[ISW] 이란 업데이트, 2025년 9월 3일

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핵심 내용:

  • 이란의 농축 우라늄:

    미공개 국제원자력기구(IAEA) 보고서에 따르면, 이란은 6월 12일 이스라엘-이란 전쟁 발발 전까지 최대 60% 농축 우라늄 440.9kg을 보유하고 있었습니다. 만약 이 우라늄을 추가로 농축한다면, 최소 10개의 핵무기를 제조할 수 있는 양입니다. 그러나 전쟁 중 이스라엘과 미국의 공격으로 이란 핵 시설이 피해를 입어, 이란이 이 우라늄에 접근하기 어려울 것으로 보입니다.

  • 이란 국내 검열:

    이란은 잠재적인 스냅백 제재에 대한 대중의 불만을 막기 위해 이란 미디어의 보도를 제한하려 합니다. 이란 문화이슬람지도부는 이란 언론에 E3의 스냅백 메커니즘 발동에 대한 보도를 제한하라는 기밀 지침을 내린 것으로 알려졌습니다.

  • 헤즈볼라의 무장 해제 반대 운동:

    헤즈볼라는 레바논 정부의 헤즈볼라 무장 해제 계획을 지연시키고 결국 무산시키기 위해 다양한 전술을 논의하고 있습니다. 헤즈볼라가 제안한 많은 전술들은 레바논 관리들의 미래 레바논 내부 갈등 가능성과 레바논군(LAF)의 헤즈볼라 무장 해제 능력에 대한 우려를 염두에 둔 것으로 보입니다.


최신 자료 및 관련 링크:

주의: 링크의 정보는 시간이 지남에 따라 변경될 수 있으므로, 최신 정보를 확인하려면 링크를 방문하여 직접 확인하는 것이 좋습니다. 위의 링크들은 이란의 핵 프로그램, 국내 검열, 그리고 헤즈볼라 관련 상황에 대한 최신 정보를 제공하는 데 도움이 될 것입니다.

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[원문]

Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report

September 3, 2025

Information Cutoff: 2:00 pm ET

Ben Rezai, Avery Borens, Adham Fattah, Ria Reddy, Ben Schmida,

Katherine Wells, Nidal Morrison, Kelly Campa, and Annika Ganzeveld

Please note that the links to our full assessment in this email will direct you to our partner, AEI’s Critical Threats Project, for full insights. We appreciate your understanding and continued support as we upgrade our website.

TOPLINES

Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press.The Associated Press reported on September 3 that Iran increased its stockpile of 60 percent enriched uranium by 32.5 kilograms between May 17 and June 13, citing the unreleased IAEA report. Iran’s 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile is equivalent to approximately 10.5 significant quantities, which refers to the “approximate amount of nuclear material for which the possibility of manufacturing a nuclear explosive device cannot be excluded.” Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely to be able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however. The IAEA report added that Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium is 9,874.9 kilograms. This amount marks a 627.3 kilogram increase in Iran’s total stockpile of enriched uranium since May 17. The IAEA reported that the IAEA has not inspected any Iranian nuclear site except the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant since the Israel-Iran War. The Iranian parliament passed a bill on June 25 that suspended all cooperation with the IAEA, and IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi confirmed on September 3 that Iran has provided the IAEA with no information on the status of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile since June 13. CIA Director John Ratcliffe stated in July 2025 that the US and Israeli strikes during the war buried the vast majority of Iran’s enriched uranium at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) and Fordow and that it would be extremely difficult for Iran to extract the material. The IAEA reported on August 27 that there is no evidence that Iran has moved its stockpile of highly enriched uranium from the ENTC since the US strikes on June 21, citing satellite imagery. Grossi said that Iran and the IAEA will hold another round of talks in the coming days to discuss resuming IAEA inspections at Iranian nuclear facilities, including those that Israel and the United States struck during the war.

Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) triggered the 30-day snapback process to reimpose UN Security Council sanctions on Iran on August 28. The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism. The directive advised media outlets to frame potential sanctions as a sign of European dependence on the United States, emphasize Iran’s ability to withstand economic pressure, and avoid portraying Iran’s future negatively. Iranian Judiciary Spokesperson Asghar Jahangir stated on September 3 that the E3’s decision to trigger the snapback mechanism was “a propaganda and psychological tool to target the people’s morale through psychological warfare.” Jahangir urged Iranian media outlets to act “intelligently” and  “maintain national cohesion and unity.” Iranian media outlet Nour News separately published an op-ed on September 2 that encouraged Iranian civilians and officials to maintain “national self-confidence" and avoid “simplistic and exaggerated rhetoric” regarding the E3’s snapback decision. The Iranian regime likely seeks to control the media narrative about potential snapback sanctions to prevent reports about the negative economic impacts of sanctions from further increasing public frustration about Iran’s poor economic conditions and potentially driving economic-related unrest. The regime’s efforts to control the Iranian media space come as the Iranian rial has depreciated to near record-low levels in recent days and the Iranian economy faces exorbitant inflation.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • Iran’s Enriched Uranium: Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60 percent before the start of the Israel-Iran War on June 12, according to an unreleased International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report obtained by the Associated Press. Iran has enough 60 percent enriched uranium, if enriched further, to produce at least 10 nuclear weapons. Iran is unlikely to be able to access this uranium due to the damage that Israeli and US strikes caused to Iranian nuclear facilities during the war, however.

  • Iranian Domestic Censorship: Iran is likely trying to prevent popular discontent by restricting Iranian media reporting about potential snapback sanctions. The Iranian Culture and Islamic Guidance Ministry reportedly issued a confidential directive to Iranian media outlets to restrict their coverage of the E3’s activation of the snapback mechanism.

  • Hezbollah’s Anti-Disarmament Campaign: Hezbollah is continuing to discuss a variety of tactics to delay and ultimately reverse the Lebanese government’s plan to disarm Hezbollah. Many of Hezbollah’s proposed tactics appear to be highly attuned to Lebanese officials’ concerns about possible future internal conflict in Lebanon and the Lebanese Armed Forces’ (LAF) capability to disarm Hezbollah.

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