May 19, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

Samuel Shafiro, Jakub Kostka, Jennie Olmsted, Grace Mappes, Kateryna Shymkiv, Diana Nasreddine, Anjou Kang-Stryker, and Karolina Hird

Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine’s allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) announced May 19 that the Russian Strategic Missile Forces, Northern and Pacific Fleets, Long Range Aviation Command, and some elements of the Leningrad and Central Military Districts (LMD and CMD, respectively) will conduct an exercise from May 19 to May 21 on preparing and using nuclear force in response to a threat of aggression. The Russian MoD stated that several nuclear units will launch ballistic and cruise missiles at ranges within Russia. The MoD reported that the exercise will involve over 64,000 personnel and over 7,800 pieces of military equipment, including over 200 missile launchers, over 140 aircraft, 73 surface ships, and 13 submarines, including eight strategic missile submarines. The BBC’s Russian Service assessed on May 19, citing data from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, that the exercise will likely involve the majority of Russia’s estimated roughly 320 nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers. The MoD stated that the exercise will also involve joint Russian and Belarusian operations with Russian nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus. The Belarusian MoD stated on May 18 that Russian and Belarusian forces began a joint exercise on the use of nuclear weapons. Russia did not previously announce the May 19 to 21 nuclear exercise and is conducting it significantly earlier in the year than its typical air, land, and sea nuclear exercises (informally called the Grom exercises), which Russia has conducted annually in October since 2022. Russian forces last conducted surprise nuclear exercises in Summer 2024, focused on non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, likely to influence Western policy debates about the provision of long-range weapons to Ukraine. The Kremlin is also reiterating longstanding threats against NATO to correspond with these exercises. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov claimed on May 19 that Russia and NATO are increasingly likely to engage in a direct clash with catastrophic consequences and accused NATO countries of provoking Russia in the nuclear sphere and escalating rhetoric about the Russian threat. Ryabkov claimed that Russian military planners will not ignore NATO’s nuclear weapons development and claimed that Western countries have not set conditions for substantive dialogue on arms control.

Russian forces are likely conducting the surprise May 19 to 21 nuclear exercises and amplifying longstanding narratives aimed at influencing NATO decision-making and masking Russia’s own weaknesses. Russian forces have so far failed to make meaningful gains in their ongoing spring-summer 2026 offensive, Ukrainian forces have contested the tactical initiative in several areas of the frontline, and Russian forces have failed to defend the Russian deep rear against increasingly devastating Ukrainian strikes. Russian officials may be accusing NATO countries of escalatory behavior coterminously with the exercise in an attempt to exercise reflexive control, a tactic that relies on shaping an adversary with targeted rhetoric and information operations in such a way that the adversary voluntarily takes actions that are advantageous to Russia, to divide Ukraine from its European partners and diminish support for Ukraine’s defensive effort.

• Russia is using unannounced strategic nuclear exercises to posture strength against Ukraine’s allies and distract from mounting battlefield weaknesses.

• Russian forces are likely conducting the surprise May 19 to 21 nuclear exercises and amplifying longstanding narratives aimed at influencing NATO decision-making and masking Russia’s own weaknesses.

• Russia is escalating its efforts to set informational conditions for possible future aggression against the Baltic states.

• Russian contract recruitment continues to decline as battlefield casualties rise, despite recent increases to one-time signing bonuses.

• The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) reportedly trained Russian military personnel in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 2025, underscoring how Russia and its allies are using the war in Ukraine for military learning and testing.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin arrived in China on May 19 for an official visit through May 20.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern Kharkiv Oblast and in the Kupyansk and Hulyaipole directions. 

• Russian forces launched 209 drones toward Ukraine overnight.  

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