April 30, 2026

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Katherine Wells, Parker Hempel, Ben Rezaei, Will Doran, Adham Fattah, Carolyn Moorman, and Annika Ganzeveld 

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Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei declared on April 30 that Iran will retain control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and maintain its nuclear and missile capabilities, which supports ISW-CTP’s assessment that the Iranian regime is unlikely to make meaningful concessions in its next proposal to the United States. Mojtaba published a written statement on April 30 in which he stated that Iran will implement a “new management” in the strait—likely in reference to Iran’s collection of tolls from vessels that transit the strait—as a means to “secure” the Persian Gulf and prevent “hostile” interference in the region. Mojtaba also underscored that Iran will defend its nuclear, missile, and advanced technological capabilities as resolutely as it defends its territorial borders. A senior Iranian official speaking to the Washington Post on April 30 similarly asserted that Iran’s security establishment rejects compromise on key matters, such as Iran’s ability to enrich uranium. Mojtaba’s statement and the Washington Post report are consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi, who appears to be dominating regime decision-making, is unwilling to make concessions regarding Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz or nuclear program. Vahidi reportedly maintains near-exclusive access to Mojtaba and serves as a gatekeeper who conveys Mojtaba’s approval of decisions. Pakistani mediators told Western media that Iran is expected to send them a revised proposal on May 1.

Some Iranian officials who have advocated for a “pragmatist” approach toward negotiations may be aligning themselves behind Vahidi’s redlines, which Mojtaba publicly endorsed in his April 30 statement. Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi has reportedly been acting in “full coordination” with Vahidi and following Vahidi’s “instructions” over the past two weeks, according to two informed sources speaking to anti-regime media on April 30. This report suggests that Araghchi may have aligned himself with Vahidi’s position on negotiations despite previous disputes in which Araghchi called negotiations that did not address Iran’s nuclear program a “death sentence.” Araghchi’s reported coordination with Vahidi in recent weeks is consistent with an April 30 Washington Post report, citing an unspecified Iranian official, that Iranian officials “yielded to pressure” from military and political hardliners to “deprioritize negotiations” after the United States and Iran failed to reach a deal during the first round of negotiations on April 11 and 12.

• Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei declared on April 30 that Iran will retain control over shipping through the Strait of Hormuz and maintain its nuclear and missile capabilities, which supports ISW-CTP’s assessment that the Iranian regime is unlikely to make meaningful concessions in its next proposal to the United States.

• Some Iranian officials who have advocated for a “pragmatist” approach toward negotiations may be aligning themselves behind Vahidi’s redlines, which Mojtaba publicly endorsed in his April 30 statement. Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi has reportedly been acting in “full coordination” with Vahidi and following Vahidi’s “instructions” over the past two weeks, according to two informed sources speaking to anti-regime media on April 30. This report suggests that Araghchi may have aligned himself with Vahidi’s position on negotiations.

• Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and President Masoud Pezeshkian are reportedly dissatisfied with Araghchi’s close cooperation with Vahidi and approach toward negotiations, even though they have publicly signaled their acquiescence to Vahidi’s hardline approach.



• Iran is trying to sow divisions between the Gulf states and the United States as part of a longstanding Iranian effort to push the Gulf countries to expel US forces from their territory.

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