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The PRC attempted to provide limited material support to Iran amid its conflict with the United States. PRC support may help Iran reconstitute its missile program and may have improved its ability to target US assets in the Middle East. The Telegraph reported on April 3 that five shipments of sodium perchlorate, a precursor material for solid missile propellant, arrived in Iran from the PRC. The PRC previously supported Iran’s missile program by providing it sodium perchlorate following the Twelve-Day War in June 2025. ABC Australia on April 5, cited an unnamed US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) official as saying that Iran used satellite imagery from PRC company MizarVision to target US military assets in the Middle East. MizarVision has published satellite imagery with artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted tagging showing the precise locations of military equipment in US Middle East military bases since US military buildup in the region began in February. The PRC government has a minority stake in MizarVision, and the PRC may have enabled MizarVision to publish its imagery for free for several weeks. Iran does not maintain its own satellite constellation and may have leveraged open-source data to improve the accuracy of its missile and drone strikes.
ISW-CDOT has assessed that the PRC has refrained from significantly supporting Iran during its conflict with the United States to prevent jeopardizing PRC relations with Gulf States and avoid US retaliation. The PRC may be attempting to support Iran using means below the threshold that would trigger US retaliation, however. Sodium perchlorate shipments could allow Iran to partially reconstitute its missile program. These efforts indicate the PRC remains invested in the outcome of the conflict between Iran and the United States and in maintaining the stability of the Iranian regime, despite framing itself as a neutral mediator.
Taiwanese opposition Kuomintang (KMT) Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun met with CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on April 10 during her six-day visit to the PRC. Cheng and Xi repeated typical rhetoric about adhering to the 1992 Consensus and opposing “Taiwan independence” as the foundation of peaceful cross-strait relations. Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) Song Tao stated on March 30 that Xi officially invited Cheng to lead a KMT delegation to Jiangsu, Shanghai, and Beijing from April 7 to 12 in response to Cheng’s expressed desire to visit the PRC. Cheng is the first sitting KMT Chairperson to visit the PRC since then-KMT Chairman Eric Chu in 2015. Cheng has continually expressed her desire to speak with CCP leadership since becoming KMT Chairwoman in November 2025, emphasizing the importance of countering the “provocative” behavior of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te. Cheng “gladly accepted” Xi’s invitation and stated that she hopes she can be a “bridge for peace” between Taiwan and the PRC. The PRC cut off communications with Taiwan following the May 2016 election of former DPP President Tsai Ing-wen. Former and current KMT politicians have facilitated dialogue with the PRC in the years since, allowing the party to present itself as the facilitator of cross-strait exchanges. Cheng and portions of the KMT may be attempting to leverage this meeting and the KMT’s ability to engage with the PRC to place the party in a favorable position prior to the 2026 local elections.
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