[ISW] 러시아 공세 캠페인 평가, 2025년 10월 18일

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핵심 내용 요약:

  • 크렘린, 우크라이나의 완전 항복 요구 재확인: 크렘린은 도널드 트럼프 미국 대통령이 10월 17일에 제안한 우크라이나 평화 협상에 대한 반응으로, 우크라이나의 완전한 항복을 요구하는 러시아의 전쟁 목표를 재차 강조했습니다.
  • 크림반도 페오도시야 유류 터미널 타격: 2025년 10월, 우크라이나의 공격으로 점령된 크림반도의 페오도시야 유류 터미널이 심각하게 파괴된 것으로 보이며, 러시아가 언제, 혹은 복구할 수 있을지 불확실합니다.
  • 러시아 휘발유 가격 상승 전망: 러시아 국영 언론 보도에 따르면, 러시아 운전자 대다수는 우크라이나의 장거리 공격이 러시아 연료 인프라를 계속 타격함에 따라 휘발유 가격이 더 오를 것으로 예상하고 있습니다.
  • 자포리자 원자력 발전소 전력선 복구 위한 국지적 휴전 합의: 우크라이나와 러시아는 러시아가 자포리자 원자력 발전소(ZNPP)를 러시아 전력망으로 이전하려는 준비를 하는 가운데, 자포리자 원자력 발전소로 향하는 마지막 전력선을 복구하기 위해 서부 자포리자 지역에서 국지적인 휴전에 합의했습니다.
  • 러시아군 전진: 러시아군은 벨리키이 부를루크, 쿠피얀스크, 포크롭스크, 벨리코미하일리우카 인근, 그리고 동부 자포리자 지역에서 진격을 시도했습니다.

관련 최신 자료 및 링크:

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[원문]

The Kremlin reiterated its commitment to Russia’s war demands that amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation in response to US President Donald Trump’s October 17 proposal for peace in Ukraine.

October 18, 2025

Information Cutoff: 6:30 pm ET

Olivia Gibson, Justin Young, Jessica Sobieski, Grace Mappes, and Kateryna Stepanenko

TOPLINES

The Kremlin reiterated its commitment to Russia’s war demands that amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation in response to US President Donald Trump’s October 17 proposal for peace in Ukraine. Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev responded on October 18 on his English and Russian language social media accounts to Trump’s October 17 call for both Russia and Ukraine to each “claim victory” in Ukraine. Medvedev claimed that this call is not applicable to Russia and that Russia needs a victory “with the conditions everyone knows.” Medvedev is likely referring to the Kremlin’s consistent pre-war demands to install a pro-Russian puppet government in Ukraine, Ukrainian neutrality and NATO abandoning its open-door policy, and limiting the size of Ukraine’s military as such that Ukraine could not defend itself against future Russian aggression.

Ukraine’s October 2025 strikes against an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea, appear to have significantly degraded the terminal, and it is unclear when or if Russia will be able to repair it. Planet satellite imagery captured on October 17 and published on October 18 shows significant damage to multiple fuel tanks at the Feodosia oil terminal following Ukrainian strikes against the terminal on October 6, 7, and 13. Ukraine-based open source intelligence (OSINT) organization Frontelligence Insight assessed that the October 2025 Ukrainian strikes destroyed or severely damaged at least 11 main oil storage tanks and at least six smaller day or additive tanks. Frontelligence Insight assessed that 19 total main tanks and six smaller day or additive tanks at the Feodosia oil terminal are damaged as of October 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on October 15 that the Ukrainian strikes damaged at least 16 oil tanks. Frontelligence Insight noted that Russia will likely struggle to repair the Feodosia oil terminal and that Ukraine could strike any repaired facilities. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) investigative journalist Mark Krutov published Planet satellite imagery from 2022 and October 2024 showing the damage that Ukrainian strikes have inflicted on oil infrastructure in occupied Feodosia since 2022, suggesting that Russia has not yet repaired facilities damaged in prior Ukrainian strikes. Ukrainian strikes on oil infrastructure in occupied Feodosia diminish the terminal’s capacity to supply the Russian military with fuel and lubricant. Ukraine’s sustained strike campaign on Russian oil refineries is imposing worsening gasoline shortages on occupied Crimea.

Russian state media reported that the majority of Russian drivers expect further increases in gasoline prices as Ukraine continues its long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure. Russian state business outlet Gazeta dot ru reported on October 18 that a poll from online finance platform WEBBANKIR found that 74 percent of Russian drivers have “noticed” gasoline price increases since August 2025 and that 90 percent expect further increases. The poll found that 56 percent of Russian drivers consider the price increases significant, and that 18.9 percent have encountered empty gas stations. The poll found that roughly 40 percent of Russian drivers have changed their driving habits due to the price increases, and that 38 percent have begun buying cheaper fuel. Gazeta dot ru noted that gasoline prices have risen 10 percent since January 2025 — the sharpest increase in 15 years. Russian Union of Auto Services Head Yuriy Valko claimed on October 16 that Russian gas stations are increasingly selling low-quality gasoline, and Chinese automaker Geely Motors blamed a series of recent vehicle breakdowns on the usage of Russian gasoline, which Geely Motors claimed has more byproducts than the gasoline its engines are designed to use. ISW continues to assess that Ukraine’s strike campaign against Russian energy infrastructure is impacting Russia’s domestic gasoline market, exacerbating shortages, and causing price spikes that will likely push inflation upwards and create further macroeconomic instability in Russia. It is noteworthy that Russian state media is openly admitting that gasoline shortages are impacting the majority of drivers, as it suggests that the shortages are becoming increasingly acute.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • The Kremlin reiterated its commitment to Russia’s war demands that amount to Ukraine’s full capitulation in response to US President Donald Trump’s October 17 proposal for peace in Ukraine.

  • Ukraine’s October 2025 strikes against an oil terminal in occupied Feodosia, Crimea appear to have significantly degraded the terminal, and it is unclear when or if Russia will be able to repair it.

  • Russian state media reported that the majority of Russian drivers expect further increases in gasoline prices as Ukraine continues its long-range strike campaign against Russian fuel infrastructure.

  • Ukraine and Russia agreed to a localized ceasefire in western Zaporizhia Oblast to repair the remaining power line to the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) amid Russian preparations to transfer the ZNPP to the Russian power grid.

  • Russian forces advanced near Velykyi Burluk, Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and Velykomykhailivka and in eastern Zaporizhia Oblast.

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