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The Kremlin continues to face harsher backlash from Russia’s domestic populace about its intensified censorship efforts in recent weeks than Moscow likely expected or was prepared for. Polling from the Kremlin-linked Public Opinion Forum (FOM) from March 27 to 29 found that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trust rating fell by five percentage points from 76 percent to 71 percent since March 22 – the highest decrease since 2019. Weekly FOM polling shows Putin’s trust rating consistently falling since February 8, 2026, just before the Kremlin significantly throttled Telegram on February 9 and 10. Russian opposition source Vazhnye Istorii noted on April 3 that several pro-Kremlin Russian propagandists and pro-war milbloggers are increasingly expressing frustration with Kremlin efforts to block Telegram, including by complaining that the Kremlin is wasting money on the censorship efforts despite rising prices and is leaving Russian forces without battlefield communication systems. Russian officials have struggled to manage backlash from the Russian information space over intensified censorship efforts, especially from the ultranationalist milblogger community. Russian officials have made contradictory statements concerning the Kremlin’s policy toward Telegram in recent weeks, suggesting that the Kremlin lacked a cohesive management strategy regarding the implementation of censorship measures and indicating that Russian officials are facing backlash potentially far greater than they originally estimated.
Ukrainian forces continued their mid-range strike campaign against military assets in Russia and occupied Ukraine on April 3 to 4. Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) Commander Major Robert “Magyar” Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck two Russian Shahed drone preparation points and hubs at the Khalino Air Base near Kursk City (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) and in Navlya, Bryansk Oblast (roughly 70 kilometers from the frontline) on April 4. Brovdi reported that Ukrainian forces struck multiple targets in occupied Luhansk Oblast, including deployment points of elements of the Russian 3rd Combined Arms Army (CAA, formerly 2nd Luhansk People’s Republic Army Corps [LNR AC], Southern Military District [SMD]) near Shulhynka (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline) and Bilovodsk (roughly 120 kilometers from the frontline); command posts and troop concentrations near Shulhynka and Bilovodsk; a ZU-23-2 towed anti-aircraft gun near occupied Lozivskyi (roughly 75 kilometers from the frontline); and a fuel tanker near Novosimeikine (roughly 135 kilometers from the frontline). Geolocated footage published on April 4 confirms strikes near Shchotove, Lozivskyi, and Novosimeikine. Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) reported on April 4 that Ukrainian drones struck the Alchevsk Metallurgical Plant in occupied Alchevsk, Luhansk Oblast (roughly 65 kilometers from the frontline) for the second time in a month, forcing the plant to halt operations. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces struck Russian railway trains carrying fuel near Shchotove (roughly 100 kilometers from the frontline) and Stanytsya Luhanska (roughly 110 kilometers from the frontline) in occupied Luhansk Oblast on April 3 and overnight on April 3 to 4.
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