September 3, 2025

Information Cutoff: 10 PM ET

Christina Harward, Anna Harvey, Jennie Olmsted, Jessica Sobieski, Daria Novikov, and Frederick W. Kagan

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Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated that he does not consider Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine, invalidating the very basis of any future peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia. Putin spoke to journalists in Beijing on September 3 and falsely claimed that the Ukrainian Constitution has "no ways to extend the powers of the president" and that Zelensky’s "powers are over" now that his five-year term limit "passed" in 2024. Putin described Zelensky rather as the "current head of the administration" and claimed that a meeting with Zelensky would therefore be "a road to nowhere." Putin claimed that a bilateral meeting is nonetheless possible, but that Zelensky should come to Moscow. Putin has repeatedly flaunted an inaccurate reading of the Ukrainian Constitution to falsely claim that Zelensky is not the legitimate president of Ukraine, claims that ISW has repeatedly shown to be inaccurate. ISW continues to assess that Putin’s claims of Zelensky’s illegitimacy demonstrate Putin’s disinterest in a peace settlement and set conditions for Russia to renege on any future peace agreement Putin should sign with Zelensky at a time of Russia’s choosing in the future. Kremlin newswire TASS reported in May 2024 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) put Zelensky on Russia’s wanted list for unspecified reasons, a report that puts a very different color on Putin’s ostensible invitation to Zelensky to come to Moscow, considering that Putin has said he does not recognize Zelensky’s legitimacy.

Putin himself is responsible for Ukraine’s inability to legally hold the referendums and elections for which Putin is calling. Putin claimed that Ukrainian authorities should hold a referendum, including to decide on "territorial issues," "if they want to be legitimate and fully participate in the settlement process." Putin correctly noted that Ukrainian law does not allow Ukrainian authorities to hold elections during martial law, but claimed that Ukraine "must" lift martial law. Ukrainian law states that Ukrainian authorities cannot lift martial law while "the threat of attack or danger to the state independence of Ukraine and its territorial integrity" remains. Ukrainian authorities are unable to hold the referendums and elections Putin is calling for until, at a minimum, Russia agrees to a ceasefire, which Putin has repeatedly refused to do. It is standard practice for peace processes to include ceasefires or armistices before the final stages of negotiations toward a war termination agreement. Putin, instead, is trying to force Ukraine to first make concessions and agree to Russia’s demands before the implementation of the theater-wide, longer-term ceasefire that would actually allow Ukraine to lift martial law and hold referendums and elections as Putin claims he wants. Putin’s statement that Ukraine cannot, in fact, make the concessions he is demanding under the conditions he is imposing is a further indication that Putin is completely unserious about negotiations.

Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to explicitly and publicly state that they are committed to achieving Russia’s original war aims through military means. Putin stated in Beijing that Russia will have to "solve all the tasks" surrounding Russia’s war in Ukraine by "armed means" if current peace efforts fail. Putin claimed that the "overwhelming majority" of his Russian military commanders are "in favor of Russia achieving all of its goals outlined at the beginning of the [war]." Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov claimed on September 3  that lasting peace in Ukraine requires international legal recognition of the "new territorial realities" that emerged after the referendums in occupied Crimea and Russian-occupied areas of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts, a reference to the illegal referendums Russia held in Crimea in 2014 and parts of the four oblasts in 2022 in which Russia claimed that Ukrainian citizens overwhelmingly voted to join Russia and that Russia uses to legitimize its claim to all of the territory of these five areas. Lavrov reiterated Russia’s demands that any future peace settlement must "eradicate" the "root causes" of the war. Lavrov repeated Kremlin claims that these “root causes include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) post-Cold War expansion; NATO’s efforts to include Ukraine in the alliance; and alleged Ukrainian violations of human rights in Ukraine, including the supposed persecution of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers and the purported destruction of the Russian language, culture, traditions, "canonical Orthodoxy," and Russian-language media. Lavrov reiterated Russian demands that Ukraine must be "neutral, non-aligned, and non-nuclear."

• Russian President Vladimir Putin explicitly stated that he does not consider Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to be the legitimate president of Ukraine, invalidating the very basis of any future peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia.

• Putin himself is responsible for Ukraine’s inability to legally hold the referendums and elections for which Putin is calling.

• Putin and other high-ranking Kremlin officials continue to explicitly and publicly state that they are committed to achieving Russia’s original war aims through military means.

• Putin underscored his continued commitment to his theory of victory, a belief that Putin first outlined in June 2024, on September 3.

• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko continues to publicly deepen Belarusian integration into Russia.

• The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) attempted to use footage showing a small-scale infiltration mission to lend legitimacy to inflated claims by Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov on August 30 that Russian forces had seized roughly half of Kupyansk.

• The Russian MoD’s claims about Kupyansk have failed to convince large parts of the Russian milblogger community, even Kremlin-affiliated and coopted milbloggers.

• The Kremlin appears to be trying to exploit the mapping methodologies that have become widespread throughout the war, including from OSINT sources like ISW.

• Russia launched another large-scale combined drone and missile strike against Ukraine on the night of September 2 to 3—the fourth combined strike of over 500 drones and missiles since the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska.

• Ukrainian forces recently advanced near Pokrovsk, and Russian forces recently advanced in the Kostyantynivka-Druzhkivka tactical area.

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