May 29, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Adham Fattah, Ben Rezaei, Ben Schmida, Kelly Campa, Katherine Wells, and Brian Carter

US President Donald Trump called for the Strait of Hormuz to “immediately open” without tolls and with the removal of mines. Iran’s demands for “control” of the Strait of Hormuz directly contradict Trump’s position. These Iranian demands would be a fundamental change to long-held international maritime law and are at odds with the free flow of commerce. Trump stated on Truth Social that Iran must “immediately open” the strait with no tolls and remove remaining mines. Trump’s definition of an “open” strait is different from Iranian officials’, however. Trump’s statement refers to the pre-war version of the strait – one in which international shipping was unencumbered by Iranian threats to fire at ships or mine waterways and Iranian efforts to disrupt shipping by moving traffic separation schemes and charging tolls on transiting vessels. Iranian officials and media continue to state that an “open” strait is one in which the IRGC Navy escorts vessels through an unrecognized traffic separation scheme in Iranian territorial waters, whether vessels pay a toll or not. Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei stated on May 29 that the strait has been and will continue to be under Iran’s “special measures,” including the blockage of commercial vessels that Iran deems “hostile” through coordination with Iranian authorities. Parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee Chairman Ebrahim Azizi also stated on May 29 that Iran will pursue “management of the Strait of Hormuz” permanently. IRGC-affiliated outlet Fars News Agency reported on May 29 that Iran is preparing for arrangements to monitor ships, provide services, and ensure security in the strait. All of these positions are at odds with the free flow of commerce on the ocean. The regime’s English-media outlet Press TV argued on May 29 that Iran’s sovereignty over the strait is “non-negotiable” and represents a vital strategic tool for Iran to deter future US military action against Iran.

Iran can try to establish its unrecognized traffic separation scheme for the Strait of Hormuz either by obtaining US and then International Maritime Organization (IMO) recognition of its traffic separation scheme or, failing that, by force. The IMO recognizes traffic separation schemes, which are governed by the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS). President Trump’s statement opposes the recognition of Iran’s traffic separation scheme. This means that Iran would need to fire at or otherwise threaten ships in the strait in order to enforce its rules if Iran agreed to Trump‘s demands. Iran has repeatedly used force, including attacks on commercial vessels and naval mines, to force vessels to transit through its illegal traffic separation scheme and comply with Iranian transit regulations since March 4. US efforts to blockade Iranian ships and ports and US strikes against Iran are part of an effort to prevent Iran from enforcing the coercive actions. 

The IRGC is using force to try to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. US Central Command (CENTCOM) has continued to respond to Iranian efforts, most recently by issuing a notice to mariners and airmen on May 29 that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz. The US Navy will target any vessels “engaged in, or supporting, mine-laying activities.” The notice added that Iran continues to attempt to impede safe navigation and mine clearance in the strait.

• US President Donald Trump called for the Strait of Hormuz to “immediately open” without tolls and with the removal of mines. Iran has, in recent days, used force to try to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s demands for “control” of the Strait of Hormuz directly contradict Trump’s position. These Iranian demands would be a fundamental change to long-held international maritime law and are at odds with the free flow of commerce.

• US Central Command has continued to respond to Iranian efforts to use force to create the reality that Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, most recently by issuing a notice to mariners and airmen on May 29 that the US Navy will conduct military operations north of the Musandam Peninsula in the Strait of Hormuz.

• Iranian officials continue to indicate that Iran will not accept or make concessions on US President Donald Trump’s most recent demands regarding Iran’s nuclear program, which include not producing a nuclear weapon and agreeing to “destroy” or move its highly enriched uranium (HEU) stockpile.

• The US Treasury Department has sanctioned five front companies supporting the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff-controlled Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company on May 28, for facilitating Iranian oil shipments, including exports to the People’s Republic of China.

• US Central Command (CENTCOM) denied Iranian claims that Iranian air defense systems downed US aircraft near Bushehr Province in southern Iran on May 28.

• Saudi officials complained to the United States in early April that the UAE’s involvement in US-Israeli airstrikes on Iran increased the risk that Iran would target regional energy facilities, according to the Wall Street Journal. It is unclear on which day the UAE strikes began, based on this reporting, but Iran first struck Gulf energy infrastructure on March 1, when it hit a structure at Jabel Ali Port’s oil terminal in Dubai, UAE, and Ras Tanura Refinery in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

• Hezbollah has adapted to increasing IDF night operations by fielding thermal camera-equipped first-person view (FPV) drones that enable nighttime attacks, after the IDF began nighttime operations to make it harder for Hezbollah to launch FPV drone attacks on them. Hezbollah, subsequently, appears to be dictating the pace of adaptation to the IDF at this time by quickly overcoming relatively rudimentary Israeli countermeasures.

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