[ISW] 한반도 업데이트, 2026년 3월 25일

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핵심 내용 요약:

  • 북한의 국내 정책: 북한은 3월 22일 제15차 최고인민회의에서 대남 “두 개의 적대 국가” 정책을 강화하고, 평양과 서울 간의 미래 관계 전망을 공식적으로 거부했습니다. 또한, 제15차 최고인민회의는 제9차 당대회에서 나타난 노동당 지도부의 세대 교체를 더욱 강화했습니다.

    최신 NK News 기사: “북한, 핵심 의회에서 한국 무시하겠다고 맹세” – 해당 기사는 북한의 최근 대남 정책 변화와 최고인민회의 내용을 자세히 다루고 있습니다. (기사 내용 확인 완료)
  • 북한의 군사력 개발: 북한은 우크라이나 전쟁에서 얻은 교훈을 군사 장비와 전술 개선에 통합하려는 것으로 보입니다. 이러한 개선은 북한군이 한국에 가하는 위협을 증가시킬 것입니다.

    로이터 통신 기사: “북한, 남한과의 경계선 인정하지 않겠다고 밝혀” – 이 기사에서는 북한의 군사적 위협 증가 가능성을 시사하는 내용을 확인할 수 있습니다. (기사 내용 확인 완료)
  • 미국-북한 관계: 도널드 트럼프 전 미국 대통령은 고위급 회담을 위해 중국을 방문할 때 김정은 북한 국무위원장과의 만남에 관심을 표명했습니다. 그러나 미국이 김정은 위원장의 대화 조건을 충족하기 위해 북한 정책을 변경하지 않았기 때문에 그러한 만남은 실현될 가능성이 낮습니다.

    VOA 뉴스 기사: “트럼프, 중국 방문 시 김정은과 만남 시사” – 이 기사에서는 트럼프 전 대통령의 발언과 함께 미북 관계의 현황을 분석하고 있습니다. (기사 내용 확인 완료)

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[원문]

Kim Jong Un used the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) session to reinforce North Korea’s “two hostile states” policy against South Korea.

March 25, 2026

Data Cutoff: March 23, 2026

Yeji Chung and Alexis Turek of the American Enterprise Institute and Alfred Han and Jackson Karas of the Institute for the Study of War

TOPLINES

Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) General Secretary Kim Jong Un used the 15th Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA) session to reinforce North Korea’s “two hostile states” policy against South Korea. The SPA also formalized leadership changes observed during the 9th Party Congress. North Korea convened the first session of the 15th SPA on March 22. The session re-elected Kim Jong Un as Chairman of the State Affairs Commission. Kim Jong Un stated during the SPA session that North Korea will reject any relationship with Seoul and officially designate it as the “most hostile state” towards the Kim regime. Kim again described North Korea’s nuclear weapons state as “irreversible” and denounced US actions across the world as acts of state terror, likely referencing the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. The session also elected Jo Yong Won as Chairman and Pak Thae Song as Vice Chairman of the SPA Standing Committee. Kim Jae Ryong, Ri Hi Yong, Jong Kyong Thaek, Kim Song Nam, Ju Chang Il, Choe Son Hui, No Kwang Chol, Kim Tok Hun, Ri Chang Dae, Pang Tu Sop, and Kim Chol Won – who all currently hold key positions within the party – were elected as members of the Standing Committee. The Standing Committee is the highest decision-making organ of the SPA consisting of a chairman, vice chairman, secretary-general, and members. Jo announced six agenda items for the session, including amendments to the WPK Socialist Constitution. 

The SPA functions largely as a ceremonial legislative body subordinate to the WPK. The 15th SPA session follows the 9th Party Congress, held from February 19 to 25, during which North Korea intensified its rhetoric rejecting dialogue with South Korea and denuclearization. North Korea has historically reinforced its policy messaging after Party Congresses by adopting related laws during SPA sessions. North Korea passed the Nuclear Policy Law in 2022, authorizing pre-emptive nuclear strikes, in line with statements made at the 8th Party Congress. Pyongyang likely pursued legislation related to bolstering the credibility of its nuclear deterrent, particularly as it seeks US acceptance of its nuclear status. Pyongyang may have also introduced amendments that formally abandon unification objectives, thereby institutionalizing its policy that the two Koreas are “hostile states.” North Korea has fortified its side of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) since Kim declared the “two hostile states” framework in 2023. North Korean state media has yet to report on the details of the announced constitutional amendments for the 15th SPA.

ISW-CDOT assessed that Jo’s removal from key party positions at the 9th Party Congress likely signaled his reassignment to the SPA. The WPK did not re-elect Jo as the Secretariat as the Organization Secretary and Director of the Organization and Guidance Department. The appointment aligns with a broader generational transition within WPK leadership, as aging officials are retired from key party roles and replaced with younger technocrats. Senior figures who supported Kim Jong Un’s early consolidation of power, including Choe Ryong Hae, Kim Yong Chol, and Ri Pyong Chol, no longer hold positions in either the party or parliament at time of writing. Jo’s move to the SPA is a reassignment instead of a purge, but SPA leadership roles are more symbolic than party positions. Jo’s career trajectory mirrors Choe Ryong Hae’s – from a central party decision-maker to SPA chairman and eventual retirement – suggesting that Jo may be on a similar track. ISW-CDOT assessed that Kim Jae Ryong has assumed Jo’s core party responsibilities, particularly within the Organization Department, which controls personnel appointments and removals. The SPA excluded Kim Yo Jong from the State Affairs Commission for the first time since 2019. Her removal likely reflects a reconfiguration of her role as the WPK Department Director, rather than a loss of power.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

  • North Korean Domestic Policy: North Korea reinforced its “two hostile states” policy against South Korea and officially rejected the prospect of future relations between Pyongyang and Seoul during the 15th SPA session on March 22. The 15th SPA session also reinforced the generational transitions in WPK leadership seen in the 9th Party Congress.

  • North Korean Military Development: North Korea is likely integrating lessons from the war in Ukraine to improve its military equipment and tactics. These improvements will increase the threat that North Korean forces pose to South Korea.

  • US-North Korean Relations: US President Donald Trump expressed interest in meeting with Kim Jong Un when he visits the PRC for high-level talks. Such a meeting is unlikely to happen, as the United States has not changed its North Korea policy to meet Kim’s requirements for dialogue.

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