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The Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) reported on October 16 that Iranian activity around Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (ENTC)’s underground facilities indicates that Iran is not attempting to retrieve centrifuges or uranium stocks. ISIS assessed that Iran may be trying to establish secure access to ENTC tunnels and reinforce tunnel entrances against future strikes. ISIS reported that satellite imagery of the tunnel entrances to the ENTC’s underground facilities showed that Iran cleared out all debris in front of the northern tunnel entrance and most of the debris in front of the middle tunnel entrance in late July and late September, respectively. ISIS reported that imagery from September 30 showed a backhoe piling rocks in front of the northern tunnel entrance, which ISIS said could be a sign that Iran is trying to reinforce the northern tunnel against possible future strikes. The ISIS report added that Iran is likely prioritizing ”slow and safe access” to the ENTC underground facilities because it may be dangerous to enter after the strikes. The United States struck the ENTC on June 22. ISIS stated that the extent of damage to the three tunnels could not be assessed at this time.
Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Ali Larijani met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 16, likely primarily to discuss sanctions evasion and mitigation efforts. This is Larijani’s first visit to Russia since the UN Security Council reimposed snapback sanctions on Iran on September 27. Iran relies heavily upon Russia as a key partner to mitigate the impact of international sanctions. The reimposition of UN sanctions restored an arms embargo and broad UN restrictions upon Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Larijani likely discussed ways that Russia can assist Iran in evading and mitigating the impact of sanctions. Iran and Russia have historically collaborated through networks of foreign-based front companies and shadow fleets transporting sanctioned goods, such as energy exports and arms sales. Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya stated on October 1 that Russia does not recognize the “snapback as coming into force,” suggesting that Russia will continue to assist Iran evade sanctions as it did before the imposition of snapback sanctions. Larijani and Putin also likely discussed Russian military assistance that Russia could provide to Iran. Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov separately stated on October 13 that Russia would “develop military-technical cooperation with Iran” with “no restrictions.” Larijani could also have discussed military support for Iran from Russia in addition to sanctions evasion and mitigation. Iran seeks to buy Russian military equipment, though procuring it has been difficult given Russia’s prioritization of the war in Ukraine. Russian assets like the S-300 have also proven incapable of stopping Israeli or US air attack, and Russian aircraft like the MiG-29 and Su-35 are unlikely to seriously challenge the US-made F-35.
Turkey is attempting to secure an agreement with the Syrian government that would allow Turkish forces to target Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fighters deep inside Syria and possibly set conditions for future military operations targeting the SDF. Unspecified Turkish officials told Bloomberg on October 17 that Turkey and Syria have discussed expanding the 1998 Adana Agreement so that it allows Turkey to target Kurdish fighters up to 30 kilometers in Syrian territory. The 1998 Adana Agreement, which the Turkish government signed with the Assad regime, currently allows Turkey the right to target Kurdish fighters it deems a threat up to five kilometers into Syrian territory. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan used this agreement to justify Turkey’s right to launch a military offensive targeting the SDF in 2019, citing the Assad regime’s lack of “measures” taken to rein in Kurdish fighters near the border. Turkey has recently threatened to take military action against the SDF — which it views as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party — by the end of 2025 if the SDF does not integrate into the Syrian state by that date. Turkey’s ability to target the SDF deeper in Syrian territory would allow Turkey to set conditions for possible future military operations targeting the SDF, including by targeting key SDF tactical and operational commanders within the 30-kilometer operational zone. Turkey has previously struck SDF forces deep into Syria — much deeper than 30 kilometers — but an amendment to the 1998 Adana Agreement would enable ground pursuit and help alleviate any possible friction with the new Syrian government.
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