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Iranian officials continue to frame control over the Strait of Hormuz as a key strategic interest and a critical component of long-term Iranian deterrence. Iran likely views control over the strait as essential to restoring deterrence against the United States and Israel following the degradation of its other forms of deterrence. Supreme Leader adviser Mohammad Mokhber stated in an interview with Iranian media that Iran’s position in the strait is similar to the strategic value of a nuclear weapon. Mokhber’s role as an adviser to the supreme leader suggests that his statements, at least in part, reflect the regime’s thinking at the highest levels. Mokhber argued that control over a major economic chokepoint gives Iran the ability to affect the global economy “with one decision.” He added that Iran “will not lose the strait under any circumstances.” Mokhber’s statements are consistent with ISW-CTP’s assessment that Iran’s principal positive strategic objective at this time is to secure recognition of its sovereignty over the strait. Mokhber’s characterization of the strait and his comparison between the strait and Iran’s nuclear program also reflect the regime’s evolving concept of deterrence. Iran appears to seek to use the strait as a future deterrent because its historical pillars of deterrence — including its missile and drone capabilities, proxy network, and air defense systems — have proven unable to deter major US or Israeli attack in June 2025 and Spring 2026. Iranian leaders may assess that the severe degradation of their traditional forms of deterrence requires Iran to assign greater strategic significance to the strait. Iran’s growing reliance on the strait suggests that the regime may not concede over control of the strait in negotiations, which is consistent with ISW-CTP’s ongoing assessment that some senior Iranian officials, including Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi who is currently driving decision-making within the regime, may prefer renewed confrontation over compromise if negotiations require Iran to relinquish control over the strait.
Iran has continued to try to demonstrate its control over the Strait of Hormuz in order to sustain high global oil prices and pressure the United States into concessions. Iranian media circulated footage on May 8 that showed the Artesh Navy seizing and redirecting the vessel JIN LI in the Gulf of Oman. The US Treasury sanctioned JIN LI (aka OCEAN KOI) in February 2026 for transporting millions of barrels of Iranian petroleum products since May 2025. The vessel has operated as part of Iran’s shadow fleet since at least 2020. A Chinese company, Ocean Kudos Shipping Company Limited, owns the vessel and is also sanctioned for its involvement in the shipment of Iranian petroleum products. JIN LI previously traveled multiple times between Basra, Iraq, and Fujairah Port in the United Arab Emirates, and most recently was idling near Fujairah, but maritime data suggests that the vessel has spoofed its location. It remains unclear whether the vessel was actively involved in Iran’s shadow fleet at the time of its seizure. Iranian media accused the vessel of disrupting Iranian oil exports and undermining Iranian national interests; however, this suggests that JIN LI may have attempted to transit the strait without coordination with the Iranian Armed Forces. Iranian officials have repeatedly threatened to respond to vessels that transit the strait without such coordination.[ Iran likely uses vessel seizures to reinforce perceptions that it controls access through the strait. These seizures increase risks for commercial shipping and contribute to higher global oil prices.
The United States and Iran remain divided over key issues, particularly Iran’s nuclear program, the status of Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile, and Iranian efforts to assert sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 8 that Iran is still reviewing the recent US proposal and will respond once Iran reaches a final decision. Baghaei also stated on May 7 that Iran has decided to pursue negotiations in a “new format” through Pakistan and added that Iranian decisionmakers chose not to enter nuclear talks “for the time being.” US President Donald Trump warned on May 8 that the United States could conduct renewed attacks if Iran does not quickly accept a deal. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated on May 8 that the United States expects an Iranian response soon and hopes it could begin a “serious process of negotiation.” Iranian officials continue to signal unwillingness to compromise on core issues, particularly enrichment activities and Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, however. Iran’s delayed response likely reflects continued internal disagreements and the apparent unwillingness of hardline actors, particularly IRGC Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his allies, to make major concessions on core issues.
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