October 11, 2025

Information Cutoff: 7:15 pm ET

Justin Young, Olivia Gibson, Angelica Evans, Ian Matthews, and George Barros

The Russian defense industry is implementing long term efforts to increase T-90 tank production and recreate Russia’s pre-war tank reserves, indicating that Russia intends to present a long term military threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Ukraine-based open source intelligence (OSINT) organization Frontelligence Insight published internal documents from Russia’s primary tank manufacturer, Uralvagonzavod (UVZ), on October 11 that reveal that UVZ aims to increase T-90 production by 80 percent by 2028, compared to 2024 levels, and launch production of the new T-90M2 (Project 188MS) variant, also referred to as Ryvok-1 (Dash-1). The documents, which ISW reviewed but cannot independently verify, indicate that UVZ aims to surge tank production beginning in 2027. The documents indicate that UVZ estimates a projected 2026 output of 10 T-90M2 tanks and intends to produce a peak of 428 T-90M and T-90M2 tanks in 2028. The documents indicate that UVZ intends to produce a total of 1,118 new and modernized T-90M and T-90M2 tanks between 2027 and 2029. Ukrainian officials previously assessed that UVZ can only produce roughly 60 to 70 T-90 tanks per year under perfect conditions, and UVZ is likely producing between three and six T-90 tanks per month. A Russian milblogger claimed on July 31 that UVZ produced 540 to 630 T-90M tanks since February 24, 2022 (an estimated average of 13 to 15 tanks per month).

The Russian defense industry may have to increase its production capacity for tank production by integrating more automation and high-precision machine tools to achieve the planned T-90 production increase, as Russia continues to face labor shortages and mounting casualties in Ukraine. UVZ notably launched a program to train computer numerical control (CNC) machine operators in March 2025, likely to expand UVZ’s production capacity. Russia has consistently relied on its allies to obtain high precision machine tools through sanctions evasion; the Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) reported on September 1 that UVZ continues to produce tank engines with European-manufactured CNC machines that Russia obtains through sanctions evasion schemes.

While the T-90 production targets as described in the leaked documents are aspirational figures that Russian industry may not meet, the plans nevertheless indicate that Russia seeks to rearm and is setting conditions to pose a significant long term military threat to NATO far beyond the end of the current war in Ukraine. Frontelligence assessed that UVZ’s goals to modernize the Russian armored fleet with over 2,000 T-90M, T-90M2, and T-72B3M tanks between 2026 and 2036, in addition to the tanks and armored vehicles that Russia produced in 2024 and 2025, is sufficient to fully replenish Russia’s tank fleet for another large scale war. Open-source tracking indicates that Russian tank losses have decreased through 2025, and a senior Finnish military official stated on April 27 that Russia is sending “almost none” of its newly produced tanks to the frontline in Ukraine but is stockpiling the tanks for “later use.” The planned production increase indicates that Russia plans for military contingencies beyond the current war in Ukraine on the backdrop of its current “Phase Zero” operations against Europe and that Moscow seeks to project power against NATO.

• The Russian defense industry is implementing long term efforts to increase T-90 tank production and recreate Russia’s pre-war tank reserves, indicating that Russia intends to present a long-term military threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

• Recent open-source data indicates that Russia is also increasing its refurbishment of T-72 tanks, possibly for use on the battlefield in Ukraine in the short term or to reestablish its tank reserve to threaten NATO in the medium term.

• Russian forces are still using tanks to advance on the battlefield during infrequent mechanized assaults when Ukraine’s drone defenses are degraded, indicating that tanks remain and will remain a relevant weapon on the battlefield under proper tactical conditions.

• Russia may be able to pose a significant threat to NATO on a timeline much sooner than 2036 and without necessarily reconstituting its tank fleet.

• European authorities continue to report increased unidentified drone sightings in European airspace near military facilities.

• Ukraine’s European partners continue to allocate aid to Ukraine and deepen cooperation with the Ukrainian defense industrial base (DIB).

• Russian forces advanced near Pokrovsk and Velykomykhailivka and in the Dobropillya tactical area.

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