋습니다.

“`

[원문]

The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the third time in 2026 and eighth time in the last 12 months while continuing attempts to portray the Russian economy as stable.

April 24, 2026

Assessment as of: 6:45 PM ET

Data Cutoff: 11:30 AM ET

Jennie Olmsted, Samuel Shafiro, Kateryna Shymkiv, Jessica Sobieski, Christina Harward, Nikolai Sundstrom, and Kateryna Stepanenko

TOPLINES

The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the third time in 2026 and eighth time in the last 12 months while continuing attempts to portray the Russian economy as stable. The Russian Central Bank announced on April 24 that it lowered its key interest rate from 15 to 14.5 percent. The Russian Central Bank previously lowered the key interest rate on February 13 and March 20, 2026. The Russian Central Bank claimed that Russian unemployment remains at historic lows and that wage growth continues to outpace productivity growth. The Russian Central Bank claimed that Russia’s annual inflation as of April 20 was 5.7 percent. The Russian Central Bank acknowledged that the Russian economy slowed and that core inflation rose in the first quarter of 2026 but claimed that the rise in inflation was due to “one-off factors.” Russian Central Bank Chairperson Elvira Nabiullina stated on April 24 that the Russian Central Bank slightly raised its average key rate forecast range for 2026 to 14 to 14.5 percent from 13.1 to 14.3 percent, as inflationary risks “significantly” increased due to the conflict in the Middle East and potential changes to Russia’s fiscal policy. The Russian Central Bank also adjusted its forecast for the price of oil per barrel in the medium term to $65 from $45 — likely in response to global oil price spikes throughout March and April 2026. Elevated Russian oil revenues may enable the Kremlin to continue to finance its war against Ukraine in the medium term but are unlikely to reverse the years of poor economic policy.

The Russian economy continues to struggle under the strain of immense war spending, however. Russia’s extremely low unemployment rate reflects the fact that Russia is experiencing labor shortages and is likely causing wage inflation in the civilian and defense sectors, contributing to overall inflation. Russia’s inflation rate is also likely much higher than the Central Bank claims, with grocery prices rising in the early months of 2026. Russia is incurring high levels of external debt and has gradually depleted its liquid reserves to fund its war in Ukraine, ignoring the long-term economic implications of the Kremlin’s economic policies. Russian business newspaper Vedomosti reported on April 23 that the number of planned layoffs in Russia increased by 43 percent since June 2025, amounting to 105,147 as of April 1. Oleg Sokolov, an official from the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, told Vedomosti that insufficient funds caused by federal and regional deficits could be driving the layoffs. Ukraine’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SZRU) reported on April 23 that Russia’s federal deficit reached 4.6 trillion rubles (roughly $61 billion) in the first quarter of 2026 — significantly more than its planned 3.8 trillion rubles (roughly $50 billion) deficit for all of 2026. Russia has steadily depleted its sovereign wealth fund’s liquid reserves in order to fund the war and had to resort to selling its physical gold reserves in November 2025 due to unsustainable spending. Russia also raised its value-added tax (VAT) from 20 to 22 percent as of January 1, 2026, in an attempt to buttress federal budget deficits from unsustainably high defense spending, placing the burden of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s costly war in Ukraine directly on the Russian population.

Polls from both Russian state-owned and independent institutions continue to acknowledge growing societal discontent with Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely due to the mounting war sacrifices for the Russian people and the Kremlin’s intensified censorship campaign. Russian state-owned polling institution All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) published on April 24 the results from a poll for the week of April 13 to 19, indicating that Putin’s approval rating declined for the seventh week in a row from 66.7 percent during the week of April 6 to 12 to 65.6 percent during the week of April 13 to 19. VTsIOM polling also indicates that trust in Putin fell to 71 percent during the week of April 13 to 19, down from 72 percent during the week of April 6 to 12. A source from an unspecified government-associated media organization told Russian opposition outlet Meduza that the Russian Presidential Administration’s political bloc advised Russian state media to either cite Putin’s more favorable approval rating from the Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Forum (FOM) or omit reports with polling data entirely. FOM’s most recent polling data found that Putin’s approval rating was around 76 percent during the week of April 17 to 19 — a difference of almost ten points compared to VTsIOM’s polling in a similar time frame. FOM data similarly indicates a medium-term decline in Putin’s approval rating, however, with FOM polls showing Putin’s approval rating between 75 and 76 percent as of late April 2026, down from 78 to 80 percent in February 2026.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Russian Central Bank lowered its key interest rate for the third time in 2026 and eighth time in the last 12 months while continuing attempts to portray the Russian economy as stable.

  • The Russian economy continues to struggle under the strain of immense war spending, however.

  • Polls from both Russian state-owned and independent institutions continue to acknowledge growing societal discontent with Russian President Vladimir Putin, likely due to the mounting war sacrifices for the Russian people and the Kremlin’s intensified censorship campaign.

  • Ukraine and Russia conducted a prisoner of war (POW) exchange on April 24.

  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area and in the Pokrovsk direction.

  • Russia launched two Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 107 drones against Ukraine overnight. Ukrainian forces recently struck Russian military and air defense assets in Russia.

EMAIL SUBSCRIPTION OPTIONS

ISW offers customizable email subscription options. Click below to learn more and customize your preferences.

ISW is powered by the support of individuals like you.

Help us stay independent and impactful.

Website | Jobs | Internships

Follow ISW on social media:

FacebookXYouTube | InstagramLinkedIn | Threads | Bluesky

© 2026 Institute for the Study of War and AEI’s Critical Threats Project. All rights reserved.

Donate online or by sending a check to the Institute for the Study of War at 1400 16th Street NW, Suite #515, Washington, DC 20036. Please consider including the Institute for the Study of War in your estate plans.

 

ISW is a tax-exempt organization under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Donations are tax-deductible to the extent permitted by law.

ISW is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization. ISW advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve US strategic objectives.

댓글 달기

이메일 주소는 공개되지 않습니다. 필수 필드는 *로 표시됩니다

위로 스크롤