[ISW] 러시아 공세 작전 평가, 2026년 5월 28일

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핵심 요약:

  • 러시아 대통령 블라디미르 푸틴은 러시아 군사 지휘부의 과장된 지도에 기반하여 우크라이나에서의 러시아 군의 성공에 대한 잘못된 인식을 갖게 되었을 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 2025년 늦여름 이후 쿠피안스크 지역에 대한 러시아 군사 지휘부의 과장된 주장은 최상위 수준에서 전장 상황을 잘못 묘사하는 러시아 군대의 더 큰 패턴을 보여줍니다.
  • 러시아 군사 지휘부의 과장은 푸틴이 2026년에 러시아의 전장 성과가 꾸준히 감소했음에도 불구하고, 자신의 군대가 단기에서 중기적으로 전장 목표를 달성할 수 있다고 믿게 만들 가능성이 높습니다.
  • 러시아군은 우크라이나의 러시아 깊숙한 후방에 대한 장거리 드론 공격 캠페인에 대응하여 모스크바 시티에 방공망을 강화하고 있습니다.
  • 러시아는 우크라이나의 중거리 공격 캠페인 방어에 계속 어려움을 겪고 있으며, 후방에서 러시아 군사 차량을 보호하기 위해 전쟁 범죄에 의존하고 있다는 보고가 있습니다.
  • 스웨덴은 5월 28일 대규모 군사 지원 패키지를 통해 총 36대의 그리펜 전투기를 우크라이나에 지원하겠다고 약속했습니다.
  • 젤렌스키 대통령은 그리펜이 우크라이나가 러시아의 유도 활공 폭탄 공격을 방어하는 데 도움이 될 것이라고 밝혔습니다.
  • 우크라이나군은 최근 벨리키 부르룩(Velykyi Burluk)과 올렉산드리우카(Oleksandrivka) 방향에서 진격했습니다. 러시아군은 최근 수미(Sumy)주에서 진격했습니다.
  • 러시아군은 하룻밤 사이에 킨잘(Kinzhal) 공중 탄도 미사일 1발과 장거리 드론 147대를 우크라이나에 발사했습니다.

최신 자료 및 관련 링크:

다음은 위의 내용과 관련된 최신 자료 및 링크입니다. 링크의 내용이 제대로 있는지 확인하십시오.

참고: 위 링크들은 예시이며, 실제 정보는 변경될 수 있습니다. 최신 정보를 얻기 위해서는 다양한 소스를 참고하고, 정보의 출처를 신중하게 확인해야 합니다.

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[원문]

Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military’s successes in Ukraine based on heavily exaggerated maps from the Russian high military command.

May 28, 2026

Data Cutoff: 12:15 PM ET

Kateryna Shymkiv, Jakub Kostka, Christina Harward, Samuel Shafiro, Grace Mappes, and Kateryna Stepanenko

TOPLINES

Russian President Vladimir Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military’s successes in Ukraine based on heavily exaggerated maps from the Russian high military command. A Ukrainian open-source cartographer and frequent geolocator published on X (formerly Twitter) on May 28 a reported leaked Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) map dated April 9 of the frontline in western Zaporizhia Oblast – the area of responsibility (AoR) of the Russian Dnepr Grouping of Forces. ISW has reason to believe that the leaked Russian MoD map may be authentic. The map alleges that Russian forces seized Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, Richne, Veselyanka, Zaporozhets, Zapasne, Mali Shcherbaky, and Shcherbaky (all west of Orikhiv); southwestern Orikhiv up to the railway; and Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohiriya (all southeast of Orikhiv). Russian Chief of the General Staff Army General Valery Gerasimov claimed on April 21 that Russian forces seized Veselyanka and entered Zaporozhets, and these claims are consistent with the leaked MoD map and show the Russian military command’s pattern of exaggerating advances in this area of the front.

ISW had not observed evidence that Russian forces had infiltrated or advanced into Orikhiv, Richne, Veselyanka, Zaporozhets, or Zapasne as of April 9. ISW observed evidence that Russian forces had entered (either through infiltrations or advances) but not seized Prymorske, Stepnohirsk, Mali Shcherbaky, Shcherbaky, Novodanylivka, Mala Tokmachka, and Bilohirya as of April 9. ISW has not observed evidence that Russian forces maintain a presence in Richne, Veselyanka, or Zapasne as of May 28. ISW has also observed no evidence that Russian forces have infiltrated or advanced into Orikhiv — the Russian operational objective in this direction since 2022. ISW observed Russian forces at closest infiltrating or advancing to positions about three kilometers from Orikhiv.

The Russian military command’s exaggerated claims about the Kupyansk area since late Summer 2025 show a larger pattern within the Russian military of misrepresenting the battlefield geometry at the highest levels. Gerasimov and other senior Russian officials have repeatedly presented inaccurate situation reports about the Kupyansk direction. Gerasimov claimed in late August 2025 that Russian forces had seized approximately half of Kupyansk. Russian President Vladimir Putin claimed in early October 2025 that Russian forces seized two-thirds of Kupyansk, and Gerasimov claimed in late October 2025 that Russian forces had surrounded 5,000 Ukrainian troops in Kupyansk and on the eastern (left) bank of the Oskil River east of the town. Gerasimov subsequently claimed in late November 2025 that Russian forces had fully seized Kupyansk, and Putin claimed at that time that 3,500 Ukrainian troops remained trapped on the eastern bank of the Oskil River. Gerasimov and Russian Western Grouping of Forces Commander Colonel General Sergei Kuzovlev claimed in December 2025 and January 2026 that Russian forces had seized Kucherivka (east of Kupyansk), Podoly (southeast of Kupyansk), Kurylivka (southeast of Kupyansk), and Kupyansk-Vuzlovyi (south of Kupyansk). Gerasimov claimed on April 21 that Russian forces eliminated the purportedly surrounded Ukrainian troops on the eastern bank of the Oskil River, almost six months after Russian forces allegedly surrounded the troops.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Russian President Vladimir Putin has likely developed a false perception of the Russian military’s successes in Ukraine based on heavily exaggerated maps from the Russian high military command. 

  • The Russian military command’s exaggerated claims about the Kupyansk area since late Summer 2025 show a larger pattern within the Russian military of misrepresenting the battlefield geometry at the highest levels. 

  • The Russian military command’s exaggerations are likely leading Putin to believe his forces can achieve his battlefield goals in the near to medium term, despite the fact that Russia’s battlefield performance has steadily declined in 2026.

  • Russian forces are reinforcing air defenses in Moscow City in response to Ukraine’s growing long-range drone campaign against the Russian deep rear.

  • Russia continues to struggle to defend against Ukraine’s mid-range strike campaign and is reportedly resorting to war crimes to protect Russian military vehicles in the rear.

  • Sweden pledged a total of 36 Gripen fighter aircraft to Ukraine in a large military support package on May 28. 

  • Zelensky stated that the Gripens will help Ukraine defend against Russian guided glide bombs.

  • Ukrainian forces recently advanced in northern in the Velykyi Burluk and Oleksandrivka directions. Russian forces recently advanced in Sumy Oblast.

  • Russian forces launched one Kinzhal aeroballistic missile and 147 long-range drones at Ukraine overnight.

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