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Russia is relying on its allies, particularly the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for energy revenues and economic support ahead of possible additional Western sanctions impacting Russian energy exports. Russian Energy Minister Sergey Tsivilev said on September 4 that Russia agreed to sell 106 billion cubic meters of natural gas to the PRC annually during Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to the PRC from August 31 to September 3. Tsivilev said that Russia also agreed to sell another 2.5 million tons of oil to the PRC through Kazakhstan. Russia and the PRC notably signed a memorandum of cooperation on September 2 regarding the construction of the Power of Siberia-2 (PS-2) natural gas pipeline, which would connect Russia and the PRC via Mongolia. Russia and the PRC also signed an agreement to increase natural gas flows through the existing Power of Siberia pipeline from 38 billion cubic meters to 44 billion cubic meters annually. These overland pipelines make it especially easy for Russia and the PRC to evade Western sanctions. Iranian Ambassador to Russia Kazem Jalali said on September 8 that the first stage of Russia selling natural gas supplies to Iran will begin in a few months and that Russian and Iranian negotiators will meet in the coming days to finalize prices on Russian natural gas.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un may have used his attendance at the PRC Victory over Japan (V-J) Day military parade to balance North Korean relations with the PRC and Russia. Kim, CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping, and Russian President Vladimir Putin walked and sat alongside one another during the parade on September 3. Beijing likely intended to create the impression of a united front and show the value that it places on both Russia and North Korea as partners. Russia is the PRC’s closest geopolitical partner, while North Korea is its only treaty ally and a fellow Communist state. The PRC and Russia are, in turn, North Korea’s most important backers and security guarantors. Kim met bilaterally with Putin on September 3 and Xi on September 4. Xi and Kim stressed their commitment to the Sino-North Korean relationship “no matter how the international situation evolves,” according to PRC and North Korean readouts. Xi reiterated China’s “objective and impartial” position on the Korean Peninsula issue but notably made no mention of denuclearization in the readout, unlike their previous four summits.
Kim’s presence at the V-J Day parade may facilitate further North Korean participation in international fora and provide a path to North Korea’s long-sought economic relief and global recognition. Kim met with Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko—a close Russian ally—on September 3 and invited him to Pyongyang. Kim also met or exchanged greetings with the heads of state of Vietnam, Malaysia, Myanmar, and likely other countries. The PRC and Russia may be seeking to include North Korea as a participant in their vision for “multilateral” global governance, including their proposals for collective security against sanctions and tariffs. The PRC used both the recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and its Victory Day parade to portray itself as the true inheritor and defender of the postwar global order. Its propaganda has likewise highlighted the wartime contributions of both North Korea and Russia, suggesting that they are also part of the global order that the PRC seeks to build.
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