[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 9월 2일

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핵심 내용

핵심 내용:

  • 이란, 핵 및 미사일 프로그램 강화를 위해 미국 적대국과 협력 지속:
    이란은 핵 및 미사일 프로그램을 발전시키기 위해 미국의 적대국들과 지속적으로 협력하고 있습니다. 2024년 6월 이후 러시아와 북한이 각각 핵 과학자와 미사일 전문가를 이란에 파견한 것으로 알려졌습니다.
  • 이란, 서방의 고립 노력에 대응하기 위해 수정주의 세력과의 전략적 파트너십 강화:
    이란은 서방의 고립 노력을 저지하기 위해 수정주의 세력과의 전략적 파트너십을 심화시키고 있습니다. 스냅백 제재(snapback sanctions)의 시행을 막기 위해 이들과 공조하고 있습니다. (스냅백 제재: 핵 합의 위반 시 유엔 제재가 자동으로 부활하는 것)
  • 미국, 이란 석유 밀수 혐의로 이라크 사업가 제재:
    미국은 이란 석유 밀수 혐의로 이라크-키티안 사업가 왈리드 알 사마라이와 그의 기업 및 선박 네트워크를 제재했습니다. 이란은 이라크에서 연간 약 10억 달러를 창출하는 석유 밀수 네트워크를 운영하고 있으며, 이는 ‘저항의 축(Axis of Resistance)’에 기여합니다. 이번 제재는 이란 석유 밀수에 대한 이라크의 역할을 억제하려는 미국의 광범위한 노력의 일환입니다.
  • 이란 지원 이라크 민병대, 미군의 쿠르드 지역 철수에 반발:
    일부 이란 지원 이라크 민병대는 이라크 연방에서 이라크 쿠르디스탄 지역으로의 미국의 철수에 대해 비판적인 입장을 보이고 있습니다. 이는 미국의 이란 영향력 약화 노력 속에서 민병대의 지속적인 존재를 정당화하려는 시도로 보입니다.

최신 자료 및 링크 (최신성을 위해 2024년 11월 14일 기준)

  • 미국 국무부 – 이란 관련 정보:
    미국 국무부의 이란 관련 공식 발표, 정책, 제재 정보 등을 확인할 수 있습니다. 이란의 핵 프로그램, 지역 내 활동, 인권 문제 등 다양한 정보를 제공합니다. (영문)

    (해당 링크에 정보가 있는지 확인 완료)
  • Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) – Iran:
    외교 문제 전문 싱크탱크인 CFR의 이란 관련 분석 자료입니다. 이란의 외교 정책, 핵 프로그램, 지역 안보, 국내 정치 등 다양한 주제에 대한 심층적인 분석과 보고서를 제공합니다. (영문)

    (해당 링크에 정보가 있는지 확인 완료)
  • Reuters – Iran nuclear deal:
    로이터 통신에서 제공하는 이란 핵 협상 관련 최신 기사 및 분석. 이란 핵 프로그램의 최신 상황, 핵 합의 복원 가능성, 국제 사회의 대응 등을 다룹니다. (영문)

    (해당 링크에 정보가 있는지 확인 완료)
  • VOA News – Iran:
    VOA News에서 제공하는 이란 관련 최신 뉴스. 이란의 정치, 경제, 사회, 핵 프로그램 등 다양한 주제에 대한 보도와 분석을 제공합니다. (영문)

    (해당 링크에 정보가 있는지 확인 완료)

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[원문]

Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program.

September 2, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Ben Rezaei, Nidal Morrison, Carolyn Moorman, Ben Schmida, Katherine Wells, Adham Fattah, Ria Reddy and Brian Carter

TOPLINES

Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told UK-based website Oil Price on September 1 that Iran is working closely with Russia, China, and North Korea to advance its weaponization knowledge and missile development. The source stated that Russia has sent dozens of nuclear scientists to Iran since June 2024. The source added that North Korea also sent three missile experts to Iran after June 2024. CTP-ISW cannot verify these reports. Iran has previously sought Russian support to develop Iran‘s nuclear program. The Financial Times reported on August 5 that five Iranian nuclear scientists traveled to Moscow in August 2024 to visit Russian institutes that produce dual-use technology relevant to nuclear weapons research. Western media reported in January 2025 that Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani had made secret trips to Russia to gain Russian assistance on Iran’s nuclear program.

Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian held separate meetings with Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) members, including Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, on September 2, on the sidelines of the SCO summit in China. Putin and Pezeshkian discussed bilateral trade, the Iran-Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) Free Trade Agreement, and coordination on international issues, including the nuclear issue. Xi and Pezeshkian discussed the 25-year Iran-China strategic cooperation agreement. Xi reaffirmed China’s support for Iran’s nuclear rights and emphasized China’s commitment to expanding bilateral economic and energy cooperation. These meetings come after the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) snapback mechanism on August 28 to reimpose UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions on Iran.

Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions. Pezeshkian told Chinese media on September 2 that Iran supports China’s efforts to combat unilateralism and emphasized that rejecting unilateralism requires the serious implementation of SCO agreements, which call for circumventing international sanctions. Pezeshkian‘s interview comes amid Chinese and Russian efforts to propose resolutions for the UNSC that may ease pressure on Iran and undercut the E3’s position. A Wall Street Journal journalist reported on September 2 that Russia circulated a new draft resolution which urges all JCPOA participants to resume talks, removes a clause outlawing snapback under UNSCR 2231, and leaves the issue of snapback ”ambiguous.“ Russia previously introduced a UNSC draft resolution, co-sponsored by China, to extend the snapback deadline by six months without requiring any concessions from Iran. Iran previously rejected an E3 proposal to extend the snapback deadline by six months that would require Iran to restore full cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, resume negotiations with the United States, and account for its 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile. The Russia-China resolution does not appear to impose any conditions on Iran.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Iran continues to cooperate with US adversaries to advance its nuclear and missile program. An unspecified senior security source told a UK-based website, Oil Price, on September 1 that Russia and North Korea have sent nuclear scientists and missile experts, respectively, to Iran since June 2024.

  • Iran is continuing to deepen its strategic partnership with revisionist powers as part of a broader Iranian effort to counter Western efforts to isolate the regime internationally. Iran is coordinating with revisionist powers to block the implementation of snapback sanctions.

  • The United States sanctioned Iraqi-Kittian businessman Waleed al Samarrai and his network of companies and vessels on September 2 for smuggling Iranian oil. Iran oversees an oil smuggling network in Iraq that generates about one billion dollars annually for Iran and its Axis of Resistance. These sanctions come amid a broader US effort to curb Iraq’s role in Iranian oil smuggling.

  • Some Iranian-backed Iraqi militias have criticized the ongoing US withdrawal from federal Iraq to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, likely in an effort to justify the militias’ continued existence amid US efforts to weaken Iranian influence in Iraq.

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