June 1, 2026

Data Cutoff: 2:00 PM ET

Ria Reddy, Parker Hempel, Will Doran, Avery Borens, and Annika Ganzeveld

The Iranian regime, which ISW-CTP continues to assess is dominated by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, suspended US-Iran negotiations on June 1. Vahidi and his inner circle likely calculate that the status quo, in which Iran has neither made concessions to the United States in a diplomatic agreement nor is engaged in a full-scale conflict with the United States, is a favorable situation that advances their objectives. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency announced on June 1 that the regime has suspended negotiations, ostensibly in response to Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. The fact that IRGC-affiliated media announced the suspension of negotiations suggests that the decision to suspend negotiations was driven by the IRGC, and presumably by Vahidi. Iranian officials have consistently demanded throughout negotiations that the US-Iran ceasefire must include Hezbollah, but Iranian officials significantly increased their emphasis on this demand after Tasnim announced the suspension of negotiations. Supreme Leader Adviser Mohammad Mokhber, for example, stated on June 1 during a meeting with Hezbollah’s representative to Tehran that any ceasefire that excludes Hezbollah is “irrelevant.”

The Iranian regime’s decision to suspend negotiations and emphasize the Lebanon issue is almost certainly a response to US President Donald Trump’s recent amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU). Trump requested several amendments, including changes to the draft’s text about Iran’s highly enriched uranium (HEU) and the Strait of Hormuz. An Iranian official close to Iran’s negotiating team stated on June 1 that Iran has “concerns” about Trump’s amendments and reiterated that Iran will not transfer its HEU to the United States and that Iran must “manage” the Strait of Hormuz. Iran likely responded to Trump’s amendments by reemphasizing its own maximalist demands, particularly its insistence that any ceasefire agreement between the United States and Iran must include Lebanon.

The Iranian regime has likely focused on the Lebanon issue, as opposed to another key sticking point in negotiations, to try to curb Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon as part of the regime’s broader objective to preserve Hezbollah. Khatam ol Anbia Central Headquarters Commander Major General Ali Abdollahi Ali Abadi issued an implicit threat on June 1 to attack civilians in northern Israel if the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) conducts airstrikes targeting Beirut. Abadi’s warning comes after Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ordered the IDF to conduct strikes against Hezbollah targets in Beirut and broaden the scope of IDF operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon. Iran rarely issues public warnings before conducting attacks, which suggests that Abadi’s threat sought to achieve an informational effect. The regime likely intended to pressure the United States to push Israel to limit its operations against Hezbollah by threatening to attack Israel if Israel expanded its operations in Lebanon.

• The Iranian regime, which ISW-CTP continues to assess is dominated by Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Commander Major General Ahmad Vahidi and his inner circle, suspended US-Iran negotiations on June 1. Vahidi and his inner circle likely calculate that the status quo, in which Iran has neither made concessions to the United States in a diplomatic agreement nor is engaged in a full-scale conflict with the United States, is a favorable situation that advances their objectives. IRGC-affiliated Tasnim News Agency announced on June 1 that the regime has suspended negotiations, ostensibly in response to Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.

• The Iranian regime’s decision to suspend negotiations and emphasize the Lebanon issue is almost certainly a response to US President Donald Trump’s recent amendments to the draft US-Iran memorandum of understanding (MoU).

• The Iranian regime has likely focused on the Lebanon issue, as opposed to another key sticking point in negotiations, to try to curb Israeli operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon as part of the regime’s broader objective to preserve Hezbollah. The regime also likely seeks to drive a wedge between the United States and Israel by falsely blaming Israel and its operations in Lebanon for the collapse of the US-Iran talks. Vahidi and his inner circle also likely calculate that the status quo will help them advance several other objectives, such as solidifying Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz and maintaining the Iranian nuclear program.

• The suspension of negotiations further indicates that Vahidi and his inner circle are driving Iranian decision-making and have likely gained the upper hand over proponents of a deal, particularly Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

• Iran and the United States have exchanged limited fire over the past 48 hours. Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media announced on May 31 that Iranian air defenses shot down a US MQ-1 Predator drone over “Iranian territorial waters.” US Central Command (CENTCOM) responded by launching defensive strikes against Iranian targets on Qeshm Island and in Goruk, Hormozgan Province. The IRGC retaliated against the US strikes by launching two missiles at US forces in Kuwait on May 31.

• Iranian forces also likely attacked a civilian cargo vessel located off the coast of Iraq on June 1. United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations reported on June 1 that an unspecified projectile struck a cargo vessel transiting the northern Persian Gulf approximately 40 nautical miles southeast of the Umm Qasr Port in Iraq.

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